DÆDALUS

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY—FREEDOMS AND RESTRAINTS

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

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Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

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Preface to the Issue "American Foreign Policy—Freedoms and Restraints"

How FREE is the United States to conceive and execute a foreign policy significantly different from the one which it presently pursues? To ask this question is not so much to express disapproval of the present policy as to inquire into the complex circumstances which produce and explain it. The Editors of *Dædalus,* in commissioning articles for the present issue, started with the assumption that an understanding of the restraints which operate on the United States in the area of foreign policy would contribute significantly to a description of the sort of innovation that is both conceivable and desirable. Too often, critics of American foreign policy, abashed by the rigidities which they discover, argue as if all that is lacking in government is will, imagination, and daring. This issue of *Dædalus* will certainly help to show the inadequacy of so simple a view of the matter. If, however, it does only this it will have failed in its larger purpose, which is to suggest ways in which the United States may profitably move. The intent is not to offer a program of specific action, suited to the requirements of this year. Rather, it is to help in that process of continuous reflection about foreign policy which is one of the most certain bases of our national security.

The articles, by their very diversity, suggest something of the complexity of the subject which they treat. Ernest May, in exploring two recent major American foreign policy decisions, shows how much these derived from certain deep-seated axiomatic beliefs and how little they reflected a precise weighing of the profit and loss likely to result. Stanley Hoffmann's analysis of "restraints and choices in American foreign policy" may seem to place undue emphasis on the former, but this is only to place in a proper perspective the possibilities that are in fact open. Roger Smith is concerned with the same theme; his essay reflects a wide experience of American gov-

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ernment. Raymond Aron, in replying to the question, "How does American diplomacy look to a European observer who is well disposed to the United States," goes far beyond his terms of reference to suggest what Europeans of various intellectual and political persuasions think about American policy and why they believe as they do. It is to be assumed that these opinions are not peculiar to Europe, and that in one form or other they would be encountered in other parts of the world. An issue on American foreign policy which neglected to treat defense would be sadly deficient. Bernard Brodie writes about why the idea of "total war," while repugnant to most Americans, cannot simply be dismissed from consideration or discussion. His article has relevance to matters beyond those which he treats. Lincoln Bloomfield writes about the United States and the United Nations, explaining why we have no choice but to use the arena which we did so much to create. Peter Paul Stender describes the Soviet Union in a way that will surprise many who are impressed by the extent of Soviet military power and who rarely gaze as intently at the society which is responsible for these achievements. If Mr. Stender's analysis is correct, the problem for American foreign policy is in no way diminished, but it is different from the one we generally discuss. Herbert Feis reflects on how American-Chinese relations have come to their present pass and what actions are now possible. The gravity of this problem is perhaps as great as any other, and the modesty of Mr. Feis's recommendations may only express the complexity of the situation. Certain of the difficulties confronting the United States in its relations with Latin America are discussed by John N. Plank in his article, "The Alliance for Progress."

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S. R. G.

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ERNEST R. MAY

The Nature of Foreign Policy
The Calculated versus the Axiomatic

DURING THE FIRST year of the Truman administration, the State Department compiled a one-hundred-page "policy book." Concerned lest military commanders in occupied areas make political blunders, the armed forces had requested a reference work in which generals and admirals could look up their country's policies under headings like "Great Britain," "China," and "former colonial areas." Kept up to date for about a year, the book was then abandoned; copies of it went into storage files. The reason was simply that it served no purpose. Officers dealing with day-to-day crises learned that they could no more look up the answers to political questions than they could look up in a manual the answers to battlefield problems. The history of the policy book illustrates one of the difficulties before anyone who writes of foreign policy—the fact that there is a good deal of uncertainty about what policy is and what it can do.

In the 1930's Charles G. Fenwick, an eminent specialist in international law, defined a foreign policy as "the more or less consistent attitude adopted by the nation in its relations with other nations in matters outside the scope of customary law or specific treaty agreement." More recently, ex-State Department policy-planner Charles Burton Marshall summarized American foreign policies as "the courses of action undertaken by the authority of the United States in pursuit of national objectives beyond the span of jurisdiction of the United States." Neither definition, however, seems quite satisfying. Common phrases spring to mind. "Foreign-aid policy," for example—is that an "attitude . . . outside the scope of customary law or specific treaty agreement"? "Asian policy"—is that shorthand for a course or courses of action?

Good recent textbooks in international relations, such as Hans J.

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Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* and A. F. K. Organski's *World Politics*, shy away from the word "policy." Although President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles used it unsparingly, President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk do not. They are careful, precise men. As someone once said of Cromwell, if you cut their words they bleed. They speak of aims, objectives, interests, positions, judgments, decisions, but seldom of policies.

The reason is not that "policy" is an empty word but that, like other useful nouns, such as freedom and comedy, it has been pasted on too many different products. In common speech one hears of policies of coexistence, deterrence, and the like, and of policies toward some event that has just occurred. Yet it takes only a moment's thought to see that some of these phrases use the term "policy" wrongly.

Coexistence, for instance, would seem to be less a policy than a possible national goal—an alternative to surrender, conquest, or suicide. It might, of course, be said that a government had a policy of pretending to want coexistence while really waiting for change to make possible the attainment of other goals. Indeed, this must surely be the case with the Soviet government. Otherwise, Chairman Khrushchev would not be able to describe peaceful coexistence as "the central feature of Soviet foreign policy" and then go on to declare, as he did at the Twenty-second Party Congress,

> Comrades, events have shown that the foreign policy of our Party . . . is correct. We have achieved major victories by pursuing that policy. . . . There is now a prospect for achieving peaceful coexistence for the entire period in which the social and political problems now dividing the world will have to be solved. The indications are that it may actually be feasible to banish world war from the life of society even before the complete triumph of socialism on earth.

In any literal sense, however, there would not seem to be such a thing as a policy of coexistence, but only policies aimed at achieving coexistence.

Similarly, in such phrases as "policy toward the erection of the wall in Berlin" and "policy toward the Albanian-Soviet rift," what is meant is not really "policy toward" but "reaction to" or, more precisely, "choice among alternative reactions to." This being the case, one is tempted to borrow military terminology and suggest that soldiers' distinctions between objectives, strategy, and tactics apply, with policy being the equivalent of strategy.

Obviously, these distinctions do help. As the example of coexist-

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ence indicates, some things are labeled policies that would better be called objectives. In such cases as the wall in Berlin or the Albanian-Soviet split, policy-makers do face situations like those of a battlefield commander finding a position under attack or discovering a weak spot in an enemy line; they have to make quick judgments about resources available for meeting a threat or exploiting an advantage and about rewards and risks entailed in alternative courses of action. There must be some difference, however, between such specific decisions and policies, for the latter must apply to more than one situation and run over some period of time. Thus what the military distinctions help to do is to sort out what policy is not.

It does not follow that they help to distinguish what policy is. Strategy, the apparent equivalent, is geared to military objectives, and military objectives differ significantly from political objectives. Only those that might be classified short-range or intermediate are comparable. Definable in terms of geographical areas to be held or taken or enemy forces to be defeated or destroyed, ultimate military objectives are always specific and attainable. Ultimate political objectives, on the other hand, are indefinite aspirations, unlikely ever to be finally fulfilled.

Secretary Rusk has said repeatedly that the principal aims of the United States are summed up in the preamble to the United Nations charter as "conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained" and "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." To speak of strategy in connection with such goals abuses the term. Indeed, even to speak of it in connection with short-term goals is risky. As General Marshall used to warn, if political problems are dealt with in military terms, they are likely to become military problems.

Still another reason for not treating policy and strategy as synonyms is suggested by something else Secretary Rusk has said. "Every time we make a move in one direction, or on one problem," he remarked, "we send a tingle of influence through every other relationship that we have all over the world." Unlike military decisions, political decisions cannot be divided into those that affect small units and those that affect large areas. Nor can they be distinguished, as strategic and tactical decisions can be, in terms of the level of command at which they are made. The word "strategy" comes from the Greek *strategos* or supreme commander. Yet in the political realm all decisions are made at the top—by the President.

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Policy and strategy thus do not make a perfect equation. The military distinctions are useful in suggesting that a line may be drawn between policy and tactics. A particular decision, even though made by the President, is clearly not the same as a policy. On the other hand, there is some relationship between decision-making and policy-making. What is it?

In approaching this question, it is worthwhile to look first at one example and consider it in some detail—the well-documented case of President Truman's decision to intervene in Korea. As we learned after General MacArthur was dismissed, the question of America's responsibility for South Korea had been under discussion for some time. Everyone in the administration had long before become convinced that Communist governments on the Soviet model would not cooperate in achieving the ends envisaged in the United Nations charter; everyone assumed the threat of Communist expansion to be worldwide; everyone believed that there were some lines around the globe at which the United States would have to check this expansion, even at the price of committing American troops and threatening war. One line had been drawn impromptu in the case of Berlin. Another had been described with more calculation by the North Atlantic Treaty. Still another was urgently needed in the Far East. In the winter of 1949-1950, the question of where this latter line should run preoccupied the State Department, the Pentagon, and the White House.

By the end of 1949 reports from the field had yielded a rough consensus on facts and probabilities. The French seemed likely to hold Indochina unless the people of the colony turned against them altogether. Taiwan, to which Chiang and his government were fleeing, seemed almost certain to go the way of mainland China. While its people were not primarily Chinese and though they had been under Japanese rule from 1895 till the end of World War II, it appeared most unlikely that the disorganized and discredited Nationalists would be able to establish themselves before Communist sampan fleets crossed the narrow strait and made the island part of their new Peoples' Republic. The testimony at the MacArthur hearings was to show that no presumed expert doubted this forecast.

Recognizing that the result would be not only Communist control over some 6,000,000 more people but also the stationing of potentially hostile forces on the sea and air routes from Japan to the Philippines, all officials in the State Department realized that the

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fall of Taiwan would be, to say the least, a misfortune. They judged, however, that its loss could be prevented only by the outright use of American force, and the armed services said flatly that the requisite troops, ships, and aircraft simply did not exist. What strength the United States had was already committed to the defense of the Atlantic area.

The chiefs of staff did suggest that over and above the $325,000,000 in economic aid that Congress had voted Nationalist China, some funds or supplies might be given to assist Chiang's military build-up on Taiwan. State Department officers viewed this proposal, however, in light of the fact that much of the $325,000,000 remained unspent, that previous monies had not been expended wisely, and that some dollar aid appeared merely to be fattening private bank accounts of Nationalist leaders preparing for comfortable exile. If the Nationalists were sure to lose, they pointed out, a half measure such as added military assistance would only increase the damage to American prestige. The Secretary of State so advised the President, and the President vetoed the recommendation of the chiefs of staff.

More consideration was given to Taiwan than to Korea, partly because Taiwan seemed at the time the more probable target for the next Communist thrust and partly, too, because Korea had been the subject of so much discussion in the past. The postwar occupation of the southern part of that country had become an increasing burden, for demobilization had so reduced the armed forces that, as Marshall testified, there was for a time a serious question as to whether the army could even defend Alaska. When the Greek crisis, the Berlin blockade, and other events of 1947 and 1948 made it seem imperative that United States forces be concentrated in Europe, the chiefs of staff virtually demanded that the Korean occupation be terminated.

After much deliberation within the Department of State, means were devised to satisfy this demand. The Secretary of State brought before the United Nations organization a resolution calling for the withdrawal of both Soviet and American troops and the holding of United Nations supervised elections throughout the peninsula. The Russians agreed to pull out but opposed the calling of elections. The resolution nevertheless passed, and a United Nations commission arranged with American help for a free election in the area south of the 38th parallel. Held in May 1948, this election yielded a decisive victory for the party headed by the veteran Korean na-

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tionalist, Dr. Syngman Rhee. He formed a government, and the United States promptly recognized it and arranged for the staged withdrawal of all its occupation force. The 50,000 American soldiers in Korea were thus freed for service elsewhere.

Although they had considered it necessary to meet the wishes of the chiefs of staff, officials in the State Department were apprehensive about the results of the steps that had been taken. Their chief fear was that Rhee might launch an attack against North Korea. A headstrong, willful autocrat, the Korean President hated Communists with passion and spoke freely of reuniting his country by force. Given an opportunity, he might act, even at the risk of drawing the Russians and Chinese into a war.

To prevent Rhee's acting rashly, State Department officials took great pains in arranging the termination of the occupation. A Military Advisory Group of five hundred men was left behind to help organize a defensive force and make sure that it was defensive, not offensive, in purpose. Light weapons were turned over to the South Korean government, but tanks, bombers, and bombardment vessels were withheld. Congress was asked to vote a large sum for economic aid and a relatively small amount for military aid. The Secretary of State and the American ambassador in Seoul then took every opportunity to warn Rhee implicitly that he could not count on United States support if he took aggressive action against North Korea.

A second fear in Washington was that the South Korean regime would collapse. The Communist-held north, while containing only a third of the peninsula's population, possessed most of its industrial plant and 80 percent of its electric-power capacity. The southern half could not even sustain itself without American aid. There was therefore a great potential appeal in the northern regime's propaganda for unification under Communism. There was also abundant evidence of active opposition to Rhee in South Korea, and, partly because Rhee insisted on persecuting his opponents and calling them all Reds, much of it took the form of revolutionary conspiracies. There seemed a real possibility that Rhee's power would one day melt away, as Chiang's had in China.

The sums earmarked for economic aid were intended to help South Korea survive, and the American ambassador in Seoul had a large voice in determining how they were to be spent. Nevertheless, spokesmen for the American government from time to time took the additional precaution of upbraiding the Rhee regime in public, as if to say that the United States would not be at fault if it fell. In

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April 1950, for example, Secretary Acheson informed the press that inflation in South Korea had reached critical proportions and that Rhee's threat to postpone new elections might jeopardize the young nation's survival.

A third possible fear—that North Korea would attack South Korea—caused the American government less concern, at least until intelligence reports in the spring of 1950 brought word of a heavy military build-up in the north. Perhaps the American officials concerned discounted this danger because they had evidence that Russia retained a controlling influence in North Korea. Since Tsarist Russia had aspired to control Korea and Stalin's wartime aim in the Far East had been the restoration of the positions that Tsardom had lost, it stood to reason that the Soviet government would not willingly surrender Korea to China. On the other hand, the Russians seemed unlikely to expand their Korean holding lest by doing so they affront the Chinese, who also had a claim to and a longstanding interest in Korea. China rather than Russia appeared the dynamic force in the Far East, and Russia's control of North Korea could be viewed as reassuring rather than the reverse.

The actual debate within the American government may not have involved such reasoning. What was said about Indochina and Taiwan as well as Korea undoubtedly touched many more points and followed more complex chains of argument. The reconstructions given here are largely hypothetical and may be quite wrong. Whatever the case, however, a number of specific judgments had been made, and from them a policy gradually emerged.

Each separate judgment might be called a policy; but it would seem better to term them tactical decisions, for each concerned a set of unique circumstances, existing in the one case in Indochina, in the other in Taiwan, and in the third in Korea. Just as a distinction may be made in warfare between tactics and strategy, so a similar distinction may be made in politics. On the one hand, there is the choice between the alternative courses of action that are open in a particular place at a particular time. On the other, there is the broad formulation that fixes priorities and provides standards by which the appropriate choices among alternatives may be made. In this sense, there was no policy until agreement was reached on certain general formulae—formulae which Secretary Acheson announced to the public in a speech of January 1950 before the National Press Club.

In this speech, the Secretary began by outlining the assumption

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on which the policy was based—that the people of Asia aspired to rid themselves of foreign domination and to end their misery and poverty—and the chief goal of the United States in Asia, which was to see these desires fulfilled. With this foundation he went on to state the policy—the broad rules of conduct that the United States would observe. The first, he declared, was that the American government would not interfere with self-determination and self-development in the new Asian nations. By retaining its footholds in Outer Mongolia, Manchuria, and North Korea, the U.S.S.R. would, he predicted, arouse "the righteous anger, and the wrath, and the hatred of the Chinese people." The United States would embark on no adventures that might deflect this wrath to itself. Showing such forbearance toward a nation already Communist, the United States would, of course, take the same position toward others, for, the Secretary said, the American government believed "in the dignity and right of every nation, of every people, and of every individual to develop in their own way, making their own mistakes, reaching their own triumphs but acting under their own responsibility."

The second rule was that the United States, to the extent of its capacities and theirs, would share its wealth, knowledge, and experience with newly independent nations and peoples striving for independence. This aid would not necessarily prevent their succumbing to Communist subversion and penetration. Other states might go the way of China, being absorbed into the Soviet empire and thus losing their independence and opportunity for progress. American assistance could be effective, said the Secretary, only when it served as the "missing component":

> The United States cannot furnish all [the] components. . . . It cannot furnish determination, it cannot furnish the will, and it cannot furnish the loyalty of a people to its government. But if the will and if the determination exist and if the people are behind their government, then, and not always then, is there a very good chance. In that situation, American help can be effective.

The third rule was that the United States would defend with military force the two nations for which it had special responsibility —Japan and the Philippine republic. In what was to be the best-remembered part of his speech, Secretary Acheson defined the defensive perimeter of the United States. He said:

> This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold. . . .

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defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine . Our relations, our defensive relations with the Philippines are ained in agreements between us. . . . We are in no doubt . . . that . . an attack on the Philippines could not and would not be tolerated by the United States. . . .

So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack.

This speech contained no slogans. The policy it outlined was cautious and judicious. The United States would not interfere in the internal affairs of states on the East Asian mainland, even to prevent Communist seizures of power. It would give aid there to independent states, but not in the expectation that aid alone would enable them to maintain their independence or achieve economic and social progress. In the last resort, it would fight to keep out of Communist hands the island nations east of the China Seas.

Just a little over five months after Secretary Acheson had announced this policy, news came suddenly of a North Korean attack on South Korea. President Truman, who was visiting his mother in Independence, Missouri, flew back to Washington. After late evening conferences at the Blair House with the Secretaries of State and Defense and some other advisers, he directed that ammunition and supplies be flown in from Japan to South Korea. Learning that the North Koreans were engaged in an all-out offensive and that Rhee's forces were in pell-mell retreat, he ordered the use of American air and naval forces. The Secretary of State meanwhile obtained from the United Nations Security Council a resolution condemning the North Korean aggression and calling on all United Nation members to aid South Korea. The President announced to the public that the United States would not only take this action but would also dispose naval forces to safeguard Taiwan and increase military assistance to the French in Indochina. Soon afterward he further announced that American ground forces would be sent into Korea.

In January it had been the clearly defined policy of the United States to commit its forces only in Japan and the Philippines. In June it was the nation's policy to fight for South Korea, defend Taiwan, and engage its resources in Indochina. Why?

The answer is not, I think, that American policy had changed, nor, though closer to the truth, that there were two policies which happened to collide. Rather it is that the United States had two *kinds* of policies and that in this case, as in others, a distinction has

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to be drawn between two different entities, both of which and both of which deserve to be called, policies.

The first, that of January, was a product of calculation.. of the hazards of analogy, it might even be termed a strateg advisers to the President had estimated coldly the objectives United States in the Far East, the obstacles to their attainment, the resources available for overcoming those obstacles. Weighing ends and means, they made judgments on what seemed feasible— on the line of action offering the greatest reward with the least risk. The result was a set of prudential rules, or what might be termed a *calculated policy.*

In June, when the North Koreans launched their attack, the President and his advisers did not judge the event in terms of this policy. Instead, their minds flew to an axiom—that any armed aggression anywhere constituted a threat to all nations everywhere. President Truman writes that while in the plane speeding back to Washington his mind dwelt on other occasions "when the strong had attacked the weak":

> I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war.

Testifying at the MacArthur hearings, the Secretaries of State and Defense and their aides all recalled having had much the same thoughts. When the Blair House meetings took place, there was little difference of opinion about the action to be taken. Nor was there, until much later, significant dissent in Congress or the press. It was almost universally agreed that the United States and all other nations should resist an act of armed aggression, wherever it occurred. Founded on *a posteriori* reasoning, this was an *axiomatic policy.*

When answering the charge that his Press Club speech had invited the North Korean Aggression, Secretary Acheson was quick to point out that he had not ignored the axiomatic policy when announcing the calculated one. After declaring that areas outside the

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fense perimeter could not be guaranteed against attack, he went on to say:

> Should . . . an attack occur . . . the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression.

He had laid little stress on this qualification precisely because he had taken it as axiomatic.

As for the sudden advance of the defense perimeter to include Taiwan and Indochina, this must be seen as merely the result of fresh calculations. At the time when the January policy was formulated, it had appeared that the available resources of the United States were not adequate for a military effort to prevent the loss of territory west of Japan and the Philippines. Now, however, the Congress was appropriating large sums for operations in Korea and authorizing the calling up of reserves and the recommissioning of warships and aircraft. The means part of the means-end equation changed, and the solution therefore changed. It became possible to develop a new calculated policy for the Far East.

The example of the Acheson speech and the June decisions puts the differences between the two kinds of policies into bold relief. Few other examples show them so clearly, largely because the calculated and the axiomatic are often tightly interwoven. One other case might be cited, however—that of the Suez crisis of 1956.

It is needless to do more than summarize this crisis. Up until the summer of that year, the Western powers had been promising Egypt aid in building a high dam at Aswan. For various reasons, both political and financial, the promise was withdrawn. Colonel Nasser retaliated by seizing the Suez canal, ousting the international company that ran it, and ripping up the sixty-eight-year-old treaty that had theretofore governed its operation. Britain and France, the two nations most affected, were in favor of immediate forceful action to put the company back in control. The United States urged patience on them; they consented to a delay; and a series of international conferences and United Nations meetings discussed diplomatic expedients, mostly the products of the legal ingenuity of the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.

None of these expedients worked. Meanwhile, tension in the area mounted. Fearing that Egypt would be emboldened by success and

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would launch a new crusade against them, the Israeli resorted to preventive war and marched into the Sinai peninsula. The British and French promptly announced that they would land forces at Suez. Although the American government was allied with them in Europe and had up to that time been a more or less consistent friend of Israel, it shocked all three nations by demanding that they back down and by asking that the United Nations censure their actions.

The then Prime Minister of Britain, Sir Anthony Eden, has described in his memoirs how he had been misled as to the attitude the United States would take. He had heard the American Secretary of State express agreement on the objective to be sought. Dulles had said that a way should be found "to make Nasser disgorge what he was attempting to swallow" and had argued that the British and French should go slowly in order to have the support of world opinion before they opened military operations. Eden and spokesmen for the French government repeatedly made it clear that they intended to employ force when and if Dulles's expedients failed. When they decided to act, they had, as Eden writes, "no reason . . . to suppose that the United States would oppose. . . ."

Lacking evidence comparable to that in the Korean decision, it is hard to reconstruct what happened. It seems probable, however, that the change of front in Washington resembled that which occurred in the earlier instance. Up to the actual onset of hostilities, the government followed a calculated policy. At that point, the calculated policy ran afoul of certain axiomatic policies, and the latter prevailed.

In the immediate aftermath of the seizure of the canal, Dulles had apparently sought to devise a policy that would suit contradictory objectives. He hoped, while maintaining rapport with the British and French, to avoid associating America with European colonialism or imperialism, to keep Egypt out of the Soviet orbit, and to prevent a brush-fire war that might end as a new Korean conflict or something worse. With these ends in view, he practiced deception.

While voicing sympathy with the British and French in confidential exchanges, he took pains in public declarations to dissociate himself from them—but with language so vague and clouded as not clearly to gainsay what he uttered privately. In so far as was possible in the case of such an ambiguous policy, it was summarized in a press release issued after a meeting between Eisenhower, Dulles, and Congressional leaders. This document, a fragile counterpart of Acheson's Press Club speech, described what the President and

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Secretary of State had said about a forthcoming conference among the interested nations. After declaring that the conference would seek "a peaceful and equitable solution," the press release stated:

> They made clear that the United States will attend with the purpose of contributing to such a solution with the objective of safeguarding the interests of those dependent on the Canal as well as recognizing the legitimate interests of Egypt. We are hopeful of such an outcome.
>
> They stressed, however, the continuing gravity of the situation and the difficulty in achieving a constructive solution.
>
> There was a general, vigorous discussion. All recognized the importance of dependable operation of the Canal as a major artery of world traffic.

To describe this policy as a pure product of calculation is to oversimplify. Dulles was never unaware of the axioms that would be in control if a decision had to be made. Although attempting not to give offense to the British and French, he quite clearly took the view that they were dependent on the United States for their safety and economic well-being, that they could not afford a breach, and that any friction over Suez would be temporary. On the other hand, he regarded it as mandatory that the United States appear not to support colonialism and not to condone independent military action as a means of resolving international issues.

In public declarations both before and after the Anglo-French landings, Dulles stated his position. In a press conference several weeks beforehand, he said extemporaneously:

> . . . there is in Asia and Africa the so-called problem of colonialism. Now there the United States plays a somewhat independent role. You have this very great problem of the shift from colonialism to independence which is in process and which will be going on, perhaps, for another 50 years, and there I believe the role of the United States is to try to see that that process moves forward in a constructive evolutionary way and does not either come to a halt or take a violent revolutionary turn which would be destructive of very much good. . . . I think we have a special role to play and that perhaps makes it impractical for us, as I say, in every respect to identify our policies with those of other countries.

In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly during the days of crisis, he said:

> . . . if we were to agree that the existence of injustices in the world . . . means that the principle of renunciation of force is no longer respected and that there still exists the right whenever a nation feels itself

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subject to injustice to resort to force to try to correct that injustice, then . . . we would have, I fear, torn this charter into shreds and the world would again be a world of anarchy. . . . I fear that . . . there is great danger that what is started and what has been called a police action may develop into something which is far more grave. Even if that does not happen, the apparent impotence of this organization to deal with this situation may set a precedent which will lead other nations to attempt to take into their own hands the remedying of what they believe to be their injustices. If that happens, the future is dark indeed.

These words explain the axioms on which the policies pursued by the United States in this melancholy affair were based.

There is no need to multiply examples. It should be stressed, however, that the distinction between the calculated and the axiomatic is not at all the same distinction as that drawn by George Kennan and others between the realistic on the one hand and the idealistic or legalistic-moralistic on the other. Nor is it the case that the calculated policy is a product of professional expertise while the axiomatic is the product of public opinion. On the contrary, as the two examples suggest, the tenets on which the latter rest are held at least as firmly by policy-makers as by the public.

Their sources are nearly always historical. Some have roots that go very deep. The axiom that the United States must not align itself against the newly independent nations is obviously grounded in America's own traditions and in a long-held belief that the tide of history runs with nationalism and with the raw civilizations of frontier areas. Most, however, have shallower bases. The axiomatic policy that governed the Korean decision and partly governed the Suez decision is derived from experiences of the 1930's. So is the related axiom that concessions made under pressure constitute appeasement and that appeasement does not appease but merely whets an appetite. The failure of wartime and immediate postwar agreements with the U.S.S.R. is the foundation for the axiomatic policy of avoiding understandings with that nation that depend on mutual trust. The Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia serves as the basis for a policy of opposing the inclusion of Communists in any coalition government.

Axioms drawn from such experiences are not necessarily unsound. It is arguable that a coalition would have succeeded in Czechoslovakia if it could have succeeded anywhere, and that country's history illustrates some of the problems that would plague any other such experiment—the question, for example, of who is to con-

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trol the police and what the police are to do about Communist subversive activities. And there are no data from any source to contradict the inference that Communists and non-Communists cannot coexist in a single government. (Laos, where the coalition form has been accepted as a face-saving alternative to surrender, seems unlikely to serve the purpose.)

Moreover, while historical experience is the substance of an axiom, it is not the molder. People read into history more or less what they want to read, and they exercise some discretion about the precepts they apply to particular cases. (Eden, for example, compared Nasser with Mussolini and argued the need for action at Suez on the precedents of the 1930's.) To understand the lessons that Americans draw from experience, one has to have some sense of what might be called the American conscience and the American character.

The term "foreign policy" applies, as was remarked earlier, to broad formulations fixing priorities and providing standards by which appropriate choices among alternatives may be made. These may be divided into two different compartments: (1) formulations based on means-end calculations, and (2) formulations based upon axioms derived from historical experience. Both are subject to change. Americans of today accept as lessons of history principles that would have been anathema to them in the 1930's. But calculated policies are much more volatile, altering with a shift in weight in any integer, while axiomatic policies vary only as history grows and takes new shape, as the makers of policy, including private citizens who mold public opinion, see the past in different light or with different eyes, or as the American conscience or character changes. Much more might be said about how axioms come into being and how axiom and calculation interact. But this may be enough to open inquiry.

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STANLEY HOFFMANN

Restraints and Choices in American Foreign Policy

NOT LONG AGO Henry A. Kissinger commented: "The stagnation of our policy is often ascribed to the fact that our best people are not in government service. But the more serious and pertinent question is how qualified our eminent men are for the task of policy-making in a revolutionary period." [1] Since those words were printed, a new administration has done its best to harness "our best people" to American foreign policy, and Mr. Kissinger's question is more pertinent than ever.

It would take a volume to analyze why policy-making is so frustrating a task in today's America. The purpose of this article is to discuss the most important constraints that restrict the policy-makers' liberty of action, and to see how narrow or how broad a margin remains for choice. Such an attempt is worth while from at least two viewpoints. On the one hand, recent theories of international politics seem to divide into opposite extremes. Some focus on the international system; they tend to describe it as a compelling, even tyrannical, sociological divinity. Others scrutinize national decision-making; they patiently list all the organs that take part in it and all the "inputs" that go into decisions. Theories of the former type have not yet examined carefully enough the weight with which the system presses on various kinds of states at different times; theories of the latter type tend to be casual about the environment. A study of the restraints and margins of choice may be useful to both groups of theories, and even begin to build a necessary bridge between them.

On the other hand, such a study may also be of interest to the observer, often baffled and generally critical of American foreign policy. What baffles him is the massive continuity of American policy, despite its innumerable verbal clashes, its promises of drastic reform, the temporary oscillations around the main trends, and the

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headlines announcing crises and bankruptcy. The wrapping changes: the substance remains much the same. Images multiply, but the reality they mirror is monotonous. Consequently, there is a constant clamor for change. The best way of trying to find out why there seems to be a curse of continuity, and to what extent it is legitimate to suggest alternatives, consists in analyzing the restraints that constrict American policy.

Now, various distinctions can be made. Certain restraints operate as prohibitions, others as imperatives: the study of the former tells us what cannot be done; the study of the latter tells us what has to be done. Certain restraints (prohibitions or imperatives) delimit what United States foreign-policy proposals can try to accomplish; others delineate what kinds of proposals United States policy-makers can put forward. To take the case of prohibitions, let us say that what cannot be accomplished should not be requested (except for propaganda reasons), but what cannot even be formulated should be expected even less. The most basic distinction, with which this article deals, is of a different kind. Its criterion is in the origin of the restraints. Some are provided by the international system. The system, of which the United States is but one element, rules out certain policies and dictates others, but it does not annihilate all freedom of choice. Other limits must be taken into account. They stem from the nature of the United States as a political community; either they rule out actions that the international system does not exclude, or else they push the nation into decisions that on surface may appear as shining examples of free choice but are actually, in a deeper sense, domestic compulsions. Many critics blame the nation or its leaders for what is the fault of the international system; others indict the system for evils that must be traced to the nation. The vultures that attack Prometheus may be the gods', but the ties that bind him to the rock may be his own.

The Impossible and the Necessary

Sensitive souls often object to describing international politics as a game—whether chess, poker, or the complicated play of game theory; but the metaphor has its usefulness. As Raymond Aron keeps telling us, the nations play a game in which payment is in blood, not only cash.[2] The restraints the players must observe are of two kinds. Some are inherent in the distribution of the cards among the players; others result from the rules of the game, which even those

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players who want better cards must respect. Whether he seeks a better distribution or new rules, the player must exercise self-restraint lest he lose. What those limitations are and to what extent they can be overcome depend on the concrete circumstances of the system and the player.

Let us start with the cards, that is, the basic elements of the present system as they must appear to the United States. The first element is bipolarity. America's power has not been America's choice. As long as the international order could be left in the hands of Britain and France, the United States chose isolation; but the United States emerged from World War II as the only nation that could counterbalance the might of the Soviet Union. The United States had literally no choice, unless one called abdication from politics and escape from history a genuine alternative. There is a difference between a mistake and a mirage; those who in the 1920's encouraged Americans to cultivate their model gardens may have been wrong, but those who suggest today that the United States practice "self-commitment and self-containment" before trying to deal with others live in an anachronism.[3] The old choice between isolation and involvement is dead; there remains only the purely academic choice between historical sleep and the dangerous life of a great power. The fact that the latter often seems a nightmare does not make escape into untroubled dreams the alternative.

It is significant that at the close of World War II the United States behaved as if the old choice still existed. It opted for a kind of disengagement that did not amount to isolation but behind which there was the expectation of a world without a bipolar struggle, or one in which other people's conflicts could be arbitrated by the United States. But bipolarity by definition rules out arbitration and entails conflict. On the world scene, Bertrand de Jouvenel's distinction between *dux* and *rex* is never really valid. In the nineteenth century the British *rex* had to behave as *dux* more often than theoreticians of the balance of power like to admit; in a bipolar world, there is a clash of *duces*, and no *rex*.* Consequently, when the nature of Soviet power and policy and the crumbling of British strength became obvious, the United States simply had to fill the vacuum. The freedom of choice President Truman had was strictly limited: it concerned the moment and the manner in which America's taking

* Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), *passim*.

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up the challenge would be demonstrated. Even in this respect, the margin of choice was narrowed by the development of the crisis in Greece. Thus it is true to see in the great decisions of 1947 supremely creative acts of statesmanship; but it is also true to describe America in Malraux's terms as the nation "that has won the greatest power in the world but not sought it." Rarely has freedom been more clearly the recognition of necessity, and statesmanship the imaginative exploitation of necessity. America rushed to those gates at which Soviet power was knocking. Part of the trouble, as we shall see, has been that so many unexpected challenges to America's power have appeared ever since on the Western side of the gates.

Among the various consequences of bipolarity, two deserve mention: one is the risk of general war; the other is the scramble for allies. Critics occasionally argue as if a specific wickedness of American policy-makers were responsible for the climate of tension and for "pactomania." But the dialectic of reciprocal fear, which accounts for both, appears whenever the game has only two major players. It is legitimate to ask whether each one does all he can to make the atmosphere less electric and to select only those allies worth being defended. In those respects there may indeed remain some freedom of choice, but it is a very limited freedom, both because bipolarity sets the stage for a pugnacious competition and because of other restraints to which we now turn.

A second fundamental constraint in the postwar international system is that system's ideological character. To make things worse, there are two ideological battles in progress. As is well known, the bipolar struggle is a contest for the minds of men at least as much as a fight for men, markets, resources, or space. What is at stake is how both domestic politics and the international order are to be organized. In any nonideological struggle (even if it is bipolar), pauses and compromises are much more likely, because their implications are less damaging to the players. In an ideological contest, the psychological repercussions of minor defeats, the use of temporary advantages as springboards, the symbolic nature of every test of will, and the unlimited character of the final objective (however limited the subject matter of a particular crisis) almost condemn the world political scene to being a desert without oases. Concessions do not disarm hostility, and may indeed infect the adversary with the exhilaration of success. Thus it becomes almost impossible (and not for domestic reasons alone) to recognize Red China. A small concession in Berlin may undo the whole tapestry;

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an East-German agent in an international control commission adds nothing to Soviet material power—his only value is symbolic—but this is precisely what the battle is about. In such a context, even mild conditions put by each camp to the signing of agreements with the other tend to be interpreted as death warrants. To ask that West Berlin stop being a teeming nest of subversive activities aimed at East Germany is tantamount to undermining the freedom of thought and speech that are the pride of the West. To ask that the Soviet Union stop bringing aid and comfort to Communist parties or guerrillas outside the Soviet camp is to ask the Communist bloc to give up the proselytizing that is its cement. In such a climate the traditional tricks of diplomacy (the neutralization or internationalization of certain areas, the political armistices that delineate spheres of influence) lose their justification. Domestic affairs cannot be insulated from the competition any more than specific areas can. As the old techniques become useless, new methods of intervention become unavoidable, and thus restraints and compulsions converge to decrease freedom of choice.

The other ideological contest, which opposes the anticolonial forces and their former masters, operates primarily as a restraint on the United States because of the link between the cold war and the nationalist revolution. The United States is not free to give full endorsement to this revolution, whereas the Soviet Union can do so; for, in the scramble for allies, the United States has lined up with all the colonial powers. Moreover, despite North American reluctance at considering United States-Latin American relations as in any way colonial, the danger of anticolonial nationalism reaching Latin America and hitting United States positions is not fictitious. Nor is the United States free to ignore or resist the winds of change, for nothing could be more calculated to turn them into hurricanes spreading Communism. This is particularly true in Latin America, for should the United States oppose all manifestations of nationalism aimed at American interests and influence there, the nationalists would have no place to turn to but Moscow, whereas African and Asian nationalists in revolt against Europe have a broader choice.

The two ideological conflicts have one important characteristic in common: asymmetry. One side is on the offensive, one on the defensive—and in both cases it is the West that is on the defensive. It takes only one nation to start a war; it takes only one camp to launch an ideological contest; the adversary has no choice but to

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pick up the challenge, however distasteful, unless he is resigned to defeat at the outset. The United States is an ideological contender by necessity rather than by choice: in the bipolar struggle, the United States "ideology" (to be examined later) consists of a set of views-on-things rather than of a doctrine (however vague) about the direction of history and rather than of instructions for pushing the world along its due course. In the anticolonial revolution the United States finds itself on the defensive, not because of its "public philosophy," but largely because this "philosophy," which is a set of anticolonial reflexes, is neutralized by America's alliances.

Such asymmetry immeasurably complicates America's problem of action. The United States must first try to gain some sort of initiative in the midst of a generally defensive strategy: in other words, all too often the site and the moment of the battle are selected by the other camp, and the United States' freedom of choice is more tactical than strategic. Second, whereas the side that is on the offensive can choose to provoke a limited and localized crisis, the United States cannot apply the traditional Cartesian method of subdividing the issue into its component parts so as to try to resolve them one by one; for such a method would lead to precisely the kind of piecemeal retreats that the adversary wants to impose. Third, because of the absence of a genuine national ideology, and because of the conflict between anticolonial feelings and colonial alliances, the way in which the United States can wage the battle for the minds of men remains strictly limited: characteristically, the proponents of a "forward strategy" do not do much more than ask for greater vigor in American propaganda activities—and there are other restraints that operate here.

The third basic aspect of the international system is the one most widely discussed: nuclear power. It is also one of the sharpest restraints with which great powers have ever had to cope. Does not the possession of the most formidable weapons in history increase the freedom of movement of its possessors? Reality, for better or worse, is more complicated. Such possession is a prerequisite of great power status, but today, because of nuclear weapons, the discretion of a great power is much more sharply limited than before. A great power is like Baudelaire's albatross: *Ses ailes de géant l'empêchent de voler*—because those wings are nuclear. It may be argued retrospectively that in the days of its monopoly the United States had a freedom of action that it wasted out of timidity; but in the age of nuclear stalemate and nuclear plenty,

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surely the restraints on the actual use of nuclear weapons are decisive.

What of the threat to use such weapons? If their invention has virtually abolished certain kinds of war as rational instruments of foreign policy, does not the possession of a nuclear arsenal increase the state's saber-rattling possibilities in peacetime? Here two different restraints weigh on the United States. First, the more the "balance of terror" tends toward stability, the less the threat becomes credible. Indeed, we have reached the stage when Europeans and Americans both wonder whether the threat of a United States first strike against the Soviet Union, in the case of a Soviet conventional attack in Europe and in the absence of a conventional NATO army large enough to be a deterrent force all by itself, has not ceased to be plausible. There may still be psychological advantages resulting from a militarily implausible threat, precisely because of the ideological dimension of the contest; and the Soviet Union has shown (in 1956 at the time of Suez or in 1961 for the "protection" of Cuba) that it was not ready to throw away the benefits of bluff. Here is where the second handicap appears: it applies only to the United States, because of the asymmetry I have discussed. A nation whose position in a contest is essentially defensive *can* use the *threat* of force defensively, for the protection of vital interests and stakes—indeed, it often *has* to resort to such a threat when only the prospect of having to fight a battle may still deter the enemy.[4] But a defensive power finds it much more difficult to use saber-rattling imaginatively in order to put the enemy on the defensive. Not only does the threat have little military credibility, but one way in which the defensive power in an ideological contest can try to win the minds of men is to stress the innocence of being on the defensive. The offensive power by definition uses all possible techniques in order to push ahead: ideological appeals, subversion, and also fear. The defensive power gains by appearing as the mighty champion of the frightened. To frighten back has more drawbacks than advantages.

One question may be raised—it has been raised many times. If these are the disadvantages of the defensive, is the United States not free to switch to the offensive? We must look for the last time at the way in which the cards were distributed at the end of World War II. There is no doubt that the challenge was cast by the Soviets and that Western positions have been besieged (indeed, often conquered) either by the Communists or by the nationalists in the underdeveloped countries. Nor is there any doubt that the West

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has nowhere tried to roll back the iron curtain. In order to preserve its position, the West will have to do infinitely more than sit and wait behind radar screens and barbed wire; but until and unless the world stops being bipolar and the Soviets' ideological drive loses its force, either because of domestic "thawing" or because of failure abroad, the basic conditions of the game will keep the United States in a defensive position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Other restraints and necessities result from the rules of the game. For the United States, foreign policy in a bipolar, ideological, and nuclear contest raises four types of problems. First, there are sharp limits to United States freedom of action in East-West relations, owing to two kinds of asymmetry. On the one hand, the ideological asymmetry discussed above not only narrows the range of common interests; it also makes the translation of such interests into explicit agreements very difficult. The fundamental difference between the two political regimes is the major component of ideological asymmetry, and the main reason why this translation appears so unlikely. The most obvious example is the spectacular failure of attempts to get a Soviet-American consensus against nuclear war and nuclear diffusion expressed in any treaty. Soviet disarmament proposals are tactical constructs. They give propaganda advantages to the Soviets if they are rejected, and they would benefit the Soviet Union by destroying the barrage of Western force that keeps Russia away from Western Europe, and China from Formosa and Southeast Asia, should the proposals be adopted. United States schemes for disarmament and arms control tend to keep the Western barrage intact. They inevitably raise the formidable question of inspection, and they give a kind of priority to the problem of surprise attack, which is not really the Soviet major fear, since the likelihood of a United States switch to the military offensive is small.

Another example of the limits that ideological asymmetry imposes on American foreign policy concerns negotiation tactics. It is easy for the Soviet Union to start a diplomatic campaign with thoroughly unreasonable and outrageous demands, which will be gradually toned down in such a way that the outcome will be either no agreement at all, and consequently a Soviet possibility of reopening the matter at any time, or an agreement in which the Soviets will have made some gain. It is much more difficult for the United States, given its regime and the vision of world order it tries to

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promote, to retaliate with equally extreme suggestions. The Soviets can ask Western forces to get out of West Berlin. The best the West can do in return is to ask for a plebiscite in West and East Berlin. The Soviets can insist on a *troika* in the secretariats of international organizations. The range of United States alternatives goes from a flat "no" to some compromise.

The other limit imposed on the United States in East-West relations comes from geographical differences rather than ideological asymmetry. Even if nuclear diffusion made it easier for the United States and the Soviet Union to agree on formulas of arms control and disarmament that would be politically neutral, that is, would not conceal advantages won by one side, negotiators would still have to cope with the fact that they are not dealing with abstract units but with one land mass and one sea power. Even in the nuclear age of permeable territorial states, geography retains some importance: the United States in its struggle needs a minimum of bases and supporters outside the Western hemisphere in order to deploy its strength and to deter or stop the advances of Communist nations. Even if the contest were not an ideological one that makes compromises difficult, the geopolitical conditions would make it disadvantageous for the United States to let too many zones in the world be neutralized. In a thoroughly disarmed world, such a liability would disappear; but what is in question is not the bliss in the millennium, it is how one gets there. Geography restricts the range of concessions the United States can make in arms negotiations; the combination of geographical position and ideological defensive compels the United States to defend the allies it needs to contain the Soviet bloc. Once again, freedom of action is limited to a choice of scope and means within a context of necessity.

A second set of problems arises from the nature of American alliances. *Any* alliance restrains the freedom of movement of every partner, including the senior one. Not even the Soviet Union can sacrifice the interests of East Germany without damaging its own; it was much easier for an isolated Russia in 1939 to reverse its policy than it is now for the leader of the socialist camp. Yet an alliance of *autonomous* nations, however unequal in power, introduces even more stringent constraints on the senior partner when he is locked in a bipolar and ideological struggle. The Western alliances are of course the prime example: the United States may be preponderant, but in almost no place are the local leaders simply puppets manipulated by the United States. In the Soviet camp, the

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satellites are not autonomous, but China is. The senior partner wants and needs allies; should he disagree with them because they are getting tired of the struggle, to mistreat them would push them out of his camp, unless he were willing to use force against them, as the Soviets did in Hungary. It is hard to imagine the United States compelling a reluctant ally by force, unless a case could be made to show that this ally had already become the tool of Communism. The United States could put pressure on France to consent to German rearmament, but it could not compel France to ratify the European Defense Community.[5]

Should the senior partner disagree with his ally because the latter resisted concessions the boss wanted to make to the common enemy, then the combination of a world struggle and of the "non-directive" nature of the alliance gives the weaker partner an almost unbeatable weapon. It is not only in the United Nations that the cold war reverses the traditional hierarchy between the weak and the strong. The blackmail of the weak who appeal to the spirit of the alliance has been one of the most serious restraints on United States freedom of movement; for the United States can literally do very little about it, unless the Soviets become cooperative. To coerce one ally in order to please the enemy is not the best way of keeping one's other allies. The United States cannot recognize East Germany as long as West Germany objects so strenuously that a United States dismissal of West German objections might destroy West German confidence in the alliance. It is false to say that in a bipolar struggle one's ally has "nowhere else to go." Nor can the United States compel Chiang to give up Quemoy and Matsu as long as the Chinese make it clear that they would interpret any concession as a sign of weakness and an incentive to push harder. Nor can the United States by itself even oblige Laotian right-wing forces to stop blocking the formation of a coalition government. If there is anything more startling than the failure of extremely strong United States pressures, it is the fact that what has finally coerced the Laotians is the Communist use of force. Whether it is in the United States' interest to have the *other* camp provide the means of compelling the Laotian allies of the United States is something else again. Hans Morgenthau has sharply criticized the United States' failure to impose its political will on its allies,[6] but the limits are set by the nature of the competition and of the alliance, rather than by deficiencies of will on the part of the United States. The major complaint from the United States' allies has not been the

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absence of its leadership, except in the final phase of the second Eisenhower administration.

Often, precisely because of what is at stake in the East-West contest, "it is not wise to scrap alliances which it was unwise to form," [7] or to evacuate bases that have lost their military usefulness (except if the nation on whose territory they are should ask for their removal). One is bound by one's commitments; one is committed even by one's mistakes. The United States may be free to avoid new and mistaken entanglements in the future. It is not free to tear out of its scrapbook the political misjudgments of the past. Nor is it free to avoid entanglements altogether (the mediocrity of SEATO as an instrument of foreign policy has led, not to a United States withdrawal from the defense of Southeast Asia, but to a downgrading of this particular alliance in favor of direct United States involvement). Once more, freedom of action shrinks to mitigating the bitterness of the unavoidable.

A third set of limits greatly resembles the previous ones, but the degree of inevitability strikes me as much lower. I am referring to the restraints the United Nations imposes on United States foreign policy. As in the case of American alliances, the limits result from one's entanglements. But whereas the need for alliances is questioned only by utopians, the need to let the United Nations be a major determinant of United States foreign policy is much more debatable. This is not the place to pursue the debate, but a few statements are in order. First, it is quite impossible for the United States to ignore the United Nations. In the recent contest between East and West, one that sharply curtails military conquest, the allegiance of the "third world" (so spectacularly represented in the United Nations) is an important stake. Also, the principles of the Charter reflect the vision of world order that Western nations propose to the rest of the world. In other words, the United States cannot bypass the United Nations as a forum and as an ideal; nor can the United States let the Soviet Union turn the United Nations into an instrument of Communist strategy. The United Nations cannot help being a stake.

Second, however, it is not at all clear that the United States is obliged to try to use the United Nations as an instrument of its own: for if the stake becomes a force, this force may well have a will that conflicts with United States interests or is plagued by internal dissensions and institutional weaknesses, and to ameliorate these may require of the United States more energy and more

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concessions than the benefits to be derived from such a force would justify. My point is that at various times in the past the United States has deliberately chosen to increase the role of the United Nations as a force in world affairs and that, although the United States' freedom of choice in the future persists, precedents have narrowed it, because of the same dialectic of commitment to which I have referred in the case of alliances. It may have been unwise at times to try to win friends and influence people through the one mechanism in which those friends and people are numerically in command; for in the attempt one puts a real, not just a paper, club into their hands. Having done it so often, however, to reverse the policy in the hope of regaining some of the influence one has already lost may be a sure way to undermine drastically the influence one still has.

A final set of limits appears in United States relations with other non-Communist nations in general and with the underdeveloped countries in particular. It is another consequence of ideological asymmetry, and a restraint for which it would be foolish to blame the United States. Almost by definition, the United States must deal with officialdom. Even when the United States believes that officialdom is corrupt, digs its own grave, and endangers the position of the West by throwing reformers into the arms of the Communists, it is officialdom that the United States must convince. This restraint can be traced to liberalism[8] only if one makes it clear that liberalism here means, not the Wilsonian view of world politics, but what is the essence of Western political regimes and of Western international law. It is not only the United States that has "failed" to organize abroad parties that would be instruments of Western interests. To say that the United States must deal with officialdom does not mean that the United States cannot keep in touch with opposition parties, or encourage reformers, or frown officially on gravediggers in power. Indeed, it may well be that the United States has been much too shy in all these respects. But even if the United States became a virtuoso in the difficult art of combining diplomatic correctness with subdiplomatic manipulation, there would still remain sharp limits to what a nontotalitarian power can achieve. There is more than a difference of degree between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Communist International.

Given such a limit, one should avoid two mistakes of judgment. When, behind the gates to which America rushed in 1947-1948, political developments destroyed or weakened the hold Western

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nations had kept on Asia and Africa, when change began to shake Latin America as well, Americans complained about having "lost" areas that were never theirs to lose. It would be quite as serious a mistake for them to believe that, because France or Britain has gone from many areas, United States influence will spread more easily there: for better and for worse, America's instruments of influence are limited. The limits are set by the international system; the expectations from and disappointments with American omnipotence are peculiarly American.

Blinders, Reflexes, Hedges

The prism through which every nation looks at the outside world has been shaped by its own experience. For a policy-maker, there is as much truth in T. S. Eliot's "Hell is ourselves," as in Sartre's "L'enfer, c'est les autres." The way in which the same challenge (say, decolonization) is met by France or Britain tells us much more about the domestic values and political habits of each nation than about the particular external circumstances that distinguish the French from the British problem. Any study of foreign policy that sets goals which cannot be reached as long as the nation has not changed its skin and its soul is of limited worth. As in the case of every political community, the limits set by the experience of the United States can be divided into two kinds: those that derive from the nation's political style and culture, and those that result from its system of government.

The *political style* of the United States has been subjected in recent years to so many searching investigations that one need only restate the familiar.[9] I do not suggest that the elements of this style are immutable; the way in which they have been affected by America's involvement in postwar world affairs has been shown often and well.[10] However, there always remains a lag between age-old blinders and reflexes, and new (especially external) pressures that make them obsolete. To the extent of this lag, the heritage of the past remains. Often, responses that at first might appear to be unprecedented can be shown to be nothing but the application of the old habits of thought and action to a new problem. The "axiomatic" policies analyzed by Ernest May are the instinctive reactions that express the nation's style.

There are three elements in America's experience that are rele-

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vant to its foreign policy. One is America's liberalism; the second, what one may call American conservatism; the third, America's peculiar experience in past world politics. The most familiar ingredient is the liberal tradition, well documented by Louis Hartz. It continues to operate as a filter of American attitudes in a variety of ways, which can be summed up as the "sin of transposition," the mistake of projecting into world affairs a vision of public life derived from the experience of the Liberal *Rechtsstaat.* What flows from such a vision is the expectancy of ultimate accommodation: even the "realist" school of international politics places in diplomacy and compromise a faith that, given the present international system, might be called *l'espoir des désespérés,* or the last straw of the tough-minded liberal. A liberal community is one in which rifts can be reconciled, or at least one in which the contenders entrust the procedures of government with the task of finding a formula for coexistence; diplomacy is supposed to be its international equivalent, and negotiated agreements tend to be seen in the same light as laws.

A liberal community is also one in which coercion is most thoroughly concealed behind consensus, so that the use of force is both exceptional and unquestionably aimed at asocial alignments. A liberal vision of international affairs suffers from a complete misunderstanding of the role of force in world history. It tends not only to see in the need for military strength a regrettable evil, but also to keep it in a kind of separate compartment and to assign specialists to thinking about it in aseptic isolation. Consequently, there still remains an instinctive inhibition in America's approach to the use of national force. This reticence cannot be explained only by the obvious dangers of the use of force in the nuclear age; but it does contribute toward explaining United States restraint in the years of nuclear monopoly. Incessantly, official and private United States disarmament proposals come back to the vision of a world government with a world police force.[11] And since it is clear that the days of the universal *Rechtsstaat* are not near, American thinking on arms control is essentially a compromise between a recognition of the fact that national force is here to stay until then, and the atavistic desire to avoid having to use the weapons or having to threaten with them. If one cannot yet amputate the gangrenous member, let us at least agree to hide it.

This attitude explains not only the often denounced tendency to fight a "just war" as if it were a community police action to weed

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out social pests and eliminate force from history.[12] It also explains what this writer (perhaps because of his own European background) cannot help calling a lack of maturity in judging other nations' attitudes toward force. Again, American caution in handling the Suez crisis in the summer of 1956, America's condemnation of the Anglo-French resort to force in the fall of 1956, America's rebuke to other nations' efforts to establish separate deterrents and to recover the liberty of diplomatic action that military power gave them in the past (which they may well be mistaken in believing is still possible in the present) cannot be accounted for by the special circumstances of the nuclear age alone. Such an attitude leads only too easily to a double standard: one's own possession and occasional use of force are not seen as objectionable, since one knows one's own reluctance; other nations' saber-rattling and gunboat diplomacy are seen as trigger-happy wickedness. Americans like to judge others by their actions or capabilities, but to be judged on their intentions.

The depreciation of the hidden role of force in a liberal community entails a depreciation of other, more subtle forms of coercion as well, and a tendency to underrate the element of struggle that persists in any political system. The basic tenets of liberal faith remain the gradual triumph of public opinion, the conciliating and unifying role of trade and industry, the civilizing and refining of power through law and legal institutions. All those tenets have left their mark on the American approach to foreign policy. They do not operate as absolute obstacles to a more effective approach, but as blinders that always take years and the successive shocks of unfortunate experiences to discard. The first mental reflex consists in trusting the General Assembly as the expression of world public opinion; in hoping that economic aid will produce social and political progress in stability; in believing that deep conflicts of interest can be transcended through institutional changes (multiplying Peace Observation Committees in the United Nations or consultation committees in NATO); in being convinced that a dictator such as Castro simply cannot be supported by his people and that he is merely a vermin which it is legitimate to destroy by force. Gradually, one learns; but the pattern is always the same—illusions are not so much lost as frustrated. The normal expectation is problemless peace or uninhibited war; but experience tells us that peace is full of troubles and that war must be limited if the world is to survive; to the liberal, however, experience is a bitter pill.

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Louis Hartz has shown that in America liberalism and conservatism have tended to merge. From the viewpoint of the limits of American foreign policy, however, the two elements have to be kept apart. America's liberalism is not unique: what makes its impact on United States foreign affairs far greater than, say, the impact of similar tenets on British foreign policy is a different experience in past world politics. America's conservatism has unique features, however. Elsewhere, conservatism is above all a philosophy. In the United States, it is a way of life and an approach to action, and both inhibit American foreign policy.

The way of life reflects a domestic experience that is so singular that it amounts to "a severance of communications" between the United States and the outside world.[13] The elements of this experience are well known. There is a long tradition of equality in affluence that has made class struggle *à l'européenne* unnecessary. But it has also made it difficult for Americans to understand and sympathize with such struggles, and it has reduced the possibilities of America's "people of plenty" for influencing the underprivileged. The amount of available aid is one thing; the amount of influence, quite another.

The United States has a long experience in social and political integration, which its social science reflects only too well. In many other countries there are both an evidence of ideological conflict and a discontinuity between society and the political system; integration may or may not be the goal, but it is not the norm. United States' policy-scientists and policy-makers have few answers to the problem of integrating dislocated communities, not only because of the limits on America's capacity for intervening in the domestic affairs of others, but also because of a lack of intellectual familiarity; it is difficult for Americans to understand an ideological mode of argument, unless it be the liberal one that plays conflict down, not up.

Nothing has contributed more to the "severance of communications" than the fact that is taken to be the very touchstone of conservatism almost anywhere else: the favor shown private interests, especially business interests, because their part in the making of America has on the whole been beneficial. This attitude has weighed on American foreign policy in two ways. On the one hand, it has broadened the intellectual gap discussed above, since the United States' experience has been so different from that of Europe, Latin America, or Asia, where private interests (even national ones) have

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often served only to preserve and increase the privileges of the elite. On the other hand, the expansion of United States' business interests abroad creates a unique problem. No Western government reacts with pleasure to the expropriation of Western private interests by nations that see in those firms either instruments of colonial exploitation or obstacles to domestic planning. But the link in the United States between those interests and the government is stronger than in any other country. This is so, not because of any "power elite" conspiracy on Populist or Marxist lines, but because of the material importance of those interests abroad, and as a result of the national ethos. Here again, we are faced with a limit which is flexible, as increasing official United States support for "socialistic" governments indicates. Yet, especially in its relations with Latin America, the United States reflex continues to be one of hostility to nationalizations, and however fast the Executive may learn, Congress in this respect serves as the thermos bottle of American resentment. It is too much to expect the United States to swallow its ethos and to accept expropriations gracefully, but since these are quite likely, the United States faces in this area one of its major difficulties.

It was fashionable not very long ago to ask for a renewal of the United States' national purpose. Even if America begins to "move again," it is unlikely that the gap between its domestic experience and that of the outside world will be closed. If a "new America" merely strengthens its tradition of equality in plenty, then the gap may even be widened. It is the domestic success of their way of life which makes Americans conservative amid a revolutionary world—and the goal of the new frontier is certainly not to impair this success in order to make them less so.

The other aspect of the Americans' conservatism concerns their approach to the solution of problems, including those problems of foreign policy which their way of life throws up. It may be called, in Walt W. Rostow's terms, "the operator's way," or it may be termed pragmatism; I would call it the engineering approach. For it is a peculiar kind of operation or pragmatism. It is not steeped in history or in psychology, which are sciences (or arts) of the complex and the uncertain. It too is reflected in American social science, with its passionate search for general laws, its preference for deductive models over inductive generalizations from history, its quest for mathematical formulas that tend to give a reassuring sense of certainty even when they measure the immeasurable.

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The engineering approach has three drawbacks that operate as blinders on United States policy-making. First, the drive toward certainty is often carried too far. Either it distorts the importance of those limited areas of policy in which calculable certainty appears to exist (hence the enthusiasm for strategy in a nation that is so reluctant to initiate the use of force). Or else the quest is carried into areas where there is no certainty. Even military policy is too tricky a matter to be left to IBM machines, however well-fed with variables. In a world in which irrationality exists, the search for a thoroughly rational policy is both a mistake and a delusion. As Aron has written, in the game of international politics, whose objectives are multiple and whose rules are uncertain, there may be *reasonable* policies and *unreasonable* ones, but there cannot be one *rational* conceptualization, least of all when the game itself, because of nuclear weapons, has become unreasonable.[14] Oversimplification and the overrating of purely technical but calculable elements over intangible ones are the by-products of a misplaced faith in human engineering.

A second flaw is discontinuity. The engineering approach is a piecemeal approach; one takes up the problems as they come. If game theory reflects the longing for certitude, decision-making theory expresses this other aspect of pragmatism. It strikes me even more as numbing. It concentrates thought and research on the immediate, which is not always the essential. For there is a double price one has to pay for waiting until the problems appear: first, one must repair what one has not prevented—the price of tardiness; second, there is the price of retrospective reflection—the remedies one discovers for the future are all too often patterned on the crisis that gave impetus to the search, a crisis not at all certain to be recurrent. Studies of limited war flourished after Korea. It is only now that one pays sufficient attention all of a sudden to "counter-insurgency." The tendency of United States newspapers to explore foreign countries after a crisis has exploded is characteristic. The "discovery" of Africa since 1960 (by the mass media as well as by the policy-makers) may be explained in part by the fact that the dark continent had been the preserve of our allies. The late discovery of Latin America after Castro has no similar justification.

Discontinuity also leads to the improvisation of measures, or to the accumulation of *ad hoc* researches, which so busily focus on the issue at hand that they neglect the deeper structural causes of the momentary trouble. The tendency to present foreign aid in

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terms of a shopping list of separate and limited projects obscures the fact that there are few areas of policy in which success requires more time and depends on more prerequisites which the donor cannot provide.

The third drawback of the engineering approach is the American tendency to support the status quo—not because of sympathy with it, but because it would take far more time to change it than the emergency allows the policy-maker. Franklin Roosevelt's deal with Darlan and United States policy in South Vietnam since 1954 are good examples. Foreign observers often make the mistake of reading an ideological conservatism into such behavior. All that is involved is a kind of scientific conservatism—the engineer who is asked to build a bridge does not start by questioning whether there is a need for it.

Consequently, a sharp contrast appears between the American approach to foreign policy and, say, the style of General de Gaulle. The latter sees in policy a continuous process. He has a *vision* (more or less debatable) of the distant future, of Europe's role in it, of France's rank, etc. He has what one might call middle-range *objectives,* such as the Algerian settlement, the organized political cooperation of Europe, an autonomous French military policy. The *tactics* to be adopted toward those objectives depend on the circumstances, and are sometimes quite baffling; but the objectives are relentlessly pursued. In the case of United States policy, the observer often has the feeling that there is an enormous gap between the over-all vague vision of a world consonant with United States values and interests, and the daily tactical maneuvers. From time to time, a grand announcement seems to mark a milestone: at best, it is a program, such as Lend-Lease and the Marshall Plan, which sets a definite objective and can become the object of a quasi-military campaign. At worst, it is an empty gesture—and as Hedley Bull has observed, a policy of gestures is the opposite from international politics.[15] Too often United States policy gives the impression of men who worry about what to do tomorrow, and who also know what they would like the world to be at the end of its political history. Their ideals have little operational (though high inspirational) value; their operational concepts are of excessively short-range value. To take each issue "on its merits" may not be the best way of doing it justice; "problem solving" may be the worst approach to the solution of problems, although it may be the most drastic method of discovering how intractable they are.

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The last element in the American experience is separate from United States liberalism and conservatism, although it has accentuated their impact on the American approach to foreign policy. I refer to the unique position of the United States in world affairs before World War II. The United States was not a major power in the game; but it was not a stake either. Usually it was not deeply involved; but when it wanted to act on the world stage, its geographic position and its power allowed it to respond to challenges in what Hans Morgenthau has called "unequivocal acts" depending on the United States alone.[16] Two attitudes have resulted from such a happy course. One is impatience—a lack of understanding of the virtue of time,[17] a perpetual fear of the fragility and instability of certain situations, which makes many Americans want to destroy them right away because they may be undermined in the long run (for instance, West Germany's links to the West). American liberalism and American conservatism are equally marked by such impatience, which reinforces both the liberal desire to reach the Erewhon of reconciliation as soon as possible and also the conservative tendency to plan piecemeal solutions to be enforced by brushing aside all human obstacles. The other attitude is the familiar faith in American omnipotence. When impatience and the illusion of omnipotence coincide, the result is the relentless drive to rearm Germany in 1950-1951, or the Cuban invasion in 1961.

United States liberalism hampers its foreign policy because it sees the world in colors much rosier than those the world displays. United States conservatism limits its foreign policy because it makes the world look infinitely less complex than it is. The heritage of America's sheltered past weighs on United States foreign policy because it really amounts to wishing the world away whenever its imperfections and complications become too blatant. It can be argued that the Korean War or the handling of the Congo crisis indicates how much United States policy-makers have learned. However, public opinion has shown alarming signs of impatience and of a continuing belief in omnipotence,[18] and the policy-makers are caught between what they know of the outside world and their fears of domestic reactions. For there are other handicaps still.

Thus we reach the obstacles provided by *the political system.* This is not the place to discuss to what extent any democratic system restricts the freedom of action of foreign policy-makers. (Indeed, at such a level of generality the subject is not of great in-

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terest.) But three characteristics of United States democracy curtail this freedom in important ways.

A first one has already been mentioned: the amorphous brooding omnipresence of public opinion in the democratic sky. Some very different generalizations about public opinion in democracies seem to be valid. One, it is quite malleable and responsive to strong leadership; in this respect, it is an opportunity rather than a restraint. Second, democratic leaders tend to overestimate the conservatism of public opinion and to exaggerate the gap between what they would like to do and what they believe the public will accept—be it a leap into supranationality, or a retreat from Empire, or the recognition of Red China. Third, even with strong leadership, whenever the gap between traditional expectations and present experience widens so that feelings of frustration or humiliation spring from it, public opinion tends to be not a mere wind to which leaders would be wise to bend, but a real twister. First, it destroys the leaders when they are blamed for disappointments, rarely of their own making; then it continues to inhibit the formulation of foreign policy long after the hurricane has vanished. What happened in the United States in the last years of Mr. Acheson's tenure and in the early years of Mr. Dulles' has been well documented. When such a hurricane develops, it becomes impossible for the policy-makers to pursue the objectives that ought to be pursued, and necessary to state objectives that obviously cannot be achieved.

A second characteristic is the presidential system. The fact that the Chief Executive is elected by universal suffrage and that he normally converses not with the nation's representatives but with the public which elects him is of considerable importance to the formulation and presentation of foreign policy. A parliamentary premier addresses the nation and converses with parliament. The President converses with the public and addresses Congress. The advantages are different in each case. In the former, the more or less brute reactions of public opinion are filtered through parliament; but when parliament, as under the French Fourth Republic, expresses only too articulately the divisions of the nation, foreign policy may be paralyzed. At any rate, the premium is on moderation, the stress, on continuity. The American system reinforces (and has to a large extent engendered) the flaws of the American style; here the emphasis is on the dramatic and the new. Even though opportunities for undiluted leadership are greater in a system in which the link between the Executive and the people is direct, inevitably

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much of the effort of the leader goes into the creation of an image instead of into the definition of the substance. The more intractable are the external limits imposed by the international system, the more frantic is the attempt to make shifts in tone, switches in style, and changes in personality pass for revolutions in policy. The temptation would be less irresistible if the trend of the political system did not slope in that very direction.

The habit of expecting the dramatic perpetuates not only the panting rhythm of United States policy-making but also the illusion of omnipotence, as well as national impatience; consequently, the lag between public reflexes and external realities persists. The leader's hunch that public opinion remains sluggishly far behind him, therefore, remains justified; and whenever the public realizes that the image mirrors nothing and that the new plan is a gimmick, a crisis of frustration assails foreign policy. It is a vicious circle. As such, it encourages another effect of the Presidential system: the tendency to lead, not through rational argument (too easily dismissed as an academic exercise which passes above the voters' heads), but through inspirational exhortation. Pulpitry replaces education; sermons substitute for explanations. Persuasion through ritual formulas and the invocation of national (or party) clichés is easier than persuasion through demonstration, which other systems of leadership often require. Not only does the necessary adjustment of the political culture to a revolutionary world thus get slowed down. This style of leadership also produces an insidious self-intoxication of the leaders. It is more usual in books about politics than in politics itself that the leaders are both cynical enough to make the distinction between rhetoric and conviction, and humble enough to realize that what they say is trash. Parliamentary leaders may be cynical, but they are rarely humble. Presidents are sometimes modest men, but hardly ever cynics.

The stress on image and innovation appears as a compensation, and often as a pitiful cover, for a third feature of America's political system: the dispersion of governmental power. It makes the definition of a substantive policy an ordeal that would have tried the patience of Penelope, and rapid innovation is an outcome so unlikely that it appears only in major emergencies. New teams of men come to Washington full of long repressed convictions about how to make foreign policy "right," or overflowing with ideas about how to make foreign policy sophisticated. Their emotions and their ideas soon get caught in the "thorns and branches and twigs of the gov-

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ernmental tree."[19] As a result, continuity in the substance of policies is preserved, but discontinuity in handling issues is not eliminated.

It is not in the United States that Parkinson's law was conceived; but the United States combines three forms of proliferation. There is the fragmentation of power which the separation between the Presidency and Congress entails. There is the dispersion that results from the increasing importance of the House of Representatives in the control of foreign policy. There is the mushrooming of Executive agencies, which insist on participating in the definition of foreign policy—sometimes on an equal footing with the State Department, often on behalf of particular domestic-interest groups in their constituency. If one also takes into account the proliferation of experts who work as consultants for all those institutions, and the press (which is both a sounding board for the various organs and a power of its own), one gets an awe-inspiring picture of government by interagency and interbranch compacts, government by leaks and subcontracts.

The search for a consensus is one of the more damaging by-products of such fragmentation. It involves an erosion of substance and the wearing out of initiatives, ideas, and people. It has its advantages—what one might call, with a backward glance at the Republicans who came to power after twenty years in 1952, the taming of the wild. But the disadvantages have also become apparent. It is not only innovation that is made difficult—after all, the constraints of the international system do not allow much of it; it is precisely the concern for the middle-range objectives, half-way between distant dreams and daily diligence, which gets corroded. Finally, even the margins of choice that the external system and the domestic culture still provide are interpreted restrictively. There have been recent examples of the taming of the shrewd.

Another by-product affects less directly the substance of policy, and more obviously its presentation: there is a necessity for talking different languages to the different "publics," such as the electorate, the Congress, individual foreign nations, and foreign dignitaries within the United Nations. The resulting confusion may not impair the judgment of the policy-maker, who is usually aware of which is substance and which is wrapping. Yet, by increasing at times the suspiciousness of Congress, or the reluctance of other nations to accept United States policies, such a wealth of communications may result in no communication at all; for it is likely that the various listeners will compare notes at some point. The dilemma in which

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the policy-maker finds himself is embarrassing: if he tries for a consensus among the various publics, the policy he formulates may well be so pale as to be ineffective; if he attempts to push a more daring one but cannot sell it to all under the same cover, he may find no buyers.

Both the search for consensus and the concern for presentation heighten the tendency to discuss issues, not so much intrinsically as in terms of personalities. The more fragmented the system of power, the more the political universe becomes a stock market of reputations and influence. The merits on which problems are tackled become the merits of the men engaged in policy-making, and those men represent not so much ideas as tangible bits and pieces of power.

Dilemmas and Directions

How much freedom of action United States foreign policy effectively retains cannot be determined merely by tracing the main restraints and their degree of intractability. The problem can be formulated as follows: given the limits set by the present international system and by its own nature, what is it the United States ought to try to achieve? Although it is true that no policy ought to aim at what it can obviously neither formulate nor accomplish, nevertheless, as we have seen, many of the constraints and compulsions are not totally unmovable or irresistible. Thus there is a fundamental problem of direction: what is the range within which it is legitimate to define goals and means? Before we examine the main alternatives, however, we must see why such a definition has proved so difficult, for it is obviously a task that has been going on continuously. It has been complicated not just because of the formidable series of restraints I have listed (in a way, the less freedom they leave, the easier the task should be), but because of certain new dilemmas of policy-making: what has been called the crisis of perplexity[20] is a crisis of complexity.

The problem of the choice of policy in the United States today is radically novel for two reasons. First, there is the contrast between the foreign-policy problems faced by a major power in a system such as obtained in the nineteenth century, and the foreign-policy problems of a major power today. Before 1914, the stakes of the game were limited to such issues as the conquest of a territory or the acquisition of advantages for one's traders and businessmen;

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with economic activities largely in the hands of private citizens, the dimensions of the balance of power were essentially military; so were the underpinnings of international order: law and a universal system of trade and payments followed the armies and the fleets of the big powers. Consequently, the instruments of action which these powers needed were the diplomat and the soldier. Yet, although the stakes were limited and the means well-defined, freedom of choice in the use of these means and in the pursuit of the objectives was considerable.

Today the situation is reversed. The stake is formidable. In a sense, it is no less than the possibility of continuing the game and establishing a new kind of international order, after the collapse of the old one, which was based on a colonial division of the world and on the economy of free enterprise. The dimensions of international equilibrium have multiplied. The invention of nuclear weapons so complicates the military balance that one can now distinguish a strategic one (the balance of terror, properly speaking), a tactical one (the balance of conventional forces), and what one could christen the balance of subversion: guerrilla wars, which erupt both because of political conditions in many parts of the world and because of a much lower risk of escalation. In addition, international politics has to cope with economic development, with the promotion of social and political stability (or conformity), and with propaganda and cultural activities, so rich in political fall-out. Consequently, the task of the major power obliged as in the past to placate feuding allies or to remain friendly with two reciprocal enemies has become far more demanding, for the performance of age-old functions now entails much more extended and more intense initiative. The means that major powers have to employ in order to shape the world's future go far beyond the soldier and the diplomat. The technical assistance expert, the Fulbright lecturer, the peace-corps volunteer, the labor-union organizer, or the agent of the CIA may be just as important. Yet, although the keyboard has many more notes, the tunes the performer can play are fewer, because of all the limits and compulsions I have listed.

In the second place, there are many indications of a reversal of the old relations between large and small powers. Before 1914, a small power had not only narrower interests and more limited means than had a big state, it also had on the whole much less freedom of action. The tune was played by the members of the concert, and the lesser states had to dance to it. Today, to revert to an earlier meta-

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phor, the superpower is an albatross, but the smaller nations are sea gulls. The superpower cannot abruptly switch directions without undoing the laborious work of its past, and, in the case of the United States, the complexity of the political system contributes to continuity. A smaller nation has much more freedom; especially if it is a new and underdeveloped one, it can practice the kind of blackmail of weakness which has become familiar, and it can choose between various ways of sheltering itself from the cold war, from nonalignment to taking refuge under the umbrella of one of the contenders. The very fact that its political system is often a rather rudimentary machine at the disposal of a charismatic leader facilitates reversals and fluctuations. Any revolutionary period puts the lesser units of world politics (small princes in the days of the wars of religion or the new states of today) in a position in which they enjoy far more attention and influence than their actual power would justify, precisely because military power becomes only one dimension among many.

As a result, the position of the United States is highly uncomfortable. On the one hand, both the United States and the Soviet Union find themselves engaged in a game whose results are even more uncertain than those in past international politics. Their greater military potency condemns them to military quasi-chastity. The new dimensions of international politics are the most difficult to control. The United States and the Soviet Union are like roulette players, who play for very high stakes but cannot know where the ball will stop. On the other hand, the United States is at a triple disadvantage in this enterprise: because of its traditional craving for certainty, because it has no official doctrine that assures that the uncertainties of the present must lead to a predetermined future, and because the normal tendency of statesmen who find themselves on the defensive, having to fight on a variety of fronts not of their own choosing, is to apply familiar rules of strategy that were effective in the past. If the rational is all too often the familiar, it is because the familiar seems the most rational; but the result is frustration.

The result is disappointing, first, because the old rules do not fit. One consists in dealing with the challenge of Communist power, not quite as the United States dealt with other challenges in the past (what Charles B. Marshall has called the quantitative view of power, that is, the elimination of someone's evil power by nullifying his capacity, has been made suicidal by nuclear war), but in the way that comes closest to the familiar one. As Robert W. Tucker has

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shown, the doctrine of massive retaliation was a peace-time extension of the classical United States doctrine of war. As its credibility decreases, the United States does refine and revise its approach. But its policy remains fundamentally a military one, and it can be criticized on two counts. One, it tends to treat in military terms problems that are not always military; whenever it is thus misapplied, it fails. For instance, guerrilla wars are indeed "prima facie evidence" of political and economic failure—evidence of a defeat on the non-military front.[21] Similarly, the tendency to see Communism in military terms has led the United States to insist on painfully won and relatively meaningless Pan-American resolutions condemning Communism, even though the main problem in Latin America at present is neither conventional war, nor guerrilla war, nor Soviet bases, but economic and social unrest that favors indigenous Communism: to concentrate on the irrelevant actually serves the enemy. Furthermore, even if an essentially military strategy succeeds in the only thing one can expect from it (the military containment of the adversary, as has been the case in Europe, the Middle East, and around Formosa), it nevertheless breeds frustration if opinion mistakenly sees in containment not just one policy among many but a panacea. Containment and deterrence simply cannot solve the world's problems; but precisely because they reflect traditional United States responses to international conflict, they have fed expectations which they alone cannot satisfy.

Another set of misleading guidelines has been applied to policy in the underdeveloped countries. The granting of all kinds of aid for all sorts of projects, with the expectation of progress, domestic stability, and international good behavior could not but be frustrating for reasons mentioned before. In order to have a chance of producing in a country all the beneficial results hoped for, the United States would have to do what no liberal nation can do, and what indeed the Communists themselves can do only when they are masters of a country—rule it and reform it through and through.

The resort to the familiar has been disappointing for a second reason. The guidelines did not only turn out to be erroneous, they were also to a considerable extent mutually exclusive forms of action. The very need to move on all the new fronts at once has led the United States to resort *simultaneously* to contradictory principles that in the past could be applied more or less effectively but at least *seriatim*. Occasionally, contradictory policies converge at one point: trouble for the United States. Raymond Aron refers in his article to

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the way both the militant (and military) anti-Communist approach as exemplified by alliances with various undeveloped countries (or by Punta del Este) and the proneutralist policy advocated by many liberals give to the underdeveloped nations, committed and uncommitted, an excessive hold on United States policy. America's attitude toward the underdeveloped nations has been schizophrenic in showing both an excessive emphasis on military assistance and a fondness for neutralism that demoralizes those leaders who have chosen to side with the West. America's policy toward the Soviet Union has been torn between a grand strategy of military situations of strength (often oversold as a way of putting enough pressure on the walls of the Russian Jericho to make them crumble) and an addiction to negotiating for negotiation's sake, which fails to take into account that when there is little on which to negotiate seriously, all that comes out of endless meetings is an inflation of propaganda and a deflation of vain hopes.

There is another form of contradiction. To put it tersely, it comes from the desire to have one's cake and eat it too. United States policy towards Europe provides a choice example. Since the cold war requires Western military strength, and since the development of the new nations requires Western economic strength, the United States has consistently promoted the creation of a Western European community of nations, even at the cost of a split between the "ins" (the six) and the "outs" (the British until recently). But the United States has also wanted the new European entity to discriminate as little as possible against nonmembers so as not to disrupt world trade and not to worsen the plight of the producers of primary products in Latin America or in the British-speaking parts of Africa. This is more difficult to achieve. Even more difficult is the reconciliation between America's desire that Europe should be more than an economic market with very loose common policies and America's hope that Great Britain will be able to join. Far more troublesome is America's wish that the new Europe—economically booming, thanks largely to the United States, and encouraged by it to find a voice of its own—abstain from challenging United States leadership in the formulation of Atlantic military and external policies. Pygmalion should not expect that, once the statue has come to life, it will stay fixed on its pedestal. For strength does not let itself be sliced easily into an economic and social sector (good) and an external one (bad or off limits).

Thus, plunged in a revolutionary world, the United States has

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tried to gain (or regain) control. It has succeeded whenever it did well what it *had* to do, but it has found the going rough. We must now turn to the future, and try to see what are the margins of choice within which United States policy-makers can escape from the dilemmas that I have described.

The *directions* to be envisaged do not include two objectives which would be consonant with various domestic reflexes, but which are, so to speak, outside the terms of the international competition. The United States can neither act as if the competition between East and West had already disappeared, nor as if "victory" in traditional terms were possible without a holocaust. This does not at all mean that the present system *condemns* the United States to take it as a life sentence; it means that political defeat and military destruction are not legitimate ways of changing the system. There remain other ways, in the two main areas of policy-making.

A first area is the military competition with the Soviet bloc—a competition which runs the gamut from the nuclear deterrence of central war to guerrilla warfare in Southeast Asia, and from the preparation of military budgets to the merry-go-round of disarmament negotiations. This is an area in which choice is extremely limited, but not altogether eliminated. It is not up to the United States or to the West to make the Soviet military threat disappear;[22] but the United States can affect the competition in three different ways.

In the first place, there is a problem of *geographical scope:* does the United States choose to resist wherever military pressure is applied, and especially in those "gray areas" in which the Soviets and their allies, through subversive warfare, are capable of infiltrating and corroding allies of the United States whose political and economic weakness has opened the way to Communist enterprises? The alternatives for the United States are extremely unpleasant, since the battlefield is of the enemy's own choosing; but once the battle begins, they cannot be avoided. If the United States decides to fight, then, since it is not in the best of positions for waging antiguerrilla warfare so far away from home and so close to the Russians and the Chinese, the danger of escalation becomes a serious one. The point may come when only the threat of an upward leap in the American commitment may deter the Communists from further increments of "liberation" warfare. Or else the United States may decide that the stake is not worth such a risk, and that it is better to

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cut bait (even if this means, say, giving up Laos under a face-saving device which fools only those who want to be fooled). Although defeat in most of the gray areas would amount to a setback but not to a catastrophe, nevertheless the political repercussions both at home and on other United States alliances may be disastrous.

Precisely because the choice is so unpleasant, it is obviously in the interest of the United States to avoid being pushed into this corner. Whenever the United States has contracted such an alliance, its only hope of escaping from the dilemma consists in promoting political reform and social progress to save its ally from the dry rot that incites "liberation wars." A military alliance in those areas obliges the United States to take full responsibility for domestic developments, if it wants to prevent actual military engagement. But we know that such a responsibility is most difficult for the United States to carry out. Since Communist conquest of those areas is less likely when reformist forces have no reason to equate the politicians in power with the United States (and the Soviets or the Chinese with emancipation), the idea of any future military alliance in these areas ought to be abandoned. Meanwhile, as regards those alliances which have been concluded in the past (often for excellent geographical reasons), there is no escape from almost equally bitter choices.

Next, there is a question of *strategic doctrine.* "Massive retaliation" is thoroughly discredited as a means of deterring "subconventional" wars, and it becomes increasingly less plausible for the deterrence of conventional wars. The United States has literally no choice but to increase its conventional forces and its capacity to fight those "subconventional" wars it considers worth fighting. However, there remains one area of choice. The alternatives can be described as follows. On the one hand, it is certain that a holocaust would result either from a process of escalation leading to the use of nuclear weapons, or from a first-strike strategy applied after it had failed to deter an attack on vital stakes such as Europe. In order to prevent such disasters, should the United States adopt a doctrine clearly designed to avoid the resort to tactical and strategic nuclear weapons? On the other hand, one may fear that such a doctrine would encourage the Soviets to multiply "liberation" and conventional wars without having to worry about nuclear retaliation. Such a doctrine might compel other nations that feel threatened by the Soviets to develop their own nuclear deterrent as a substitute for the American one. Moreover, in a world of nuclear weapons, any

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war, however limited at first, may well escalate, despite the initial doctrine. Should the United States, therefore, maintain its nuclear arsenal not only larger than a minimum deterrence strategy would require, but also diversified enough to have nuclear weapons available to deter and to fight different types of war? The less "irrational" the doctrine, the less unlikely deliberate wars become: a rational strategy tends to be one that assumes that wars can remain rational instruments of policy. The more "irrational" the doctrine, the more disastrous the consequences, should the enemy fail to take the threat seriously. The adoption of either doctrine entails a continuation of the arms race, as long as no negotiated agreements are forthcoming, but the nature of the arms race depends on the choice of doctrine.

A third choice remains: it concerns the *intensity* of the military competition. I repeat that to do away with the competition, at least in the near future, is beyond the reach of the United States—unless the spread of nuclear weapons creates such perils to peace that the Soviet Union and the United States would at last overcome the asymmetries and the obstacles to negotiated arms control and disarmament—i.e., agree to give up, at least in part, their freedom of using or of threatening to use weapons. This is not impossible; but such a reconciliation of the enemies, brought about by a greater threat, does not seem at hand. In the meantime, the United States has two alternatives: either to take unilateral measures of arms control in the hope of making the nuclear age less irrational and of eliciting parallel measures of restraint from the Soviet Union; or else to refuse to reassure the enemy so as to increase pressure on him, to oblige him to devote more resources to the unproductive arms race, and to force him into concessions. The former policy has been the one chiefly followed, as shown by an impressive series of restraints: United States opposition to nuclear diffusion, United States "punishment" of the British and French at Suez, United States caution in military clashes with the East, and United States reliance on the United Nations for acts of "international neutralization."

Once again it must be made clear that each one of these policies has its disadvantages and its advantages. The policy of unilateral restraints moderates but also perpetuates, it civilizes but also rationalizes, the competition; indeed, the more it succeeds in slowing down nuclear diffusion, the less it incites the two supreme contenders to get out of the "comfortable" world in which each one believes that it can have its own arms, and also a cautious ad-

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versary. The other policy creates extreme dangers, but may well bring nearer the day when the world (to use Aron's terms) may have to give up the traditional power game so as not to give up its life.

As to the issues of strategic doctrine and intensity of competition, the United States' choice to a large extent will be determined by events beyond its control, such as the speed of China's military growth and her political behavior. But the political style and system of the United States will also be of great importance: the weight of the liberal tradition, the engineering approach with its stress on rationality, the fragmentation of power, with its built-in caution—all converge toward a deliberate choice of the first type of policy in each of those two issues. Should the result of such a choice be a multiplication of small wars and the frustration of hopes for negotiated restraints, then the old reflexes of impatience, the crusading zeal, the nostalgia for the axiomatic and "unequivocal" response might provoke upsets. Thus, whatever the choice, the risks will remain great and the margins of freedom narrow as long as the military competition persists. Since traditional "victory" and a leap into the millennium are equally impossible, the best the United States can strive for is a gradual change in the rules and the basic elements of the game—the end of bipolarity and of ideological conflict. But this cannot be achieved by direct action in the East-West conflict. It may result from the continuation of an over-all military stalemate, from developments within the Soviet camp or from events in the non-Communist parts of the world.

Thus it is to the other main area of our concern that we must turn: United States foreign policy in the non-Communist world. The United States faces so many different problems that it is impossible to discuss them here in detail. Whether one looks at the prospects of United States policy in Latin America, at United States problems in Africa, or at the relations between the partners of the would-be North Atlantic community, all the issues seem to have one point in common: they require a choice between two alternatives, which I would call (with no pretense at impartiality) the frustration of preponderance versus the ambition for modesty.

What is at stake is how best to promote, in the non-Communist world, the values on which most Americans agree—how to realize the objective of a pluralist world of states which will solve their disputes peacefully, cooperate in order to promote economic development, and avoid disrupting their neighbors' affairs. In other

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words, what is at stake is the best method for trying to *moderate* the international system, for reintroducing as much limitation of the ends and means of world politics as is compatible with the likely continuation of the East-West conflict (at least until the effects of moderation reach it too), and with the invention of nuclear weapons.

Now, there are two "ideal types" of possible policies. At one extreme, there is a *maximalist* policy. It would, on the one hand, have the United States intervene as forcefully and with as rich a range of instruments as possible in order to promote its objectives; on the other hand, it would try to preserve for the United States as much control of the direction as possible—in particular, so as to maintain United States preponderance in the North Atlantic Community and the position of the United States as the lynch pin of the Pan-American system. At the other extreme, there is a *minimalist* policy. It could be summed up as trusting pluralism in order to get a pluralistic world. Such a policy would, on the one hand, try to limit the scope and the instruments of United States intervention to those areas and methods least likely to prove frustrating. On the other hand, it would argue that all the energy that did not go into manipulating others and trying to maintain United States preponderance ought to go into the definition of common policies on matters of common interest. Otherwise, the only result would be a pluralistic jungle.

Like all ideal types, those two are exaggerations. However, whether we envisage the Alliance for Progress or the development of NATO's military policies, we find that the actual alternatives come fairly close to those extremes. (Of course, they are often *presented* otherwise.) I would like to give my reasons for suggesting the more modest formula. A first reason is the necessity to avoid the disappointments of overcommitment. In the underdeveloped countries, the effects of technical and economic aid are difficult to chart. It is not within the possibilities of a power such as the United States to ram through the social and political reforms without which such aid risks being wasted. Wherever local leaders are indifferent to such reforms, it is hard for the United States to persuade the ruling classes to enforce the changes themselves. For, although the United States presents the reforms as a calculated risk that can stave off the far greater likelihood of unrest, the local elites tend to see in the reforms the more immediate threat to their position, and in potential unrest, a distant cloud. Consequently, if the United States limits its commitment to the kind of aid that, given the special circumstances

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of each country, is most likely to produce good results, the United States could avoid the Charybdis of total indifference, all too easily exploited by the Communists, and the Scylla of identification with often calamitous elites even more beneficial to the Soviet camp. The fact that in a country like Brazil reformist movements push neutralist or third force foreign policies should be a warning. The United States is not equipped to manipulate satellites: it either must tie its chances to the local rulers (a risk that worked for obvious reasons in Western Europe better than anywhere else), or it must try to take over, as it has been edging toward doing in South Vietnam; but this is hardly what it does best.

A second reason for a more modest approach may be called the increasing complexity of the world with which the United States has to deal. The greater the number of states, the more refined the United States approach will have to be; the more successful the attempt at turning those states into genuine nations, the more diversity will have to be taken into account. Again, the United States is ill equipped to control events in countries it ill knows and in which its own concerns, world-wide and world-shaking as they may seem to us, are likely to appear irrelevant or parochial.

A third reason derives from the previous one. Should the United States succeed in promoting its objectives, then the nations it will have helped to grow will undoubtedly desire to weigh more heavily in international affairs. This is precisely what has happened in Europe. United States' warnings about the perils of nationalism have little chance of deterring others, as long as they sound less like an invitation to join in a great and somewhat undefined auto da fé of sovereignty than as a grumbling protest against rising challenges to American power.

Fourth, resignation to not being able to control, resignation to what I have called the uncertainties of roulette, has its rewards: if the ball does not always stop on the number on which the United States gambles, it is even less likely to stop at the Communist number—unless American involvement has boosted Communist chances. In the short run, the Soviet Union has the advantage of better means for intervention and the asset of a philosophy that pretends to provide a master key for development. United States efforts amount to a disparate set of keys, which are often too small. Yet in the long run the Soviet Union risks stumbling over the determination of most nations' leaders to be not only the agents of enonomic growth but also the champions of national independence. If it is

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this ambition that proves to be the bane of Soviet efforts, then it is in the interest of the United States to respect it.

Any attempt at intervening too much and at preserving a preponderance resulting from the temporary collapse of Europe, one that developed at a time when there were half as many states, is bound to founder on the limits set by the international system and to exacerbate domestic frustrations. On the other hand, it is also clear that a pluralistic world of sovereign states, prey to the disease of nuclear diffusion, is not a reassuring prospect: hence the necessary talk about all kinds of partnership. Here we must, however, sound a note of caution: the idea is a good one, but its realization should not be spoiled (once again) either by impatience or by traces of the illusion of omnipotence. Let us look at NATO, the main achievement so far of the Atlantic nations. There are three very different kinds of joint "rational" military policies conceivable. Rationality can be interpreted in the light of United States interests (a likely outcome would be an increase in European conventional forces, and a United States monopoly of the deterrent). Then there is the rationality of the alliance as a whole, which leads to the advocacy of a joint deterrent. Finally, there is the rationality that is a compromise between the first two, and the separate interests of the main partners—along the lines of an attempt at coordinating as well as possible the various deterrents, and at defining as rigorously as possible a common policy acceptable to all. The trouble with ideas of partnership is that what they often conceal is a nostalgia for a rationality of the first type; or else they leap forward to a rationality of the second type, which is still a premature abstraction from separate state realities that have not converged enough. At best, it could be achieved only *after* a rational policy of the third type has been hammered out.

To try to work now toward partnership of the third type strikes me as essential. It is not a spectacular enterprise; but grand institutional schemes are worthless when there are no common policies for those institutions to carry out, as the history of the United Nations machinery demonstrates. The interests that states consider most vital are those that are not only most difficult for another to control or manipulate, but also most difficult to transcend through supranational or majority rule. However, they are also the interests most important to try to reconcile, lest they disrupt attempts at building world order. Thus, though less exciting than the Pan-American meetings that discuss the Alliance for Progress, negotia-

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tions to stabilize the prices of primary products would probably contribute far more to the link between the Latins and the Colossus of the North.

The United States, for reasons we have seen, is used to going it alone, or doing it alone, either in isolation or through organizations it dominates. To continue thus may well be instinctive, but it is also mistaken: for it is an attempt at doing more than the United States can do, and it achieves less than it could achieve. It incites others to try to do it also, and thus leads to domestic disappointments in the United States and to international tension. A policy more modest in its pretensions, but less self-indulgent, requires that America's *esprit de géométrie* be tempered by much more *esprit de finesse*—that the United States get into the painful habit of working with, rather than through or without, others. But this is after all what involvement in world affairs requires. If it means gradually transcending the limits of domestic traditions, does it not imply that what is true of others is true of the United States as well: that the decisive keys to the success of a foreign policy are in the hands of its makers?

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1. Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice* (New York, 1960), p. 340.
2. See Raymond Aron, *Paix et Guerre entre les Nations* (Paris, 1962), especially the introduction.
3. See William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Cleveland, 1959), for such a suggestion.
4. Pacifists who fall into the Soviet trap and interpret United States bases abroad or the United States threat of a first strike to deter a Soviet nonnuclear attack in Europe as aggressive moves usually miss this important point.
5. On this point see Fred Greene, "The Impact of Military Factors on American Foreign Policy," in Stephen D. Kertesz (editor), *American Diplomacy in a New Era* (Notre Dame, 1961), pp. 525-548.
6. Hans J. Morgenthau, in Roy C. Macridis (editor), *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (2nd edn., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1961), pp. 201-224.
7. Morton Kaplan, *United States Foreign Policy in a Revolutionary Age* (Princeton Center of International Studies; Monograph, 1961), p. 20.
8. Regarding this theme, see John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy since World War II* (New York, 1960).
9. See in particular *The American National Style* (*Dædalus*, Spring 1958), and David M. Potter, *People of Plenty* (Chicago, 1954).

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10. See especially Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations* (Chicago, 1953); and *Limited War* (Chicago, 1957). See also Charles Burton Marshall, *The Limits of Foreign Policy* (New York, 1954.)

11. See for example Arthur I. Waskow's suggestions in "Limits of Defense," *The Atlantic,* February 1962, pp. 80-87.

12. See Robert W. Tucker, *The Just War* (Baltimore, 1960), and this writer's "Terreur et Terrier," *Revue Française de Science Politique,* December 1961, *11:* 936-956.

13. See the author's "L'Amérique incommunicable," *Cahiers de la République,* 1959, *4:* 90-97; and Jean-Marie Domenach, "Le Modèle américain," *Esprit,* July-August, September, October, 1960, pp. 1219-1232; 1360-1374; 1520-1534.

14. Aron, *op. cit.,* Note finale.

15. See Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race* (New York, 1961), p. 80.

16. Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Purpose of American Politics* (New York, 1960), p. 135.

17. See for example Dean Acheson's remarks on President (then Senator) Kennedy's speech about Algeria in 1957 in *Power and Diplomacy* (Cambridge, 1958), pp. 122 ff.

18. The recent spate of books, movements, marches, etc., for "peace" or for "victory" indicates that the pattern has not changed: uncertainty breeds frustration; both extremes react to it as if it were in the power of the United States alone either to restore world harmony or to crush the enemy. On the Left, impatience activates the liberal's horror of weapons; on the Right, impatience strengthens the "engineering" enthusiasm for strategy as a political panacea.

19. George F. Kennan, "America's Administrative Response to World Problems," *Dædalus, op. cit.,* p. 16.

20. Morgenthau, *op. cit.,* p. 143.

21. See W. W. Rostow, *The United States in the World Arena* (New York, 1960), p. 323.

22. This does not mean that I believe in the Soviet threat of a surprise nuclear attack; it has been argued, however, that the Soviet "failure" to produce as many missiles as United States officials had feared proves that Soviet intentions had been misjudged. All it shows is that, given the nuclear stalemate (as long as it lasts), the main fronts of the competition will be in less apocalyptic areas. It does not mean that there is no Soviet military threat.

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ROGER SMITH

Restraints on American Foreign Policy

Occasionally American foreign relations seem composed of nine-tenths restraint and about one-tenth policy. Perhaps both the morbidly curious observer and the practitioners, lost and discouraged in the forest, will benefit from a catalog and analysis of the rather imposing array of restraints.

To introduce some order, the inquiry can be divided into two parts: first, those restraints or inhibitions on the design and conduct of American foreign policy which appear to be structural and thus subject to only minor, if any, adjustment or manipulation over the middle term; second, those restraints, some of our own making and some transitional, which are perhaps subject to change if we understand them and *if* we have the will to do so.

Structural Restraints

A mere allegation that some restraints are structural will provoke an academic debate. But if the problem is to be managed at all, there is no alternative to an arbitrary division, placing to one side the relatively intractable elements of an exceedingly complicated subject.

First and foremost among the structural restraints are those imposed by our curious, and what many sympathetic foreign observers consider an unworkable, political system with its balance of powers. The foreign observer fears that we have a mechanism designed for an earlier and less dangerous era, for a country able to enjoy—thanks to others—the irresponsibility of isolationism, in short, a system too weak and too cumbersome to carry our inescapable burdens of world power and leadership.

Subordinate to the balance of powers phenomenon are such re-

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lated inhibiting factors as the Congressional committee system, with legislators jealously clinging to various facets of foreign policy. For instance, a Congressman who questions the entire theory of foreign aid is chairman of the subcommittee which remains firmly in control of foreign-aid appropriations.

An unwholesome relationship exists between the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Atomic Energy Commission—an outgrowth of the special, and necessary, authority of the Congress during the secret phase of nuclear developments, but a relationship corrupted by the feud between Lewis Strauss and a powerful group of Senators. Once Strauss was broken, his successors found peace through docility. The Joint Committee has assumed the role of board of directors; the AEC has been relegated to operating officials. As the delicate and fundamental questions of nuclear arrangements with our Western European allies may be crucial to the development of an effective Atlantic Community, the Joint Committee-AEC-Senior-Junior partnership unquestionably limits the ability of the President even to consider the use of America's wasting nuclear assets as a means of building strength and unity in the West.

In historical perspective it may turn out that the fragmentation of responsibility exercises more restraint than any conscious attempt by Congress to usurp the foreign-policy authority of the Executive. An agricultural subcommittee, by involving itself in the allocation of sugar quotas, may unconsciously undermine the careful work of the State Department—and even of the House's own Foreign Affairs Committee. The fault lies not in a conscious adoption of contrary foreign policies; the frame of reference is just wrong. These men and committees, naturally enough, view the world through the prism of their own special and frequently narrow interests.

Also at work on the Congress and on the committee system is the Hill's psychological reaction to the irresistible accretion of Executive power, a function of complex and fast-moving foreign affairs. This process sharpens the jealousy of Congress and encourages bafflement, petulance, sometimes irresponsibility, and frequently intransigence. Even the consultative process, designed to modulate the conflict inherent in our system, is undercut by the seniority system in the committees, dominated by maharajas of the South and the bipartisan resistance of our democratic system to party discipline. Brought down to earth, this combination of legis-

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lative elements leads to pervasive uncertainty abroad about the constancy of American policy, and uneasiness as to whether Executive decision commits the United States.

The historical release of popular emotion and tension through war is no longer possible. As this safety valve for the deflation of local or national passions is blocked, and as the emotions turn inward, they work with unwholesome effect on the psyche, the morale, and the political processes of the state. We see in the nostalgic quest for war the perfect catharsis; and the simple solution to complex issues in the current demands for "total victory" and the companion attack on the "no win" policy. Out of this frustration grows the ultra-right; some throw in their hand and retire into a shell; others become disgusted by the apparent absence of domestic and international morality.

The era of peace through mutual terror creates a new environment and new restraint. Prior to World War II, balance-of-power politics—the threat and willingness of the major powers to use force—meant that the means existed to keep under some control small states and irresponsible regimes. Within an accepted sphere of influence a major power could "move in" on a small troublesome nation and restore equilibrium. Further, the power and willingness to act made the threat to do so credible. Today, the acute sensitivity of both ends of our polarized world to the dangers of nuclear escalation means that the United States and the Soviet Union are both painfully sensitive to the possible consequences of action to restore order, even in the most remote corner of the world. Thus, with each side wary of the other, which in turn creates a delicate balance of terror stability, an arena is opened for small-nation recklessness. Nineteenth-century methods, while neither gentle nor equitable, did inhibit the small nations, which now feel free to move noisily and carelessly in the shadow of world destruction, which their own actions bring closer.

This is another way of saying that we are at a high point of sovereign equality, an equality that seems to nourish not responsibility but a lack of it. Pakistan and Afghanistan can fall on each other's throats, comfortable in the knowledge that no major power will attempt to bring about a solution through force.

The difficulty of cataloging restraints, which leads to arbitrary and subjective selection, can be demonstrated by considering the broad area of economic policy. There are both beliefs and facts that seem to limit the ability to formulate new policies and take

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action: our commitment to the private enterprise system and our distaste for economic planning; the widely held conviction that the American economy has a finite breaking point when the national budget reaches some magic figure, or when foreign aid rises above, say, 5 billion dollars; and our obsessive worry about the deficit in our balance of payments. However, there are several reasons for putting this familiar body of material to one side. First, it is a subject unto itself. But more importantly, Presidential leadership can and has dealt at one time or another with all these restraints. The current battle for a new national trade policy shows what can be done, even in the sacred bone yard of tariff policy, by a President who decides that he needs and is prepared to go after new authority.

Hung somewhere between structural and nonstructural restraints is the American attitude toward Communism, in its several guises. Today when the Soviet policy line is hard and threatening, an American response that is equally tough appeals to all elements of our society except, perhaps, the uninfluential left and the frustrated intellectuals. But the future will not be so kind. At some juncture serious negotiations on one issue or another will be upon us. We may assume that tough-minded officials will produce out of these negotiations a result calling for give on each side. Yet the public, unsophisticated in the many permutations of Communism, innately suspicious of their own diplomats, in ignorance of the frightful consequences of thermonuclear war, can be expected to produce a belligerent minority who will receive any American concession with the cry "sell out" and "treason." As long as the American dream contains the sub-vision of total victory, just that long will exist a serious and dangerous restraint which could paralyze the Government. Our paralysis allows the Russians to play the card of negotiation and by modest concessions in the future create divisive confusion and acrimony within the alliance and produce a shambles in America.

The almost impossible mission of the President is to lead his flock to maturity; to persuade them that toughness, a 50 billion dollar defense budget, and antimissile missiles are essential in 1962 against aggressive international Communism—*and* the essential and only basis for ultimate negotiation. Then he must convince them that the first negotiated settlement with the Soviets is desirable and that the concessions are necessary, and that our world will for the indefinite future have its Communists. If this were not enough, he must also put across the point that the nation's international

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life, like that of the individual citizen, is a grey affair, uncertain and never without its dangers.

Even now we can feel the strait jacket bind. American public opinion does not allow the Executive branch to "give up" any free-world real estate to the Sino-Soviet bloc, be the ground ever so undesirable—whether it is Quemoy and Matsu; or to live with a Bloomsbury Communist as confused or obscure as Jagan. The Commander-in-Chief has orders to hold every inch of territory, even though success in the larger battle may be made more difficult or thrown into question by his inability to give unimportant terrain in order to work toward larger strategic goals.

The Nonstructural and Possibly Temporary Restraints

American distrust of foreigners and those whose lot it is to deal with them remains a stubborn part of the American dream. This attitude transcends the *Chicago Tribune* and the second-generation immigrants. As in the case of bacteria that are resistant to the new drugs, the new manifestations of isolationism seem in certain cases stronger and more virulent. The attitude seeks not the "what" of a problem, but the "who" of it. The rash of articles on the State Department seek the answer in an alleged incompetent or disloyal State Department.

There is a new permutation of this Jacksonian attitude toward a career service. The suspicion is nourished that the classical machinery of foreign affairs is more sensitive to foreign interests than to those of the United States, that those in charge of this machinery are "soft" rather than "hard"; that they move slowly when speed is of the essence; that "they," somehow or other, should be able to reform a three hundred-year-old Latin American civilization, if not by the time Congress adjourns, at least over the next ten years. There is of course some truth in all these criticisms. But it is not our task here to examine again the State Department, but to analyze the restraints on foreign policy. The distrust of international affairs and those who deal in this black art remains a most serious inhibition.

There is a body of restraint, much examined in the literature of diplomacy, to be described perhaps as the enduring and elemental features of the anarchy of the jungle relations between sovereign states. Here is another element that swings somewhere between the structural and the nonstructural. As Harold Nicolson suggests,

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prior to the latter half of the nineteenth century the public left this mysterious business of political magic to the sovereign and his counsellors. The last one hundred years have seen a permanent change in this situation, however, with the miracles of modern communication and rapid transport compressing the world, with scientific genius lending its talents to the production of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. All these revolutions have forced the unwilling citizen to an unhappy awareness of the plight of his world and the uncertainty of his position in it. If not the mystery, certainly the confusing panorama of foreign affairs induces either a sense of resignation and hopelessness or of suspicion and animus. Thus individual involvement in these affairs—unwilling, unhappy, poorly informed—imposes a new and probably permanent restraint. The sovereign can no longer pursue the intricacies of foreign relations on his own, but henceforth must be concerned equally with the problems themselves and with the attitudes, the prejudices and, indeed, the irritations of public opinion.

A footnote on this changing world is the psychological effect of a nasty and dangerous world on a people—confused, indignant, and slighted—who are incensed that wrong seems to win over right. Responsible Dutchmen, for instance, are incensed that the principle of self-determination for the Papuans seems lost in the power struggle in Southeast Asia. Understandably enough, they overlook the strategic stakes in the area, concentrate on the feet of clay of Sukarno, and pretend that the Netherlands is ready to go to war with Indonesia over this issue. The instinct of the democratic man for justice and rule of law is constantly jarred by the cynicism and unprincipled character of international affairs. He does not like it.

This leads quite naturally to another double-edged characteristic: the great optimism and impatience of the American people—an inheritance of our frontier spirit. This urge to act today derives in part from a young nation; a nation undefeated in war, confident of its political, spiritual, and cultural values. America is a country in a hurry, restless in the presence of vast political and economic change in the world, wondering why other peoples take so long to adjust.

Our conviction of national virtue joins forces with the burdens of foreign aid and leads to a national conclusion that if Washington only had the will a waiting world could be reproduced in the American image. This dream and this impatience frequently conflict

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dangerously with facts of international terror and anarchy. It means an unwillingness to wait for time to work on today's insoluble problem and to live with the hope that it may be soluble in the future. How can one accept the American dream and believe that there is no absolute solution to the world's problems other than absolute and total war? How can a people realize that we are 180 million people among approximately three billion—and yet not despair? Perspective and patience are hardly the outstanding qualities of a people who insist on early change in the social and political mores of the Brazilians and the Laotians, simply by willing it, and yet fail to see the relevance of the national failure to induce the white South to accept even one hundred years later the full meaning of the Civil War.

We suffer greatly in not being able to distinguish between the tactical and the strategic. We gravitate instinctively toward today's crisis. The summer lightning of headlines and radio bulletins transposes a political crisis in the swamps of British Guiana, with its half million people, into an issue which we persuade ourselves, today at least, is the issue on which the West is going to succeed or fail in the contest with the Soviet Union. Washington hypnotizes itself over the movement of ten or fifteen men in Viet Nam while it ignores the critical strategic importance of Japan. This continual and what could be a fatal error in strategic judgment is both a matter of geography and of issues. It manifests itself in domestically oriented escape-clause action on Belgian carpet and glass while deprecating the impact of this action on the evolving policies and attitudes of the dynamic European Common Market.

Failure to make this distinction can imperil our foreign policy and our nation. To drive the point home, a few words on broad strategy are necessary. The fruit of fifteen years of American policy is at hand: political and economic unity and economic progress in Western Europe. If an integrated Europe and the United States join together for the common defense of the free world, if we collaborate in constructing a sound international financial system, if we provide from the vast resources of the Atlantic region the capital and the markets for the less developed countries of the world, then the conditions that make possible a secure and increasingly prosperous world will have been created. The instinct for the crisis must be counterbalanced by reiteration, private and public, of the grand strategy, and by a willingness to pay a price to further it.

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A pervasive restraint, which only the hopeful could call temporary and which in part springs from our constitutional system, is the power and the parochial orientation of the major domestic governmental agencies. The ties of these agencies run naturally back to the nation's special interest groups—Agriculture to the farm groups, to the two agricultural committees and the powerful congressional and senatorial interests; Interior to the mining and petroleum interests in the country and in the Senate. There is nothing inherently iniquitous about these relationships; they are a natural, almost behavioral, aspect of the political process. But in a constricted world where each action impinges upon and affects a complex web of relationships, parochial decision and action can damage, and do damage, our foreign relations.

One of the difficulties is that the senior officials of the domestic agencies, no matter how sympathetic and devoted they may be to the major lines of foreign policy, are captives of their environment and the great pressures of office. Working outside the continuing process of foreign-policy formulation, with excessive demands on their time for the performance of their official and related functions, and with advisers equally harried and tied down, it is inevitable that these officials react to the pressures of their trade. If there is an answer to this parochialism, it is not to be found in fighting the essential specialization of Agriculture, Labor, Commerce, Interior, or Treasury—or even Defense—but in involving the domestic agencies more directly in the foreign-policy process and improving the caliber of people within these agencies dealing with foreign affairs. But the cure will have its troublesome side effects. With knowledge and experience in international affairs, the temptation will grow for these agencies to dabble in foreign policy, to extend their area of responsibility, so that the entire governmental process threatens to become a paralysis of collegiate action.

The State Department: Restraint and Solution

Once again the process of arbitrary selection must be imposed to isolate those elements of State Department organization and behavior which seem either particularly important or relevant—or impossible of remedy.

Perhaps the heart of the problem today is to be found in the infinite variety and the multitude of crises, difficulties, and imponderables around the world. All these issues in varying degrees

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involve American national interest and responsibility, from an eager Alaska governor impounding a Japanese fishing boat to border clashes between Syria and Israel. The country lives unaware of the unrelenting pressure bearing on the upper reaches of the State Department. The nature of the world and America's pre-eminent position in it means that there is no issue from which we can stand aside and say, "This matter does not concern us." Even silence is construed as support for one disputant against another.

Into the seventh floor of the architecturally offensive and clinically designed State Department comes a stream of messages from some two hundred and ninety-four posts around the world, forecasting new problems and seeking guidance on old ones. Over one hundred embassies in Washington seek information, attempt to persuade, and inevitably succeed in adding to the burdens of the Department. Disliked by a Congress still nostalgic for isolationism (a body quite aware of the fact that the State Department lacks a constituency in the country), the State Department's executives are constantly subject to pre-emptory calls to appear before their betters, to receive the constituents of Congressmen, to provide information, and to offer its officers for sacrifice at periodical intervals on the altars of several Congressional committees. The officers must be, if not fair game, at least accessible to the national and international press and to the hundreds of nongovernmental organizations whose support is indispensable to legislative action and to the hopeful improvement of the State Department's "image" before the American people. The current theme, however, is the insistent and basically constructive demand of an impatient President and his personal staff for quick if not immediate answers.

This pressure focuses on perhaps one hundred senior officers of the State Department, but disproportionately it hits the Secretary and the Under Secretary. One dangerous result of this concentration of pressure is to deny to those who have the authority to act, the opportunity to think. When a political appointee comes to Washington, he arrives with a set of ideas, a philosophy and some policy predilections. By and large, he will tinker with these during his tour of duty and use up the intellectual capital he brought with him; but it is the rare man who can take advantage of his involvement in these international affairs to gain new perspectives or to adjust radically his initial concepts of foreign policy.

The institutional response of the Department of State to the infinite variety of problems and the fact that today almost all issues

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have a significant impact on foreign relations means the allocation of foreign relations into geographic and functional subdivisions. This division is admittedly arbitrary and admittedly indispensable. But the very process necessary for order condemns the Department to the loss of perspective. Segmentation builds special pleading into the organization. The counterbalance to this is a hierarchy sufficiently disinterested to relate, to review, and to decide. Yet the pressure is such on the upper reaches of the hierarchy, on those few sufficiently detached to perform this function, that rather than judicious judgment the probability is summary decision based on inadequate briefing, sometimes on whimsy, but more often on reflex reaction that draws on the frame of reference the executive brought to the job from a previous incarnation.

The unbelievable pressure of crises and responsibilities, the unavoidable parochialism, and the geographic and functional subdivisions conspire, with the result that the past is extrapolated. It takes time, thought, persuasion, and daring to design new policies for an old problem. The State Department's skill in grinding out stock position papers and reiterating policies that sing the old tune frustrates and aggravates the White House. The system, in an ironical way, which insistently demands another background or position paper for yet another state visit, places a premium on the second-rate bureaucrat who knows the history, his filing case, and has the knack for saying the same reliable thing in a slightly different fashion.

Specialization, parochialism, concern with the immediate, White House and Administration sensitivity to criticism, and fear of short-term losses add up to distaste for being tough in pursuit of a policy. It is not merely that Americans like to be liked, it is the more serious matter of failing once again to see the strategic owing to obsession with the tactical. If the handful of responsible officials in Washington have not the time or in some cases the instinct for mature reflection, then the system automatically works in such a way as to attempt to satisfy as evenly as possible all the claimants.

In the Far East the strategic situation is clear: Japan is absolutely indispensable to American strategic interests—our military forces in the area must have the bases in Japan and the Ryukyus; Japan is the economic dynamo of Asia, whose positive contribution to the area will increasingly be of vital importance; the loss of Japan to the Free World could be fatal to Asia. Yet because relations are amiable, the Japanese prosperous, and the political situa-

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tion reasonably stable, the key strategic significance of Japan is pushed aside by our preoccupation with crises in Southeast Asia or, worse, by our pandering to cries of domestic self-interest groups and taking actions threatening to our whole position in Japan. Further, tough strategic policies place a premium on being right, and in turn lay immense demands on the Executive that he give the country a sense of strategy, history, and perspective.

Public Criticism

There appears to be a curious paradox in America. Popular interest in and even preoccupation with foreign affairs are today a part of the American scene. But sound and reflective criticism of foreign policy is the lot of the specialist, though all too frequently it is lost in the clamor of irresponsible comment and attack. Again, the interest in the immediate, the scandalous, and the irresponsible gains the front pages. This phenomenon cannot be shrugged off at a time when the policy makers have never been in greater need of intelligent criticism and of sympathetic understanding and support. Tabloid criticism leads the Executive Branch to search for the politically easy solution, to pull every punch, with every policy subject to compromise as a means of avoiding the total gutting of essential policy. The fact that the irresponsible attack seems to dominate the legislature and the press corrupts the Executive Branch, in the sense that the executives become conditioned to irresponsibility and thus hardened in their refusal to consider open-mindedly suggestions emanating from the outside.

It is instructive in this connection to consider the critical area of the relations of the West with the Chinese Communists. There has been no disinterested Congressional examination of this issue—nor have the great foundations or the private information media made any significant contribution to the subject. It will be difficult for the future historian to understand the total official and legislative blackout on thought in this area at a time of tremendous change and realignment of forces: the failure of Chinese agriculture and the enormous pressures on the mainland economy; the mounting and probably irreconcilable differences within the Communist bloc; the essential conservatism of action of the Chinese Communist regime as contrasted with its belligerent language; the impact of United States China policy on our relations with our principal allies, and the influence of American policy on the affairs of the United

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Nations. At the time when there should be debate and examination, there is silence. A summary Commerce Department rejection of a technically incomplete application for the sale by a Seattle firm of several million tons of wheat to the Communist regime was subject to no public analysis. It is irrelevant to this analysis to judge the correctness or incorrectness of this action or of the basic policy, but it is appropriate to suggest that in silence lies danger. Our free society will prosper to the extent that the public keeps pressure on its Government. In this important area inquiry has been closed off, and neither the Government, the press, nor private groups have taken the initiative to examine the alternative courses of action available to us.

This is a rather sad, almost a *New Yorker* tale, all trouble and confusion with no ending, happy or otherwise. Perhaps the morale of the story is that to know the problem is to be able to deal with it. The history of American postwar foreign policy is a bright page; a people still damp from isolationism, but willing to innovate, lead, run risks, spend money, and be disliked. This experience should give us the confidence to see what we can do to surmount these formidable restraints if we have the wit and the will. If we are to succeed, the President must draw upon his enormous good will in the country, to live with sharp criticism of policies that bite or do not succeed at first, and above all, to educate America to the grand design, and to what the game is all about.

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RAYMOND ARON

Reflections on American Diplomacy

How does American diplomacy look to a European observer who is well disposed to the United States? I do not feel really qualified to answer this question, posed by my friends of *Dædalus,* because I know too many of the men responsible for American policy and have been in Washington too often to share some of the illusions and fears prevailing in Europe. If I were to give my own personal interpretation of "United States diplomacy," it would probably resemble that of some Americans rather than typify a European point of view. It may be more useful, therefore, to summarize the criticisms most frequently leveled at American diplomacy by various European schools of thought. A discussion of these criticisms may help enlighten American readers about the attitudes of their allies in the Old World.

Let us start with a proposition that is obvious but often overlooked: the United States has and must have a world-wide diplomacy, whereas European nations, even Great Britain and France, no longer have the resources required for action on a world scale. When France was at war in Indochina, she depended even more on the United States, because she was incapable of carrying on the war without transatlantic military and financial aid.

This difference between a world-wide perspective and a purely European one has been responsible for misunderstandings and tensions between the United States and its European allies. It could not be otherwise. Europeans would have thought it normal for the United States, as an ally, to take sides with them under all circumstances; but viewed from Washington, the Atlantic partners appear merely as links in a chain surrounding the Soviet Union. Of course there is a greater agreement on moral ideals between western Eu-

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rope and the United States than there is between the United States and any Latin American or Asiatic nation, even if officially allied to the American Republic. Of all the treaties signed by the United States since 1945, the Atlantic Pact is the most important. It is the foundation of the entire American system of alliances. Nevertheless, it is one instrument of action among others, and no United States administration has thought of carrying out the formula, so often suggested by French leaders, to extend the sphere of the Atlantic Pact to the rest of the world. French ministers might demand, "Is it possible to be allies in the heart of Europe and not in the Near East?" "Certainly," American spokesmen (Democrats or Republicans) might have replied, had they chosen to be frank. At the time of the Suez crisis, the American stand against the British and French in support of President Nasser was a striking demonstration, not of American duplicity, but of the dualism, or better, the pluralism of the considerations the President of the United States must bear in mind. The ultimate goal is the same everywhere: to contain the power of Soviet Russia and prevent the growth of Communist regimes, but the means employed may be in Europe the Atlantic Pact, and in the Near East, concessions to Arab nationalism, however anti-colonial and anti-European those means may be.

We may summarize this rapid preliminary analysis by stating that the object of American diplomacy throughout the entire world is to oppose the principal enemy, the U.S.S.R. (or the Russo-Chinese bloc).* The United States, therefore, refuses to subordinate its actions to the preferences and interests of its allies, even if they are partners in a regional pact. Specifically, the United States has always sympathized with movements of national liberation and with anti-colonial ideologies, being always sufficiently discreet not to provoke the indignation of the particular colonial power involved and sufficiently frank not to abandon to the Soviets a monopoly of the words assumed to be popular in the Afro-Asian nations.

Inevitably and logically, Europeans who refuse to 'liquidate the empire" or to "free oppressed peoples" have felt American policy to be a threat. Oddly enough, the men of the European Left, especially in France, ought to have agreed with American policy (despite their anti-Americanism) because it was anticolonial, but they have seldom recognized that they share this attitude, and they have almost never expressed it. United States' support of France in Indo-

* The United States has not yet taken into account the split between Moscow and Peking.

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china after 1950 also provided ammunition for those who denounced "American imperialism" and wished to ignore the anticolonial intentions of the United States.

American diplomacy, concerned with all five continents, must express the wishes, not of a prince and his advisers, but of the most talkative and on surface the most incoherent political system in the world. In the last months of 1950, while the Eighth Army was fighting a hard war against the North Koreans and the Chinese volunteers, scarcely a day passed without some general or Senator airing militant views which rocked the boat in political circles in Washington and made the British, whose diplomatic style still bears the stamp of aristocratic traditions, tremble. The sudden trip of Clement Attlee to Washington in November 1950 was caused by rumors (growing out of indiscretion) about the eventual use of atomic weapons in Korea. The polemic on Cuba between John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon during the presidential campaign of 1960 is another example of the "democratic style" of American diplomacy, which is deplorable in foreign eyes. The television exchange between the two candidates about Quemoy and Matsu is another example of American diplomatic practice which is easier to denounce than to change.

President Kennedy has issued several directives with the object of reducing the number of American spokesmen on foreign policy as well as controlling their oratory and their imagination. Generals and admirals are to submit their speeches to official screening. A Senate committee is investigating this abridgement of free expression, and it wonders whether it is constitutional thus to muzzle free citizens of the United States. I hope the American reader will not accuse me of meddling in domestic affairs if I indicate my approval of this "preventive censoring." In spite of everything, American diplomacy will continue to be noisy, controversial, and hotly contested, with a single man who must make great decisions at any moment but tens or hundreds of men who believe themselves qualified to declare policy, denounce it, influence it, correct it, or comment on it.

So much for criticisms aimed at obvious contradictions in the diplomacy of a nation which has only one enemy and many allies, the diplomacy of the most verbose democracy in history. These weaknesses result from the nature of both the United States and of the world as it actually is.

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If we except Communists and radical reformers, having already excepted the defenders of Empire, the majority of Europeans all but unanimously agree with the goals of American diplomacy: to contain the expansion of Communism without risking general war, or, if one prefers, to contain Communism by reducing the risks of a general war to a minimum. What are the principal criticisms of the means adopted to carry out these goals, of the method of action in general? For purposes of analysis, one might say there are two types of criticisms: those of the so-called realists, and those of the so-called idealists.

The objections of the realist school obviously vary with the different phases of American policy. They think that during the war American diplomacy was led astray by a failure to understand the nature of the Soviet regime. President Roosevelt was anxious to win the war as fast and as cheaply as possible. He postponed the problem of the political organization of the world until after the victory. He did not see that the conduct of operations and the strategy adopted at the time predetermined the peace settlement. Thus the United States allowed the Soviet Union to "liberate" and "Sovietize" Eastern Europe even while the United States kept a monopoly of atomic weapons. If I may paraphrase Sir Winston Churchill, never has a state had such a superior force and taken so little advantage of it. In 1945, however, the great concern of the United States was "to bring the boys home." A diplomat, nostalgic for the old days, asks wistfully, "How can one trust the fate of the West to a republic which sacrifices half of Europe to appease popular and political clamor?"

From 1945 to 1950, the realists say, the United States allowed the Communist parties to carry out revolutions managed from above to their logical conclusion unchecked. It was capable neither of supporting Chiang Kai-shek nor of abandoning him to his destiny. The Americans hastened to demobilize their army and their naval and air fleets but not to produce the atomic weapons on which American superiority rested. Not until the Korean War did President Truman make the decision to rearm seriously and turn a deaf ear to "economists" who thought inflation a greater threat than the Soviet Union and who foresaw the end of "free enterprise" if the day should come when the budget for national defense broke the ceiling of $15 billion. The ceiling of $50 billion was broken for the year 1962-1963, and free enterprise survives.

In the period 1948 to 1962, the European realists would reproach

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American diplomacy for having been "timid," for having abandoned the initiative to the Soviets, and for never having tried to win a real victory. In 1948, when the Russians, using the pretext of technical difficulties, gradually established the blockade of Berlin, American diplomacy sought and found a way out in the air lift, but it did not risk sending an armed convoy to break the blockade. In Korea, the United States leaders ceased military operations and consented to armistice negotiations as soon as Moscow expressed a desire to negotiate—in the spring of 1951. For a war between the United States and North Korea (aided by Chinese volunteers) to end in a stalemate and not in American victory was in the eyes of the world the equivalent of a defeat for the nation supposed to be the strongest on earth. Similarly, in the second Berlin crisis since 1958, American diplomacy has constantly made moves toward negotiation "under threat of force," whereas (according to General de Gaulle) all that would have been needed was to "stand firm" until Moscow had stopped threatening and a calm atmosphere appropriate to peaceful talks had been restored. We shall return later to the dialogue between the Europeans and the new administration of President Kennedy. Suffice it to say that, to the realist school of European critics, American diplomacy—in the years when United States territory was safe from attack and when the Strategic Air Command was capable of striking at Soviet territory—erred by ineptitude or by an excess of caution, so that it was not able to win in Korea, and it did not choose to aid the Hungarian rebels.*

At present (1962), the realists attack particularly the conduct of American diplomacy toward the uncommitted nations and the United Nations. In this respect General de Gaulle is a good spokesman for the realist school. The European realist does not at all dispute the idea that the United States should keep in touch with the Afro-Asian nations as much as possible and influence them away from the Soviet bloc. What he questions is the conception of competing for the allegiance of the uncommitted nations formulated by the American diplomat, and the methods he uses to win out over his rival.

Is it wise to give representatives of the new nations an exaggerated idea of their own importance? Is it right to let them believe that their words or commitments will seriously affect the relation-

* Is it necessary to add that, if American diplomacy had done or attempted to do what the realist school reproaches it for not doing, many Europeans, probably a majority, would have accused the United States of warmongering.

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ships of world power? Is it advisable to flatter them and suggest that we need them, when they in fact need us much more? Furthermore, American opinion (including diplomatic opinion) tends to picture the uncommitted nations as choosing sides according to their sentiments and according to the morality and generosity they see in the great powers, while in fact they are or will be affected much more by their passions or their guesses about the outcome of the struggle. To the European realist, nothing seems more ridiculous than the attention paid by the State Department or the White House to what they call "world opinion."

There is no such thing as world opinion on the political level. The representatives of the uncommitted nations meeting in Belgrade did not condemn the Soviet resumption of nuclear tests, but they would have denounced the United States indignantly if it had taken the same initiative. Why this double standard, to use an American expression? There are several reasons, and different critics would choose a different combination: the uncommitted nations are more afraid of the U.S.S.R. than of the United States, they know the Soviets are less sensitive to moral condemnation, they are naturally more anti-capitalist than anti-Communist. They know that positive neutralism—that is, noncommitment expressed in language closer to the language of the Soviets than to that of the West, in general pays off. Positive neutralism, shrewdly practiced, often leads to competitive bidding among the great powers for the good will of the neutrals, even to competitive financial generosity. The lesson is simple: the uncommitted nations are not the arbiters of justice and injustice; popular opinion and the opinion of politicians is no more impartial in the neutral world than in the West or in the Soviet bloc. Where is that world opinion to which Adlai Stevenson is so sensitive, outside his imagination? The realists would say, "Let the United States do what its own defense and that of the free world requires and stop being frightened by a phantom."

The American attitude toward the United Nations falls under the same criticism. What basis is there for attributing to the votes of the General Assembly, at present consisting of the delegates of one hundred and four states, a superior value to decisions taken by the states or by a bloc of states? The members of the United Nations behave in New York as they do elsewhere. They are selfish, seeking their own advantage, power, or prestige. What results from their debates is not the "general will" dreamed of by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, it is not always even a fair compromise, but rather an equivocal text

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on which a majority was able to agree because in its last precise formulation the text was unacceptable only to a minority.

It is true that a considerable number of American diplomats have no illusions about the United Nations. President Kennedy referred to the world organization as "a hope and an instrument." Setting aside the hope, the instrument remains. Mr. Khrushchev attacked the instrument because it made it possible for the Anglo-French Suez operation to be liquidated without too much damage, because it maintained a degree of peace on the frontiers between Israel and her neighbors, and because in the Congo it aided the formation of a government which wished to be moderate and neutral.

This reasoning would not convince the realists, for whom General de Gaulle is a leading spokesman. They would say that the Congo problem should have been handled by the coordinate action of the powers directly concerned. In the opinion of the French President, United Nations intervention adds the confusion of the protector to the chaos of the protected. The United States will not allow itself to intervene openly and frankly, but it subjects itself to the opinion of the majority in the Security Council or the General Assembly. This means that the international community is dependent on contingents from Ethiopia or Ghana to establish order, even to bring Tshombe into line.

Even if the United Nations finally succeeds, even if Kasavubu and Adoula eventually establish a power acceptable to the West, to the neutral nations, and to the Congolese alike, General de Gaulle would not think in retrospect that he had been wrong and the White House right. As an instrument of diplomatic action, the international organization would still seem to him to be burdened with all the defects of parliamentary politics, at the mercy of demagoguery and disorder. Rational diplomacy is diplomacy that is quietly but firmly conducted by the great powers, disregarding the outcries of newspapers, the invective of the Kremlin, and the factitious indignation of the new masters of new nations. If it were argued that Western intervention in the Congo would have provoked intervention by the Soviet bloc, General de Gaulle would reply that the Kremlin has neither the means nor the wish to commit itself seriously in central Africa.

In short, in the opinion of European realists, American diplomacy was not able to foresee postwar problems during the hostilities, nor was it able to exploit its own superior resources in the early postwar

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period. American diplomacy maintained a defensive position, sometimes clumsy and always timid, when it could have taken the initiative. It was satisfied merely not to lose in Berlin and in Korea, and never did it either take the risks or face the cost of a winning policy. Today, with the uncommitted nations the subject of rivalry between the two blocs, American diplomacy confuses support of the United Nations (at best a tactical measure, useful in some circumstances) with development of strategy, and, by fearing a world opinion which exists only in the minds of some diplomats, it subjects United States action to a ridiculous concern with prestige, to the anticolonial or anti-Western prejudices of the transient leaders of states which owe their existence (more fictitious than real) to the disintegration of European empires and to the rival ideologies of the two great powers.

The interpretation of United States diplomacy by the idealist school, although perhaps not contradictory to the foregoing, is quite different. It has four main themes, in my opinion. (1) *The anti-Communist obsession* has degenerated into excessive fear of the danger created by the men and ideas of the Kremlin. There are several expressions of this obsession and various arguments against it. In New Delhi one of the most influential newspapermen, speaking of American diplomacy, told me, "By crying 'wolf' when there is none, the United States may end by speaking to deaf ears when the wolf appears." In Europe, a dozen years ago, the French equivalent of the Indian journalist would probably have said, "American diplomacy acts as if there were imminent danger of military aggression from the East, whereas the Communist danger, if there is one, is more political than military, more a long-range threat than an immediate one." This school would add that the effectiveness of all the measures taken by American diplomacy, including the justifiable ones, is blunted because anti-Communism rather than a positive policy seems to be both their cause and their goal.

(2) Communism being not only the primary but virtually the absolute enemy, *any government, even a reactionary one, seems worthy of American support if it is or seems to be the only alternative to power in the hands of men oriented toward Moscow.* The best informed critics of the idealist school would recognize that in certain cases American diplomacy did not have much choice, that a despot or a military oligarchy was the only possible alternative for the exercise of power excluding Communists or radical reformers.

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Critics would maintain, however, that sometimes American diplomacy unduly restricts its own choices by equating radical reformers with Communists, and at other times it adapts itself too easily to a despotism which is neither necessary nor inevitable until it becomes intolerable and is overthrown by a popular revolt. When the leaders of such a revolt reproach Washington for leniency toward despotism and thus appear to be anti-American, they are treated as enemies by American diplomats. In this way the United States risks being considered an ally of reaction and an enemy of progress. The result is that a movement like the Cuban revolution slides into Moscow's camp.

(3) Cuba illustrates another error committed by American diplomacy over the years: that of putting too much confidence in alliances or military pacts. Up to 1945 American diplomacy remained faithful to the tradition of avoiding alliances or commitments which would limit American freedom of action. This tradition is composed of two distinct elements: the desire to avoid international conflicts (isolationism), and concern not to be bound by agreements made in advance. It asserted itself again after World War I and was responsible for the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and of membership in the League of Nations. Since 1945 the United States, glorifying what it had condemned, has indefatigably accumulated treaties: the North Atlantic Pact, the South-East Asia Pact, the Reciprocal Defense Pacts with South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. In South America, under the pretext of defending the hemisphere against military aggression (one wonders from where) the United States has supplied arms to all governments of whatever stamp. Fidel Castro's guerillas fought against tanks furnished to Batista by the Pentagon. Further afield, critics wonder whether a pact with or the supply of arms to Pakistan helped to stabilize the situation, or whether on the contrary they did not provoke a kind of local arms race between the two successor states to British India.

(4) Finally, the idealists consider American diplomacy to have been exceptionally rigid, especially in John Foster Dulles' time. In Asia, more than ten years after the assumption of power by Mao Tse-tung, American diplomacy stubbornly continues to recognize the survivors of the Nationalist Chinese regime in Formosa as the legitimate government of China, even though they are incapable of setting foot in it. Perhaps the reader will object that American policy should not be accused of being at the same time too lenient toward

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the neutrals and too rigid toward the Soviet Union and Communist China, but this is in fact the image of American foreign policy abroad: it stands firm in Quemoy and Matsu, it forbids Japan and the Philippines to renew diplomatic relations with Communist China, and on the other hand it supports Nasser against the British and French after the nationalization of the Suez canal. To be sure, John Foster Dulles refused to finance the high dam at Aswan, and even based his refusal on arguments which could not but hurt the Egyptian president, but apart from this decision, expressed in an unnecessarily aggressive style, American diplomacy, because of its anti-Communist obsession, is always ready to make concessions to the neutral uncommitted nations in the hope of preventing them from making a commitment against the West.

At this point the idealists end up by joining the realists. What the former explain by the anti-Communist obsession, the latter explain by weakness or confusion, but they both hold it against American diplomacy that the United States seems less concerned to remain faithful to its friends than to please the uncommitted or somewhat hostile nations. The realists see in this a sign of mistaken idealism, a respect for "world opinion," which is invented to meet United States needs; the idealists denounce it as a result of the anti-Communist obsession. In the last analysis, the allies of the United States (the European allies, for example) are least likely to slide into Communism, and the neutrals, even if they are unfriendly, are most likely to commit themselves to the other side. If American diplomats seem at times to pay more attention to the neutrals than to the allies, it is not because they prefer the former, but because they are more afraid that the neutrals may decide to take the fatal plunge of adhesion to the Communist bloc. In this sense, the hierarchy of importance established by American diplomacy seems to be an inversion rather than an expression of the hierarchy of friendship. The uncommitted nations have the advantage of being the most removed from American affections, with the sole exception of the Communists. Fidel Castro could have gained much if he had stayed on the threshold instead of entering the temple.

Let us summarize the two types of criticism and try first to discern the valuable elements they have in common, and then to see how other elements cancel out by contradicting one another, so to speak. In the realist criticism, there are two themes which are generally accepted by enlightened opinion, even in the United States:

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the conduct of the war by Franklin D. Roosevelt and his administration was dictated by strictly military considerations and showed an absolute indifference to the problems of the peace. Everything that happened seemed to indicate that the American President did not understand the long-range implications of the various ways in which the war could be won. Similarly, there is no doubt that in 1945, after the capitulation of Japan, the United States demobilized too fast and did not know how to use the striking superiority it had at the time to prevent the sovietization of eastern Europe and impose a just settlement.

What can be argued is the extent to which these errors were *necessary*. Could Roosevelt have followed Sir Winston Churchill's suggestion of a major operation in the Balkans in order not to let eastern Europe be "liberated" by the Red army alone? Could he have placed less confidence in Stalin, or at least left his successor instructions to reverse the policy imposed by the war against Germany as soon as possible? Could Truman not have resisted the demand to "bring the boys home" and thus have saved eastern Europe from sovietization by using threats, if not force? It would be futile to pretend to give categorical answers to these questions. What is indisputable is that between 1941 and 1945 American diplomacy had only one enemy, Hitler's Germany, that from 1945 to 1948 it deprived itself of the military means it actually had, which a great power cannot do without, following a war which had put the territorial settlement of the entire planet at stake.

Concerning the period 1948 to 1958, both the realists and the idealists are right; American diplomacy acted with moderation but sometimes spoke in extremes. Obsessed with anti-Communism, the United States took a minimum of risks and maintained a consistently defensive policy. It avoided the dangers of action even when it could have brought victory, not merely avoiding defeat. Not even in such cases would the United States risk the cost. Could not American vision have been broader? Could not the United States' objective have been to defeat the "Chinese volunteers" and not merely to repulse the North Koreans? Was a local military victory possible without a serious risk of spreading the war? I am tempted, with hindsight, to give affirmative answers to these questions, but I am not sure that this was my conviction at the time, and I am sure that more dynamic action would have been denounced as aggression and warmongering by a majority of Europeans. In other words, the realists are not wrong in suggesting that the United States could

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have taken greater advantage of its superiority, and the idealists are not wrong in stressing the rigidity of American diplomacy and its obsession with anti-Communism. Both would be wrong to forget, however, that the foreign actions of the United States in Europe and in Asia were essentially in line with the ideas of moderate Europeans.* Action was defensive because the Western democracies had no desire for conquest or reconquest, and, in a test of force between democracies and totalitarian regimes, it is always the latter who take the offensive. The action was finally cautious and in no way warlike, not because the United States is a "paper tiger," but because its only goal was to contain communist expansion.**

We come then to the last theme on which the idealists and realists meet, although they do not use the same words or formulate the same reproaches: the American attitude toward the uncommitted world. In fact, it is useful to distinguish between different times and various regions of the world. In Africa and in Asia the United States was dealing with the colonies of its European allies. It wanted to show its sympathy for movements of national liberation without breaking the Atlantic Pact. Even though the Europeans more than once cursed the powerful transatlantic ally, the United States can congratulate itself on having virtually accomplished the task it set itself. Decolonization is almost complete, and relations between the United States and its partners in the North Atlantic Pact are no worse than they were ten years ago. It may be that Portugal will prefer to leave the Atlantic alliance tomorrow rather than resign itself to decolonization, but even a break with Portugal (which is rather improbable) would be a failure of only secondary importance in a policy which has been on the whole successful.

Although American policy toward national liberation movements and European nations has been criticized by some as too favorable to the former and by others as too careful of the latter's feelings, the most serious crises have arisen in regions where it was not really a question of decolonization properly so-called, for example, on the occasion of the nationalization of the Suez canal by the Egyptian government. It is the general attitude of the United States toward

* Errors of execution must also be excepted, like the possible misunderstanding of American intentions that was probably at the bottom of the Korean campaign.

** We pass over the main American defeat, the victory of the Communist party in China, because at the time Europeans were primarily absorbed in their own problems.

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the uncommitted nations which is criticized, an attitude dominated by anti-Communism and expressed in military pacts, in support of reactionary governments and in rabble-rousing rivalry with the Soviet Union, resulting eventually in concessions to the most determined of the neutral leaders.

The American leader may answer that the various expressions of the American attitude toward the uncommitted nations can be more or less justified by the circumstances. I willingly agree. It is easy to denounce the inadequacies of Diem's government in South Viet Nam, but it remains to be proved that any other would be better. Similarly, military pacts, even with countries not exposed to direct aggression, can be a means of reinforcing a weak government and of showing interest in the political fate of a new state. Only a detailed analysis would enable us to measure precisely the advantages and disadvantages of the measure taken in each case.

Having made these reservations, I am nonetheless inclined to support the fundamental objection: United States policy, because of its anti-Communist obsession, ends by giving the states it protects the feeling that the normal order is reversed. The protector state accepts conditions imposed by the protected states, as if in escaping Communism these states were doing a service to the United States rather than to themselves. American diplomacy would have everything to gain in dissipating the impression it has itself created that, wherever Communism is or seems to be a threat, the United States is ready to intervene with pacts, with dollars, even with soldiers. The fate of the United States does not depend on the domestic government of "Ruritania." The day when the State Department makes it clear that it is tired of "blackmail by threat of communism" and that it is determined not to yield to it any longer, a great step will have been taken.

Next, American policy should try to control its tendency to oscillate from one extreme to the other: yesterday hostile to neutrality, today resigned or even favorable to neutralism; yesterday accumulating military pacts, today concerned only with economic aid and alliance for progress; yesterday supporting any *de facto* government as long as it is anti-Communist, today trying to impose social reform and making such reform the condition of economic aid.

Finally and most importantly, American policy, even if it continues to act through the United Nations in some circumstances, should not be taken in by its own propaganda. Effective or not as an instrument, the United Nations is neither an impartial arbiter nor

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the expression of a "universal conscience," nonexistent at present. Concessions to the neutrals in order to obtain a majority in the Security Council or the General Assembly run the danger of being ultimately too expensive. In serious matters like armament and disarmament, there is no need to pay much attention to the opinions or prejudices expressed on all occasions by the governments of states which do not share the responsibility. Even in matters of secondary importance, it would be wrong for the United States to show too much concern with the judgments of the uncommitted nations. On the world scene, it is not a good thing for the strong to perpetuate the farce of submission to the weak. The U.S.S.R. never plays such a game, and it is none the worse off. The competition between the Soviet Union and the United States is neither a tournament of morality nor a rivalry in generosity.

In conclusion, it may be useful to note briefly European reactions to the Kennedy administration. Let us skip the first months of the administration, dominated and darkened by the Cuban fiasco. Now, a year and a half after the inauguration, what are the distinctive characteristics of Kennedy's methods, that is, of a policy whose goals and principal means cannot be modified by a change of President?

In relation to the uncommitted world, I note three characteristic actions. The Alliance for Progress in Latin America shows an effort to make economic aid conditional on social reform. The action in South Viet Nam and Laos shows American willingness to make a virtual military commitment, if need be, to contain Communist subversion. Finally, the recourse to the United Nations in the Congo operation, the military support given by the United States to the United Nations forces opposing the secession of Katanga, can be interpreted in idealist terms (the United Nations is the guarantor of peace or the hope of mankind) but also in realist terms (in certain cases the United Nations is a useful instrument for preventing a direct clash between the two blocs). These three actions in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Congo suffice to show that the Kennedy administration is not dogmatic but is ready to use the language of social reform, the language of guns, or the language of international law, depending on the particular situation. This eclecticism or flexibility, once recognized for what it is, should be approved by moderate opinion in Europe. Up to the present time, critics have paid most attention to the third case, United States

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support of a *military* operation on the part of the United Nations.

As regards the Soviet Union, the originality of the Kennedy policy lies chiefly in the serious attention given to the ideas of academic specialists, especially in regard to arms, disarmament, or arms control. These ideas have been cautiously received in Europe, partly because they are not understood, but also because they are purely technical and overlook the political aspects of the problem.

The new administration is even more opposed than the Eisenhower administration to the spreading dissemination of atomic weapons, but its leaders did not consider in advance the probable reaction of the British, French, and Germans to a system in which Americans would retain exclusive control of nuclear weapons, while the Europeans devoted their resources to conventional weapons. Meanwhile, since the Russians have resumed testing, and since negotiations about stopping tests have definitely failed, the Kennedy administration is forced to "rethink" its policy. It is not enough to show that "rationally" a world with only two thermonuclear powers is more stable than a world with three or four deterrent forces; it is also necessary to convince both the allies and the neutrals that the possession of the decisive weapons should be reserved to the United States and the Soviet Union. I have never thought that the experts of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology or the Rand Corporation would succeed in convincing General de Gaulle, Mao Tse-tung, or even Mr. Strauss.

Imperfectly understood, the Pentagon's ideas have disturbed Europeans, who see in them the germ of a partial withdrawal. If Americans demanded of Europeans an increased effort in conventional arms, it would mean that they are no longer prepared to give Europeans protection by the threat of thermonuclear reprisals. The result is to draw a radical distinction between the Old World and American territory, the former not protected, the second protected by a deterrent force exclusively under the orders of the President of the United States.

At the present hour, President Kennedy's advisers are discovering that an *explicit* agreement between the Big Two to close the Atomic Club is not possible. They are learning that technically correct ideas may be politically inapplicable. In short, they are leaving the ivory towers and dealing with politics, measuring the distance between Cambridge and the White House, between the models of the game theory and the reasoning processes of statesmen. General de Gaulle never played poker at Princeton, and he probably has

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never opened the book of J. von Neumann and Morgenstern, but he knows the force of a "no" in a game where the rules forbid laying the cards on the table. Or, if you like, he knows the value of a refusal in a test of will which does not permit the open use of force. I am sure the day will soon come when these American leaders, their minds trained in rational disciplines, will make the inevitable concessions to others' motives, even if these appear irrational in their own eyes. On that day, the policy of the Kennedy administration will be grand.

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BERNARD BRODIE

Defense Policy and the Possibility of Total War

THE UNITED STATES, the original home of the doctrine of "massive retaliation," is also the country with a national compulsion to deny the possibility of total war.* One needs no more vivid proof than the surge of shocked rejection provoked in the latter part of 1961 and the beginning of 1962 by some serious talk and a slight amount of activity concerning fallout shelters.[1] One recalls in the same connection the bitter denunciation by some reviewers, and by many others who may or may not have seen the book of Herman Kahn's *On Thermonuclear War*.

So far as concerns shelters, the significant factors from our point of view are the passionate and also the discriminate nature of the outcry against them, which stands out against a remarkably passive public acceptance of a national-security budget recently raised to fifty billion dollars and covering an array of conspicuously offensive and therefore presumably more "provocative" weapons. The initial outlay for a public fallout shelter program was projected at something over one percent of that figure for the first year. Why then has this program—especially the private efforts which were quite independent of the government allocations—been singled out for such special reprobation?

Clearly, fallout shelters, like the Kahn book, are objectionable because, unlike ballistic missiles, they cannot be written off to "deterrence"—a useful and important word that has by now acquired some of the qualities of magic. The fallout shelter *may* help somewhat in deterrence, but its curse is that its most ob-

* This paper was in the main prepared while the author was on leave of absence from The RAND Corporation on a Reflective Year Fellowship awarded by the Carnegie Corporation. Thus The RAND Corporation and its sponsors are more than usually dissociated from the views expressed by the author.

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vious utility is for saving life *in the event of total war*. Thus to accept shelters is to accept the possibility of the unthinkable. The thought frightens, and fright hides behind moralistic indignation.

For the purposes of this article, the most interesting argument urged against shelters is that they would make war more likely. They will do so, according to various views, by making the citizenry and the politicians more complacent or more bellicose and by detracting from the more "positive" kind of efforts for peace—that is, proposals for disarmament and the like, where the appeal to the opponent gains its force only indirectly or in veiled fashion from military power.

Yet even if it were true that fallout shelters would make war more likely, it would still be important to know: By how much? And against what useful result? We should also want to know how much probability of war already existed before this alleged incitement or provocation was added. Even if the probability of war were originally either very low or very high, we might still want to go ahead with our shelter program so long as shelters (a) added only marginally to the risk, and (b) had a good chance of being considerably useful in war; for a low probability is not the same as a zero probability where so much is at stake, and a high probability puts a certain urgency on getting ahead with anything that promises to reduce substantially the loss in lives. However, I must stress that our example is purely hypothetical. In any kind of sober analysis of all the relevant factors (which has not yet been done), a noncrash program for the provision of shelters will probably appear to be, especially in relation to the mass of other preparedness measures, of slight effect on the probability of war; and that slight effect is as likely to turn out negative as positive.[2]

Our example demonstrates that it is often useful or necessary to think quantitatively, at least in terms of "more" or "less," of "much" or "little," even where we cannot discover the true values for the relevant quantities or probabilities. The knowledge or strong suspicion that a is greater than b may be important to our policy even when we do not know the true value of a or b. Similarly, to know that something is "conceivable" is to know only that it has a finite probability, which may, however, be also an extremely low probability (as for example the so-called "catalytic" war about which so much has been written and said, that is, the war started

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or provoked by the clandestine action of a third party who desires to see the protagonists at each other's throats). Policy makers may and should respond in their planning to an array of possible contingencies, and not merely to the single most expected event; but it might take a prodigal expenditure of resources to attempt to prepare for every event that is merely conceivable.

How, then, shall we appraise, if not measure, the probability of total war, or "general" war, as the military prefer to call it? It is certainly more than merely conceivable, for it is frequently being explicitly or implicitly threatened by one side or the other in the cold war. The probability of such war is also clearly affected by our policies, so that by acts of omission or commission we can make it much more or much less probable. On the other hand, it is not always easy to know what actions, or omissions, have what effect on the degree of probability. Also, we suspect that the best behavior on our part would still leave a residual possibility of we know not what dimensions. Uncertainty concerning the degree of probability of general war is the problem most basic to our national defense policies, and it has equally great consequences for our military commitments with our allies in NATO and elsewhere.

If Americans are reluctant to accept seriously the threat of general war, the British and other Europeans have been even more so. This applies even to people who are deeply interested and well informed, and whose views are often reflected in governmental policy. In the United Kingdom, for example, a retired head of the Royal Air Force can write of total war having been "abolished" by nuclear weapons[3]—a view that in America is least likely to be advanced by a senior air force officer, whether active or retired. In France the well-known book by General Pierre Gallois, formerly of the French Air Force, *Stratégie de l'âge nucléaire*, advances the view that not only total war but all war will be abolished by nuclear weapons when enough countries have such weapons.[4] He avoids too heavy a commitment to the status quo by allowing for *faits accomplis*, but insists that they will go unchallenged.

There has been a great deal of direct or implied criticism of American "overspending" on total war capabilities, especially in the United Kingdom. Total war and limited war capabilities do indeed compete for funds, but President Kennedy's administration is apparently determined to build up both, thereby accepting the necessity of a larger over-all defense budget. The President seems to

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be, among other things, of a different mind from his predecessor about what "the country can afford."

However, easing somewhat the restrictions on the over-all budget can only alleviate marginally the conflict of views within the United States about what defense funds ought to go where. Everyone concerned will admit that, since the ability to retaliate to a strategic nuclear strike is basic to our security—and to that of the whole Western alliance—its requirements must have first priority. Unfortunately, that admission does not answer the question: How much is *enough* for the retaliatory force? For several years there has been a heated controversy within the American military services, much of it inevitably in public, concerning the minimum and maximum needs for the retaliatory forces. Interservice controversies about budgets are bound to be with us always, but this one involves a question of basic principle.

One side has held that what it calls "finite retaliation" (an adjustment from what it formerly labeled "minimum retaliation") is enough. The saved resources, it feels, should go into limited-war capabilities. The other side is in favor of a general-war fighting capability which, although certainly not infinite, is nevertheless much larger; and they are willing to cut back on limited war, and certainly on conventional war capabilities. The military, it should be noticed, are generally much more concerned than most economists with the danger of "bankrupting the country" by military expenditures; to them it is not simply a matter of what Congress and the Administration will allow.

The interesting thing about this argument is not the precise levels sought by each side but the fact that the "finite retaliation" advocates put the chances of total war at an extremely low level —though they concede that it is the existence of the retaliatory force that makes the risk so small. They believe not only that the deterrence of total war should be our first and major strategic goal, but also that it is a *sufficient goal so far as concerns total war.* They hold, therefore, that a relatively modest retaliatory force, especially if it is secure (like a few squadrons of submarines of a Polaris type) is enough to deter. The other side argues first that it is very difficult to know how much is enough to deter, given different kinds of crisis and given especially the fact that techniques are constantly changing (there may well be an "answer" to Polaris submarines); and they point out second, by a logical extension of the first argu-

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ment, that a total war may break out *despite* deterrence, in which case it will then have to be fought to a favorable conclusion, or anyway to the least disastrous one possible. There is an important difference, they insist, between winning and losing even a nuclear war, and there are vastly different degrees of damage to be suffered in either winning or losing.

Why should we have a total war? Mr. Khrushchev seems clearly not to want one, and certainly we do not. The Communist Chinese, to be sure, differ from their Russian colleagues most crucially on the question of the "inevitability" of cataclysmic war between the Communist and the "capitalist" worlds—a quarrel, or at least a divergence, in which the Chinese hold rigidly to the unreconstructed Leninist view. Nevertheless, for a long time to come Communist China will not want to provoke a general war with the United States. Her present lack of the means to fight such a war is sufficient guarantee to that. So long as China lacks a large nuclear and missile capability, the belief of her leaders in the inevitability of all-out war may even work to our advantage rather than the reverse. A government that thinks general war possible or probable —let alone "inevitable"—may for that reason be more cautious about moves that might provoke it prematurely. If their behavior has been outrageous, we may reflect that it might have been a good deal more outrageous.

We should now clarify what we mean by a significant probability of total or general war. Obviously, a degree of probability low enough to have warranted a quite relaxed attitude before the advent of nuclear weapons may well be alarming under nuclear conditions. This change is due not only to the enormously greater destructiveness of war under nuclear conditions, especially to the home territories of the major contenders, but also to the fact that in nuclear general war virtually all significant preparations must be completely ready in advance. The latter consideration is in some respects more overwhelming than the former, certainly in its requirements on the peacetime thinking of the citizenry concerning war.

Thus, even if we estimate the probability of a general war within any given time span as very low, say one percent, the implications for policy of our taking seriously that degree of probability might be very great. One is reminded of the famous formula $E=mc^2$ that Einstein gave the world in 1905 and that accounts for the tremen-

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dous energy released by nuclear reactions, whether fission or fusion. In the fission bomb only a relatively small proportion of the atoms available for fission actually undergo it, and of those atoms that do only about one-thousandth of the mass is translated into energy. Yet the bomb yields enormous power. The reason is that the constant which is squared in the formula represents the speed of light! With a multiplier so huge, "M" can be quite small and still yield a very large E. In the same way, so far as contingency planning is concerned, a low probability is subject, should the event occur, to the multiplier of untold costs, even with a moderately favorable outcome, and to much more heinous penalties if preparations have been critically lacking.

These considerations suggest, incidentally, that even a fairly sharp improvement in political relations between the opposing blocs would, if these matters were decided according to cold reason, have a relatively small effect, at least on certain kinds of defense preparations. If a program for fallout shelters is indicated during the hotter phases of the Berlin crisis, its continuation is indicated even if that issue cools off or is resolved, for such a program takes a long time to carry out, and the political climate may deteriorate again.

Much the same is true of armaments like antimissile missiles, in which the measure of adequacy in numbers is a matter not so much of superiority over an enemy but of proportionality to peoples, areas, or installations to be defended. In a matter like antimissile missiles, however, obsolescence is a critical factor; and therefore an alleviation of political tensions might mean more emphasis on furthering research and development, rather than on procurement, while an intensification of political heat might have the opposite result. Nevertheless, in rational planning, we should expect a good deal less than proportionality between shifts in the political climate and shifts in the pace and direction of a weapon program. The two relevant questions to be asked of any improvement in political affairs are first, how enduring is it likely to be, and second, is the probability of general war, though diminished, still sufficient to be material in our calculations? In other words, in this changed, relatively benign atmosphere, can a dangerous storm still arise?

Any specific estimate of the probability of an event must also be fitted into a time dimension if it is to have meaning. Over a

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long enough run, almost anything can happen. But our decisions, especially in the fields of military and political policy, are not concerned with the state of the world over the next two hundred years, nor even the next fifty. Our military policy decisions do have to be concerned with lead time in the development and production of new weapon systems, and such lead times are generally longer than the layman expects them to be. Even so, ten to fifteen years is about as long a time as we can meaningfully plan ahead with respect to specific hardware systems. The last ten years, incidentally, have been long enough to see two distinct and basic revolutions in weaponry: the advent and quick development of both the thermonuclear bomb and the long-range missile, each developing the potency of the other.

Weapon systems are not all that matter; there is a political structure of the world to be considered too, and that happens also to be subject to swift and often unpredictable shifts. Anyway, for the purpose of making estimates of the probability of war, something between a decade and a score of years is as long a span as one should reasonably attempt to handle.

Even if it were possible to arrive at some kind of estimate of the probability of war for the next ten or fifteen years, we should have a figure which has meaning only as a statistical norm. Probability figures are derived from or pertain to a multiple array of similar events, and, when we say that something has an 0.1 probability of happening, we mean that out of ten recurrences of essentially like circumstances the event in question will tend to occur once—though it would be more reliable to express the proportionality in terms of larger figures, like ten out of a hundred. When we discuss the probability of general war, however, we are talking about a unique event—at least, most of us are interested only in the one that happens next—and a unique event is almost by definition an aberration from any statistical estimate of probability. To the person who gets killed on his first plane ride, it does not matter that tens of thousands of others have flown repeatedly without accident. The odds for him have been tremendously in his favor, yet he has lost. Similarly, even if we could be assured that the probability of general war is low, we should nevertheless have to be guided in many of our policies by the realization that it *could* happen—as long as we lack real guarantees against its happening. On the other hand, it is also true historically that the world has often seen wars

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between two states averted, sometimes permanently, even though there were periods in which such a war looked highly probable.

Above all, the probability of total war is affected by what we do about it. It is possible to imagine a world in which general war could be produced only by madmen. That would not relieve us of all our worries, but at least it would be a different and safer world from the one we live in now. Much remains to be done in the military field, and no doubt in other fields as well, to reduce the chances that *sane* men could resort to total war. Among the various military actions likely to have that effect, the most important by far are those which reduce the vulnerability of the retaliatory forces—thereby reducing or even nullifying the advantage of striking first, or the necessity of quick reaction or of anticipating enemy action.

Naturally we are most interested, by a very wide margin, in reducing the vulnerability of our own retaliatory forces—which is to say, in assuring ourselves of the ability to retaliate if hit—but we are not comparably desirous of denying the enemy a similar posture. If the overriding object is to reduce the probability of general war, it is not necessarily true that whatever is his gain is our loss, or vice versa. It is a very good thing to be able to hit the enemy hard *if* we go first, and certainly it may be useful to be able to make that threat; but against that consideration we have to weigh first the fact that we are not likely to go first, and second, the compensating advantages to us of his feeling secure in his retaliatory force, which should make him less trigger-happy in a crisis. To be sure, *our* being secure in itself greatly reduces any tendency on his part to be trigger-happy—though such a term does not in any case describe what Russian-American relations have thus far been like.

The Russians will not ask us to decide for them how they should handle their vulnerability problem, but by our example we will certainly influence their relevant decisions. If making our retaliatory forces more secure causes them to make theirs more secure, the net result appears clearly more advantageous to both sides (in terms of reducing the probability of general war) than a condition of mutual vulnerability. One must be clear, however, that a condition of mutually decreased vulnerability tends to shift the burden for supporting policy to limited-war forces.

We shall have more to say on this subject presently, but let us

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consider now the view which, as we have already seen, is held by many people of public importance: that the probability of total war is extremely slight or nonexistent. This view is generally based on three assumptions: (1) it would be irrational for the Soviet leaders to start a total war; (2) they are not irrational; and (3) we in the West would have the same inhibitions, plus moral ones.

Each of these assumptions, if not demonstrably wrong, is at least demonstrably unfounded. One might reply to each in turn as follows: (1) it may indeed be rational for the Soviet leaders to start a total war, which is to say that they might think it rational and have fairly good reasons for thinking so; (2) to argue that the Soviet leaders would never act irrationally or on the basis of emotion on so grave an issue is in effect to argue, against voluminous evidence, that they are superhuman; and (3) we are ourselves not much less capable than the Soviet leaders of starting a war for what might pass as rational reasons, and at least as capable of doing so irrationally—our moral inhibitions probably being in both instances subject to quick erosion under pressure. To be sure, one must explain and justify each of these replies.

First, as for the question of the rationality of attack by the Soviets on us, or for that matter the other way round, one naturally has to deal with a fairly confined appreciation of the term "rational." Thus, when we say that an attack can be rational, we mean simply that it can accomplish an immediate advantage over a dangerous opponent, the advantage being of sufficient dimensions to quell or control the danger. The argument that in the long run such a tactic cannot pay has the impossible task of proving that long-run considerations should prevail over short-run ones, even in a duel.

In his article, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," published in *Foreign Affairs* in January 1959, Albert Wohlstetter called attention to the likelihood that if the enemy struck first in an all-out war, most of our retaliatory forces might never get into the air against him, and those that did might never arrive over their targets (at that time the retaliatory forces were comprised exclusively of aircraft). Thus, in a showdown the enemy might see a chance to eliminate our power with something like impunity. Presumably, with some modifications for differences in target intelligence and other factors, including a marked strategic bombing superiority on our side, the reverse was also true, but Wohlstetter was address-

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ing himself primarily to our own dangers and to what we had to do to remedy them.

That article attracted much attention, as well it should have, since the arguments were largely novel and shocking and were implemented with great skill. Possibly Wohlstetter was overlooking some important intangibles (the balance has in the intervening time proved something other than "delicate") but his factual data were impressive, and he was drawing attention to a situation which was either actually or potentially dangerous and which was until that moment almost completely overlooked by interested laymen, as well as by many who were not laymen.

The question now is whether adequate measures are being taken to reduce progressively and rapidly any continuing danger. We have Polaris submarines, and programs are under way to "harden" or shelter the launching sites of long-range land-based missiles. Other things have been done or are planned to make an enemy surprise attack less likely to succeed in destroying our retaliatory forces. Whether these steps are sufficient in view of the changing nature of the danger (including for example, a phenomenal accuracy in long-range missiles which was undreamed of four or five years ago and which, along with more powerful warheads, makes the problem of defending one's own retaliatory missiles much more difficult) cannot be answered here. However, a few generalizations which are both pertinent and important can be made.

First, it takes a lot of money to make a retaliatory force secure; and because the character of the danger changes, the investment must be a continuing one, requiring imaginative anticipation as well as a liberal dedication of resources. Second, this kind of imagination and liberal spending has always in the past been much more easily evoked for offensive than for defensive requirements, even where the defensive measures affect the security of a basically offensive force. There are strong military traditions, especially in the United States, which account for this leaning or bias, and they are not necessarily stupid or pointless traditions. We may now expect the United States Navy to stress the value of protection, since for the Polaris-submarine system its whole reason for being lies in its inherent protection of its retaliatory power, but the development of that attitude happens in historical fact to be more the result of the system's existence than the cause of it.

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Before leaving the matter of rational or semirational attack and the problem of deterring it, we have to mention also that our conceptions of what comprise "unacceptable losses" to the enemy may easily be overcomplacent. Obviously, we ought to think in terms of moods during a sharp and bitter crisis, in which mutual intransigence is compounded with fear of each other's next move. In designing an edifice, the architect does not consider merely the wind load of a summer's breeze; he takes into account the worst gales the region has known, and adds some safety factor for that still worse gale yet to come. The same must be true of a retaliatory force, which has to deter not merely those attacks which might be based on quiet calculations of advantage but also those which spring from the sharp conviction that untold danger lies in waiting. In this connection we have to think as well of gambles provoked by frenzied anger or despair of alternatives, but that takes us outside the realm of the rational.

Yet outside the realm of the rational is where we find a great part if not the greater part of political as well as personal behavior. It is a common and persistent vice of historians that they overrationalize the motives and behavior of the persons they describe, including such behavior as decisions for war. Among historians of the American Civil War the so-called "revisionist school" has taken as its trade-mark the position that that conflict was the "unnecessary war" because it was apparently precipitated by the emotional behavior of "hotheads." No doubt in the genesis of that war strong emotions played an especially important part, but one wonders if the revisionists would consider the emotional causes of the Civil War so exceptional if they had studied other wars with comparable intensity.

In any case, emotion is not a dispensable or easily controllable factor in the decisions of human beings, especially in the kinds of decisions which lead to war. For that matter, why should it be considered unreasonable of people to have been emotional about slavery? Surely an antipathy to slavery within one's own country should be no more difficult to explain or justify than an antipathy to disunion or even to war. Do we really want people to be insensitive to the most vile kind of injustice? The revisionists, blaming with lofty impartiality the "hotheads" on both sides, have managed to achieve such insensitivity, largely by ignoring or denying a mass of solid historical data pertaining to slavery, but surely this is not scientifi-

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cally commendable, let alone morally so. Anyway, when it comes to explaining the causes of a war, this condemnation of emotion is really throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

Today there is a current doctrine that the Soviet leaders are especially cold and calculating in their political behavior, and that however emotionally others might act, *they* at least are not going to be swept along on the winds of passion. It is true, as Nathan Leites pointed out some years ago in his *Operational Code of the Politburo* and his *Study of Bolshevism*, that the Russian Communist leaders have taken special pains to admonish themselves against yielding to emotion in their political behavior, and it is likely that this admonition has had some tangible, important effects. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court recurrently admonishes itself that its function is to find the law, not to make it—and this self-admonition too has real and important results on its decisions. But it is also true that when the Supreme Court splits on a decision, as it so often does, one usually sees the personalities lined up in a somewhat accustomed and predictable pattern—which only proves again that we are dealing with men and not machines.

One could go on with endless examples to demonstrate what should hardly need demonstration, that bias is not easily curbed, partly because its possessor usually does not recognize it as such; that bias affects and conditions perception as well as action, and the effects of bias on perception are not desultory or spasmodic but constant. Above all, bias almost always has an emotional underpinning. This is not the place to go into an extended discussion of the effects of unconscious as well as conscious emotion on behavior, but it is pertinent to point out that there is by now a large literature on the subject, all the essentials of which are absolutely ignored by those who insist that the Soviet leaders, or any other leaders for that matter, are not going to act irrationally, which is to say emotionally, especially on issues involving violence or the threat of it. It is in fact reasonable to assert the exact contrary: that they are *bound* to act at times irrationally, even in important matters, simply because all men do so. Neurotics tend to do so more than others, but there is not the slightest evidence that the Soviet Union has a lower incidence of neurosis than other countries or that neurotics are less likely there to climb into high political positions.

Incidentally, what we are saying here is certainly not new. Plato lamented the fact that kings were not philosophers, and that they

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acted out of passion rather than reason. So have many other writers since his time, but always there has been the opposite tendency to assume the rationality of great decisions. La Rochefoucauld put his finger on it when he said: "Men would make us believe that the great and dazzling acts of history are the results of carefully thought-out plans; actually they are more often the results of men's moods and passions."

We come now to the final point outlined earlier, which indicated that we in the West, especially the United States, are not going to leave entirely to the other side all possible initiative for a general war. What we can almost certainly rule out is a coldly calculated preventive war by us, designed to take advantage of a temporary military imbalance in our favor. Since it would be imprudent to assume that the reverse situation must also hold equally true—that is, that the Soviets would surely refrain from exploiting a temporary but decisive military advantage—we are making an assumption that gives ourselves higher marks for morality. But that is as far as we ought to go in letting our beliefs about asymmetry of morals affect our judgments on who is capable of launching total war. In periods of intense crisis, we are probably as capable as the Russians of acting out what may seem to be the imperatives of the moment. Our conceptions of what we are compelled to do will be molded, like theirs, by a range of rational, semirational, and nonrational judgments or impressions, all coming out of human beings charged with emotion, including emotions of which the possessors are not even conscious.

In addition, we have commitments which may force us to take intransigent and even menacing positions. We live in a world in which many things have changed and are continuing to change drastically—above all, methods of waging war—but in which the basic patterns of diplomacy have changed relatively little. These patterns continue to place heavy reliance on threats of force, implicit or explicit, to maintain existing positions, or to change them in one's favor. Granted that the world's statesmen feel far greater fear and horror of what wars bring than they did before the nuclear revolution, or for that matter before 1914, that fact has not yet been enough to bring into being adequate substitutes for the age-old reliance upon force.

The "massive retaliation" doctrine laid down in 1954 by the late John Foster Dulles was perhaps stillborn, but at any rate it is dead

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now, if we mean by the term a strong disposition to reply to limited or local kinds of aggression with total war. The recognition of this fact is causing the present administration to take vigorous steps to revive forces equipped to fight with nonnuclear weapons. We are attempting also to impress our new ideas as to the value of conventional forces on our allies in NATO and elsewhere. But who can ever know what will come of a limited response to a limited aggression? If we were to guarantee in advance that our response would remain in each case within nonnuclear bounds, we would only stimulate the enemy to try to outmatch us in the localized application of force—which in many areas he will be able to do, secure in the knowledge that he runs no exceptional risks in doing so. That kind of guarantee we should not give him, even if we could. But we cannot do it because, among other reasons, we cannot fully predict our own acts.

Under diplomatic pressure backed by threats, such as we have continued to experience concerning Berlin, it is usually neither feasible nor shrewd to yield. Conscious of our great over-all strength, we have to act in the expectation that our determination will induce the other side to refrain from carrying out his threats. But there can be no *guarantee* that determination, even if judged by the other side to be genuine, will have so benign an effect. Determination may be indispensable, but it may also not be enough in itself. It is largely this kind of ambiguity concerning what needs to be done that makes international politics so serious and so full of risk.

If the other side decides to push us out of Berlin, they can hope and even legitimately expect to maneuver in a way that will induce us to keep our counteraction limited. We are of course describing what will be for both sides a risky business; but which would be the first to back away from the risk? It is not at all certain that either side would do so in time, that is, in time to avoid resort by one side or the other to a total rather than to a limited use of force. And when I say "one side or the other," I mean indeed that it would be rash to predict in advance which side would be the more likely to make the final fateful decision. Each side would have great incentives not to do so, but with each side these incentives might suddenly give way to equally great incentives *to move first.*

I have not attempted to argue here that total war is likely within the next decade. If we thought that to be so, then our every other thought or program would have to yield place to frantic efforts in the time remaining to us to cope with the impending horror. In-

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stead, I am simply saying that there is no real basis for the relaxed assumption that total war has now been abolished by nuclear weapons. The implications of that simple statement, however, are that we must take *seriously* the fact that total war can happen, and to take that fact seriously is to do certain things which we have thus far almost entirely omitted to do (such as building fallout shelters) or to do adequately (such as increasing the protection of our retaliatory force).

They are things which must certainly add to the net burden of our defense costs, because there is no other area of our defense expenditures which can be appropriately shrunk enough to offset the difference. Certainly, I would not argue that expenditures for "conventional" or limited-war capabilities should be reduced. On the contrary, these have been too long neglected; the more effectively we do our job in the area of total war capabilities, the greater the range of possible cases for the application of limited force. In other words, we probably have to spend more on total war in order to have sound reasons for spending more on limited war.

References

1. Under the title, "Shelter Shakeout," the *Wall Street Journal* for 28 March 1962 carried an item to the effect that the market for private fallout shelters had collapsed. The boom, which began after a television speech by President Kennedy in July 1961, warning that a threat of war was inherent in Russia's drive for an October showdown over Berlin, never reached substantial dimensions and was quite short-lived.

2. The contrary view suggested by Arthur I. Waskow in "The Shelter-centered Society" (*Scientific American*, May 1962, pp. 46-51) is an interesting example of how such conclusions are commonly reached. This article is a condensation of the report of a conference held by the Peace Research Institute in Washington. The article announces that "it was the unanimous judgment of the [selected] conferees" that a shelter program would be extremely unlikely to produce a reaction among the American people in favor of disarmament. In fact, they expected the reverse effect. The assumptions are then implicitly made, without further examination, that (a) the effect on the American public would be intense enough to influence if not control American official behavior with respect to disarmament, (b) American official behavior is the critical factor determining the success or failure of disarmament negotiations, and (c) the success or failure of disarmament negotiations is the critical factor in determining whether or not we have a nuclear war. Each of these assumptions is, to say the least, of questionable validity and also of completely ambiguous content. For example, if the issue of

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nuclear war and peace really hangs on the issue of disarmament, surely it makes a difference what kind of disarmament we have as well as how much. See, for example, T. C. Schelling, "The Stability of Total Disarmament," Institute for Defense Analysis, Study Memorandum No. 1, October 1961.

3. The reference is to Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor; but since the above was written another retired head of the R. A. F., Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Dermot Boyle, has stated in a published lecture that he is quite "sure" that nuclear weapons will never be used in war. See his "Thoughts on the Nuclear Deterrent," *Journal of the United Service Institution,* February 1962, pp. 11-15.

4. Pierre Gallois, *Stratégie de l'âge nucléaire* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1960); published in translation under the title, *The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961.

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LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD

The United Nations in Crisis

The Role of the United Nations in United States Foreign Policy

In its uneven and crisis-ridden history the United Nations has several times been the object of serious reappraisal by those who saw in its actions (or inaction) signs that it was undergoing a process of significant change. The ways in which those changes have been viewed depend on one's attitudes and assumptions regarding the organization. Since these differ widely to begin with, it is not surprising that in the times of reappraisal—after the Cold War began in earnest, after Korea, after Suez and Hungary, indeed, from the beginning—the diagnoses and the prescriptions for cure have often been in diametrical conflict.

The first two years of the 1960's brought into focus still newer issues about the United Nations. The tendency of the Secretary Generalship under Dag Hammarskjöld to fill vacuums created by great power deadlocks; the explosive growth of newly independent states; and the growing suspicion of the Soviet Union that even without military divisions the United Nations had a capacity to thwart Russian ambitions—all these came to a head in the Congo. There the organization undertook the unprecedented task of pacifying and stabilizing the chaotic internal situation left in the former Belgian Congo when in July 1960 the European rulers executed an unexpected and clearly unprepared withdrawal of their colonial power. The complex events in the Congo, in particular the ensuing financial problem, brought about a crisis of confidence regarding the United Nations, a crisis that left in its wake still wider questions about the organization and the American interest in U. N. member-

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ship. Such questions are being asked both in the Congress and in the country at large. Many have questioned the very basis of American support for the organization.

There is every reason to welcome such a reappraisal if conducted soberly and responsibly. First, there have been disturbing events and portentous trends; their meaning needs to be better understood. Second, without any doubt things have been changing from what they were, and a new appraisal is timely. Last, there is always a chronic requirement to throw new light on an aspect of American diplomacy that is characteristically interpreted in terms of either sentimentality or prejudice.

The contemporary crisis affecting the United Nations comprises a number of elements. One element in recent American criticism of United States participation is the latent force of isolationism, of xenophobia, and of distrust of any form of international cooperation. The critics representing such views, normally at the fringe of our society, have always been quick to fish in the troubled waters of national policy. But the crisis of confidence has more serious components, which taken together have tended to create in the United States and other Western countries a growing uneasiness about the United Nations.

In the large, there has been a generalized impression of deterioration in the moral and political climate of international relations and in the standards of international behavior. In the context of the United Nations, where international politics are cast (at least verbally) in moral terms, the impression becomes concrete. In Western Europe there is a bitter resentment of what seems to many a double standard of international morality. It came to a head in 1956, when the United Nations appeared to ignore Soviet action in Hungary while focusing on British, French, and Israeli aggression at Suez. It did not help to point out that the United Nations took much the same purely hortatory action in both cases, the difference being the French, British, and Israeli susceptibility to the same type of political pressures as left Russia unmoved. When in 1961 India got away with what was clearly military aggression in Goa, the proof was in, for many Europeans, of the incorrigible bias in the ostensibly objective moral standard of the United Nations majority.

Other events, as seen by Western-European eyes, followed the same pattern: United Nations pressures on France in North Africa, the single-minded campaign against Portuguese colonialism and South African racialism, and finally, in late 1961, the use of force

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by the United Nations in Katanga, an act which in some European and American quarters raised the specter of a military power at the service of a United Nations majority that one day might be outright hostile to the West. In the United States resentment was primarily aimed at the default of friend and foe alike on certain of their financial obligations which we were somehow expected to make good.

From these grievances have developed the more sweeping indictments that the United Nations is composed of a host of self-centered, quarrelsome, hypocritical states; that it is worthless because it is unable to agree on solutions to such otherwise insoluble problems as disarmament and Soviet tyranny; that the members do not behave as though constrained by a higher law, but follow their own interests as they see fit; and, above all, that a majority of its members seem to repudiate the version of history and of international behavior traditional to the white man of the West. This complex of attitudes forms the background of the following estimate of the United Nations.

Now, as at any time in the turbulent world scene which the United Nations so faithfully mirrors, the organization makes sense only in the light of the real world of politics in which it is embedded. If the mirror of the United Nations is a prism that distorts and magnifies the light, still the light is cast by external sources. It has become trite to cite the great tidal events in the world which supply the historical context for the United Nations. I take it as given that the Cold War continues to be waged inside the United Nations as well as outside it—with occasional truces inside as well as out; that the Soviet leaders would dearly like to control the United Nations, and short of that to prevent it from taking action inimical to Soviet interests. But while the Cold War infinitely complicates the task of diplomacy everywhere, two great revolutions of the mid-twentieth century, neither of which directly involves United States-Soviet relations, supply the root causes for the situation in the United Nations. In an important sense, the Cold War is irrelevant to these two revolutions and they to the Cold War, except that one keeps impinging on the other. Neither 1789 nor 1917 entirely explains them, although 1776 and 1848 go a certain distance toward doing so.

One is the political and social revolution of premodern societies throughout the southern hemisphere, as they strive to catch up with the twentieth century and in the process to find their nationhood.

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Nothing is apparently going to stop this revolution. The United States, alone or through the United Nations, can either attempt to influence its course or, by subscribing in detail to the unprogressive colonial policies of some of our allies, accompany them to a historic dead end.

The other revolution is the technological revolution, with its by-product of an historically unprecedented capacity to destroy. Without the inhibiting effects of weapons which make general warfare irrational, and given the conflicts of our day which compare only to the religious wars of the sixteenth century in their intensity, we would undoubtedly long since have had World War III and probably World War IV as well. With a transformed strategy as backdrop, the present crisis surrounding the United Nations springs directly from the precipitate liquidation of the Western colonial empires and the explosive growth of nationalistically minded independent states in their stead. It remains only to ask whether what has happened in the United Nations is a consequence of evil motives, of incorrect policies, of a fundamental historic error in trying to work through international organization, or (as I would argue) whether it is in the main the result of these forces working themselves out, forces which would plague us in even greater measure if we had no international institutions with which to contain them, however imperfectly.

The resulting changes in the United Nations are in the non-Western orientation of a growing majority, and in the parliamentary power that majority has acquired. From a Western-oriented organization of 51 states, it has become a virtually universal organization of 106—universal except for mainland China, the two Germanies, the two Koreas, and the two Vietnams. The profound political consequence of that change in the United Nations is that the Afro-Asian states now command a numerical majority of votes and can easily muster the so-called "blocking third," which makes it impossible for a two-thirds resolution to be passed in the General Assembly over their concerted opposition. But the problem is not just arithmetic.

The growing United Nations majority practices two basic policies that clash with some Western interests on almost every count. One is the policy of nonalignment in the Cold War. The other is a doctrinaire and at times fanatical anticolonialism. Neither policy was produced by or in the United Nations; both would have to be faced even if there were no United Nations to bring them into sharp focus.

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Because the United Nations does just that, they tend to become identified with each other and to dominate our picture of the organization.

The Belgrade Conference in the early fall of 1961—an event that actually had nothing to do with the United Nations—was perhaps the most conspicuous example of a new double standard in international behavior. There the neutralist failure to react to the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union brought home with a shock the lack of symmetry between their expectations (and suspicions) of us, and their solicitude for Soviet sensibilities in the face of outrageous Communist behavior (the cases of Hungary and Tibet in the United Nations being earlier examples).

The neutral stance is compounded of a number of complex elements—fear, naive hopes, and a not so secret pleasure at seeing the West humiliated and outraged that traces back to a historically traumatic master-slave relationship. Perhaps in addition it can be explained by the elementary political maxim once inelegantly phrased by Joseph Alsop, which prescribes that the first rule of political survival is not to interpose oneself between a dog and a lamp post. The policy of the *tertius gaudens* is one we ourselves should understand, since we practiced it consistently for the first century or so of our national existence.

Yet curiously enough the facts from the United Nations voting record do not support the thesis that the neutrals are consistently "neutral in favor of the Russians," or that they are wholly "irresponsible," even by Western policy standards. At the 1961 United Nations General Assembly, the United States without question suffered several defeats. They were not, however, defeats of the West by the Communists. They were either defeats of *both* the United States and the Soviet Union by a predominantly Afro-Asian majority, or a case of Communist coat-tail riding on an issue primarily sponsored by the underdeveloped nations. On 3 November 1961 the mandate of the Committee on the Capital Development Fund was extended by a vote of 70 to 4 over United States objections. This widespread preference for a United Nations aid program has encountered United States opposition for a decade. On 6 November the General Assembly approved a resolution sponsored by neutral nations for an uninspected moratorium on nuclear testing. This was carried by a vote of 71 to 20; the United States—and the Soviet Union—were among the 20 opposing. And on 21 November the General Assembly passed a resolution declaring that the use of nuclear weapons in wartime

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should be outlawed. The vote was 55 to 20, with the United States in opposition for reasons we understand, but a great many people in the world do not.

It might be noted that in the same session the Soviet Union suffered a number of major defeats. The greatest, of course, was its failure to get any support at all for the *troika* proposal, even with the adventitious vacancy in the office of the Secretary General. Other votes were equally revealing. On 21 October the Fifth Committee voted over strong Soviet objections to spend up to ten million dollars in November and December to support the operation in the Congo. The vote was 55 to 9, with not one other state voting with the Soviet bloc. On 8 November the General Assembly with United States support asked the great powers to resume test-ban negotiations toward an inspected treaty system; the vote was 71 to 11, again with no non-Communist state supporting Moscow—a major Western victory.

The cold-war issue that was undoubtedly of greatest direct interest to the United States—the representation of Communist China—signified a victory for the United States that surprised even American diplomats. The Soviet Union lost on two votes. The first vote, to consider the seating of Peiping an important matter, thus requiring a two-thirds vote, carried by 61 to 34. The Soviet proposal to seat Communist China and oust the Taipei regime received only 37 votes in favor, 48 opposed. (It should be added, however, that this by no means assures future victory, although it is an improvement over the previous trend. If Peiping is seated in the Assembly, it will not be because many countries have changed their opinions, but rather because they have ceased to vote contrary to their opinions to please us.)

Three other votes in the 16th General Assembly and one in the Security Council supplied conclusive evidence that United States vital interests were still able to command the support of the majority. On 20 December 1961 the Assembly by a vote of 56 to 11 (the Soviet bloc plus Cuba) called on Red China to restore Tibetan freedom; on 26 December it defeated Soviet efforts to terminate the United Nations force in Korea, with only the same 11 in support; and on 15 February 1962, again the Soviet bloc and Cuba were not able to persuade one single other state to support the Cuban contention that the United States was planning aggression in Cuba. In the Council on 30 January 1962, not one non-Communist state went along with a Soviet attempt to initiate a patently mischievous debate on the Congo. (A meeting of a score of African heads of state in

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Lagos the day before the vote publicly protested the Soviet tactic as unconstructive.)

It is difficult to see what vital American interests have been adversely affected, or how the American position has deteriorated in the General Assembly *vis-à-vis* our principal opponent, or why the United States should not continue to make such use of the United Nations forum as serves United States national interests, broadly conceived. (There are few if any examples of the United States using the United Nations in ways which disserve the national interest, assertions to the contrary notwithstanding.) Nonalignment may be annoying; but it is not invariably pro-Soviet. It is an attitude on the part of nations with whom we must deal, whether in the United Nations or outside it. It may yet prove to be a Western asset.

The other and more positive facet of neutralist Afro-Asian policy is anticolonialism. Here the facts, in the form of voting record, are quite different. It is truer than ever that, to the extent it supports the colonial policies of its Western European allies, the United States is going to find itself in a parliamentary minority. There is nothing new about this fact, or about the exquisite difficulty it poses for American policy. We have sought over the years to mediate between the two forces, not always with success, and rarely without incurring the dissatisfaction of both sides. There is no indication that this problem has appreciably changed.

The power of the anticolonial drive in the United Nations has been obvious for years. In 1961-1962 it became spectacular. In the 16th General Assembly, vote after vote confirmed the trend: the unprecedented censure of the South African delegate for his "racist" speeches (67 to 1); the condemnation of Portugal for refusing to report on her territories (83 to 3); the vote to condemn South Africa (72 to 2); and the call on Portugal to cease her repressive measures in Angola (99 to 2). The only countries opposing any of these were South Africa, Portugal, or Spain.

The real power of the anticolonial group may be better measured by such votes as those aimed at expelling South Africa: 48 voted in favor, and 30 opposed. (Thus it failed of a two-thirds majority.) These votes are closer to the hard core figures and tell more about the political forces in conflict. Even Africa is a shifting constellation of forces. The African group on several important votes has split down the middle, with the Brazzaville group on one side and the so-called Casablanca powers on the other. The "responsible" powers are still able to organize a parliamentary majority on some colonial

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matters, as when on 28 November 1961, over Soviet objection, the Assembly by a vote of 46 to 19 passed a version of the now notorious call for the immediate independence of colonies, a version which was acceptable to the United States.

The process of liquidating the Western type of colonialism has just about ended. But the cause of anticolonialism has never been more vehement. An analogy from astronomy may throw light on the phenomenon: a receding star in the heavens appears to move into the red band of the visible spectrum. This is the so-called "red shift," named after the spectroscopic appearance of the change. I would suggest that the anticolonial revolution against the European West is having its "red shift" just before it ceases to be an issue of contemporary substance. (The "red shift" is literal as well as metaphorical in some instances; but here too, as with Egypt, Iraq, and Guinea, there is nothing inevitable about the process, and without the presence of the Red Army it is potentially reversible.)

So long as colonialism is a dominant theme in Africa and in the United Nations, United States policy continues to face the unhappy dilemma of a conflict of interests. This conflict of interests is at the very heart of American participation in the United Nations today. It cannot be shrugged off, nor can it be dealt with wholly by reason. Reason should applaud an enlightened Western policy that has produced approximately forty new states, virtually all of which are now in the United Nations. Decolonialization is removing whole continents from the realm of civil war and peace-shattering revolution, and in time it will have transferred the former revolutionaries to the camp of the territorial status quo. Those who are now a part of the international order, such as it is, are not in mutiny against it or open to capture by those who, like the Communists, thrive on revolutionary situations. This does not imply that their revolutions are over or that the status quo will be accepted in detail by the new states. But the examples of Israel and Tunisia (to take only two) well illustrate how the American preference for stability can best be served. No single country freed of colonial rule has voluntarily chosen Communism. (Cuba is in another, equally worrisome category.)

If justice were done, the British, French, Australians, and New Zealanders ought to be congratulated rather than reviled for ending their rule voluntarily—or in most cases voluntarily. Certainly it is only fair that the United States should never be confused with Portugal, even if we are military allies in NATO. But the conflict

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goes deeper, to the level of loyalties, of racial pride, of basically different perceptions of the very shape of history.

One frequent conclusion drawn from this fact is that the United States must make a choice between the neutrals, on the one hand, and its NATO allies who feel themselves to be the chief victims of the former. There would undoubtedly be some benefits from a public opting for our allies. A significant proportion of French, Belgian, and to a lesser extent English, Dutch, German, and Italian interests would without question feel closer to American policy if it were to repudiate the United Nations. United States relations with South Africa and Portugal would be eased (including the important question of United States base rights in the Azores), if we had not joined the overwhelming United Nations majority critical of Portuguese rule in Angola and of South African policies of racial repression and refusal to internationalize the former mandate of South West Africa. Both countries may leave the United Nations, not to return until either they have had their own upheavals or until overwhelming security interests compel a reversal. Other unpleasant consequences might flow from our divergent policies, to the point of endangering the very basis of Western association that is so vital to our security and to the future of the Western world.

But the choice is a false one, for two reasons. One is that matters have not yet reached such a point, and with a reasonable amount of statesmanship never should. The other reason is that such an option is not really open to United States policy. Policy must be addressed to interests; and the vital truth that is missed by those with the radical solutions is that there *are* divergent interests involved, interests which are served by divergent policies. The divergence is most visible in the United Nations, for obvious reasons, but it was not created there. The NATO countries have a profound common interest in the Atlantic basin; but their world-wide interests are not always common interests, and United States policy cannot proceed as if they were.

Actually, the facts are not so bad: at the 16th Assembly the overwhelming majority of NATO nations voted *with* the U. S. on 20 colonial resolutions. But nothing could so disserve the United States' national interest as to tie the United States' future in Africa to the policies of Portugal and South Africa, both of which appear to be leading to an inexorable tragedy, however understandable all the reasons. It is unthinkable that we should reverse our present attitudes in order to support and condone the undemocratic and re-

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pressive character of both rules. To act otherwise would mock our judgment, our instinct, and our system.

It is even possible (although our allies would never admit it) that the United States is correct in its reading of the colonial problem, and that United Nations pressures in which the United States joins can have a beneficial effect, even at the cost of lost affection—not a particularly important value compared to interests. In essentially the same mood as today, American leaders began nagging our British cousins for Indian and Palestine independence while we were actually their fighting ally in World War II. Similarly, we have used persuasion on both the French and the Dutch, to their profound displeasure but perhaps to their ultimate benefit, in North Africa and the East Indies. The results have been salutary, not because their rule was necessarily worse than what followed (although I happen to believe that a people are fundamentally better off if they rule themselves than if they are governed by a foreign occupier, however enlightened). The result was salutary in terms of the Western image, on which we depend so heavily in the spiritual and psychological warfare with Communism. Colonial rule, however enlightened, carries with it the attributes of racial superiority, economic exploitation, and social humiliation. That these are pathogenic, so to speak, is amply illustrated by the heritage they leave.

We cannot expect our allies now to appreciate or even understand what in some cases may seem to them a betrayal of our relationship. But whatever befalls, the United States cannot be party to a deluge which the modern Bourbons, learning nothing from history, are willing to contemplate as the cost of their policies. The anticolonial revolution has its full share of unattractive qualities. Indeed, just because the United States *does* believe its anticolonial attitude reflects accurately its deeper interests, the Indian invasion of Goa in 1961 strained to the utmost the constancy of our political vision. Nothing in the erroneous policies of Western colonialism exonerated India from using force in Goa to attain political ends—an act that was at once stupid, illegal, immoral, and in the long run counterproductive for India herself, and perhaps for world peace as well. Equally damaging to their own cause was the way in which the Security Council minority averted its eyes and refused to apply the principles of the Charter. This moral abdication profoundly distressed Americans.

It was to be expected that the Soviet Union, with its profound

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cynicism, would further incite India in a cause certain to be popular with the street mobs. But it was shocking that the United Arab Republic, Ceylon, and Liberia joined the Soviets in blocking action by the Security Council, an action which would have enabled the United Nations, not to intervene physically, but simply to register disapprobation at a flagrant departure from one of the few established norms of acceptable international conduct. It will be that much harder for them to secure protection when they in turn are attacked by someone else acting on the same grounds of *raison d'état*. Rarely have nations been guilty of such shortsightedness as those who get away with their petty aggressions, or those who (like the representative of Guinea before the General Assembly in January 1962) threaten that, unless the organization accedes to the bidding of the impatient radicals, they will resort to violence. Indonesia's threats regarding West New Guinea fall into the same irresponsible and self-destructive category. There are other manifestations of hypocrisy (or in any event inconsistency) in the radical position. The very concept of self-determination, which for so long supplied an ideology for anticolonialism, has suddenly been forgotten by some of the new status-quo states. President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo, whose international career was launched as spokesman in the United Nations for an Ewe national state, has suddenly begun to deprecate the notion of self-determination as obviously inconsistent with his new nation's nonethnic boundaries. Similarly, President Sukarno of Indonesia rejects self-determination for the Papuans of "Irian" West until they are firmly in Indonesian hands.

Actually, it has been quite unhealthy to believe that somehow the great powers have been guided only by expediency, while the neutralists in some magical way constitute the sole repository of moral wisdom. In the clamor over Goa and West Irian, it was forgotten that in the 1940's India had forcibly suppressed a self-determined independence movement in the province of Hyderabad, and Indonesia, one in the South Moluccas. Perhaps it is as well that the air has been cleared and an irrational moral division of the world done away with.

There is much in the present situation to support Canning's maxim that interests should be the "shibboleth of policy." Our despair at the intransigeance of Portugal might estrange us from a NATO ally; our distaste with what seems to us to be the shortsightedness of India or Indonesia or Ghana might stop us from caring about the modernization process all three are undergoing.

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A combination of both might (and does) fan the embers of isolationism. The only proper answer is to pursue our interests in both areas after calculating those interests on a rational basis. The results of such a calculation would not in my opinion differ markedly from the present course of action.

If it is true that United States interests are not always identical with the interests of our Western European allies except in the North Atlantic area itself, the role of the United Nations in United States policy becomes clearer in this situation. The United States enjoys in effect a three-way relationship with the allies and with the neutrals—the Communists apart. For us, the United Nations is a place where this relationship can be, so to say, triangulated. It is most significantly a means by which the United States can relate itself to its nonallies, and perhaps it is the only existing means for doing so. Nothing about NATO obviates that need. The argument that "when the chips are down" the United States can count only on its allies is doubtless true, but it overlooks the world we must live in when the chips are not down, or are only a part of the stakes in the game.

We need an organization in which we can discuss international problems on a regular basis with all the other countries in the world. This may seem self-evident, but it tends to be overlooked. We cannot do the job only in meetings of allies, because there are problems we have to discuss with other than our allies. It is not convenient to call a diplomatic conference every time a number of countries want to talk things over with one another. As a continuing diplomatic conference, therefore, the United Nations is a great convenience—never mind the aspirations, the intimations of world order, or the police functions. The United Nations, at the world level, is what man has always needed, wanted, and has therefore had at every other level of political interaction, whether in the form of bazaar, agora, forum, convention, town hall, exchange, parliament, legislature, or Congress.

Having dealt with the colonial issue, we can now turn to even more important uses United States policy may wish to make of the United Nations in the period that lies ahead. The first is in relations with the Communists. The second is in dealing with future brushfire disorders requiring international civil or military action. In a period in history when all-out warfare would be mutually disastrous but when political and ideological warfare continues unabated, it is

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important to discover on a continuous basis whether conditions exist for moderating the conflict. One such means is bilateral diplomatic intercourse. Another is in the realm of practical, "functional" cooperation in the routine (and not so routine) day-to-day existence both sides must share.

A surprising amount of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States took place at the 1961 General Assembly. An Acting Secretary General was agreed on, along with an arrangement for his deputies, despite ominous predictions to the contrary. A budget for the organization was voted without trouble. Agreement was reached between the United States and the Soviet Union (and therefore among all other countries) on a new forum to discuss disarmament. Agreement was unexpectedly reached on proceeding with the committee on outer space, and at this writing the prospects are better than fair for some degree of cooperation between the two giant possessors of contemporary space technology.

Predictions are treacherous, but the manner in which ideological warfare is now unfolding between the Soviet Union and Communist China is beginning to make more provocative the view considered dangerously naive when first proffered: that Communist societies are subject to non-Marxist laws of growth, maturation, decay, and metamorphosis, just as are all other societies. The difference between Moscow and Peiping in stages of maturity and of development is tending to move them in such divergent ways that the external world may be looking very different to each of them. Those who in years past half-jokingly predicted a future Soviet-American alliance against Communist China may yet be proved right. As the Soviets claim, interests may indeed be determined by objective historical forces and may be indifferent to ideological pretensions, but not in the way the Marxists predict.

The evolution of Russian society might well generate a set of interests common to us; American diplomatic capital then would be better invested here rather than in the raw, poor, non-Western, and unremittingly hostile and expansionist China of the mainland. Containment of that China may be the great task of the last third of the twentieth century. The support of India, Japan and Southeast Asia will be vital to the United States in this process—a further argument for the continuing relationship in the United Nations. An emerging network of practical, "business-like" ties between an increasingly consumer-oriented, increasingly middle-class, increasingly "conservative" Russian society might supersede the messianic drive

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of its present leadership, particularly if our deterrent power remains strong. The United Nations should be viewed as an important agency for harmonizing—or buffering—relations with the Soviet Union, even when our Goldwaters and de Gaulles and their Molotovs and Mao Tse-tungs try to prove that no compromise is possible.

Politicians, all of whom practice compromise at the local and national level as often and as regularly as they brush their teeth, can always be found who will assert that compromise at the international level is somehow evil, immoral, or "soft." Such an attitude tends to paralyze American diplomacy, which has quite enough enemies abroad. Further, it causes Americans to continue to misunderstand the true nature of the struggle they face; it tempts them to continue their historic bath in the warm amniotic fluid of supposed omnipotence. Above all, the extremist view that equates the United Nations and compromise with "softness toward the Communists," if allowed to govern American policy, undoubtedly would diminish our prospects of getting through what is perhaps the most dangerous period in modern human history without a catastrophic war.

The major use of the United Nations to United States foreign policy in this period may well be that of an executive power. This does not necessarily mean a superstrong international secretariat. It does imply an agency capable of carrying out in detail the general will of the constitutional majorities in the United Nations, within the limits of the powers granted to the organization in its Charter. Barring a wholly unexpected South African or Rhodesian or Portuguese reversal of policy, there will be more Congos; and next time they may be in multiracial societies, with complications and reverberations which may make the Congo seem simple by comparison. It is predictable that the same sorts of issues as arose in July 1960 in the Congo will recur and pose comparable dilemmas. They must be met.

The United States has a profound interest in the executive capacity of the United Nations to intervene in situations like that of the Congo, in which any alternative appears even less desirable or acceptable. The only real alternatives tend to be overlooked in criticisms of the United Nations Congo action. They are three: intervention by the former colonial power; intervention by the United States; or intervention by the Soviet Union. If the colonial country intervenes, the likelihood is a racial war of continental dimensions, benefiting only Communism. If the United States or the Soviet

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Union intervenes, there may be a great-power war with all the dangers of escalating to a thermonuclear general war. The United Nations, with all its difficulties, complexities, imperfections, lack of consistency, and lack of support, is probably the only acceptable means to do the job. American policy, through leadership, can help shape the process soundly. (And it must be said here that Indian reinforcement of the United Nations Congo operation, at a time when the Communists were close to sabotaging it and other neutrals were pulling out, was of incomparable benefit to American interests. India now supplies 40 percent of the United Nations force in the Congo, plus the leadership of the United Nations force in Gaza.)

When the Katanga episode begins to fade, it will again be time to attack, with far more vigor than before, the problem of a more reliable, more readily available, better trained United Nations paramilitary capability. Some of us have proposed as a minimum a program of training and earmarking forces from other than the great powers, for service ranging from observation and patrol duties to the pacification of a dangerously inflamed area. It is also important to earmark on a standby basis logistical support, with sea and airlift capabilities, in advance of another Congo. Planning for a modest international constabulary directly recruited by the United Nations should be begun. The need in countries such as Kenya will be not for an army but for a police force. If the Soviet Union will not pay for these operations, this is the greater reason for having them at hand to thwart Soviet imperial designs—as in the Congo.

These prospects raise the equally excruciating question of financing United Nations security operations. The financial crisis in the United Nations grows out of this area of operations alone; it would not exist if the Suez and Congo forces had not been created. The problem is acute for the United States. As by far the largest contributor, with perhaps the most to gain from such stability-favoring operations as those two, we are looked to for bailing the organization out of its difficulties. The problem here for the United States is compounded by the addition of two NATO allies (France and Belgium) to the list of states that have refused to pay their assessed share for the Congo operation.

The United Nations is simply going to have to have resources of its own to enable it to do a job which is in the interest of even those who are seeking to sabotage it by withholding their financial support. My own suggestion is for an endowment: a capital fund sufficient to provide an annual income that will enable the United

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Nations to carry out at least a significant part of the task the nations charge it to do in keeping the peace in the field. There is the danger that a majority may feel freer to act if some funds are already available. Yet actually no increase in international power is involved, but simply the knowledge that the means exist to back up a decision made by exactly the same political process as today. In times of crisis those decisions are going to be made first anyway. With a growing reserve of funds, the United Nations could go ahead with its job without depending either on its enemies' paying their share (an unrealistic hope) or on putting the United States government in the position of appearing wholly to subsidize it. In the meantime, the most strenuous moral and political pressures should be exerted to persuade the defaulters that fiscal irresponsibility will in the end be destructive of their own interests.

To say that the United Nations is demonstrably of positive value to the United States, to assert that even the peace of the world may depend on keeping it strong and vigorous and capable of taking action in future Congos, is by no means to defend in detail everything it does. It is not to excuse those who use or threaten force, or those who pick and choose among the acts of violence they condone. It is not to overrate the validity (or even the existence) of "world public opinion." And it is certainly not to be complacent about the irresponsible policies, either political or financial, of others. These are negative aspects of the United Nations that are legitimate sources of concern to us.

Yet there are positive features as well. I have suggested that the record so far does not support the more extravagant assertions about the minority position of the West. What I did not add is that the change from a United States-dominated to a polycentric United Nations also has positive results in terms of the nature of American diplomacy: an occasional minority stance has taught us to relax, to concentrate on what is important, and to stop straining for victory on every issue, however minor. As one who has freely criticized American policies on occasion, I am enormously proud of the courage and decency of the United States government in doing what it believed to be right in Suez, in the Congo, and in Goa—to the ultimate annoyance of friend and foe alike. I know of no other way to conduct foreign relations when the alternatives are as unattractive and the possibilities for moral evasion and political ambiguity so tempting.

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There is little doubt in my mind as to the value of continuing United States support for the United Nations. In a Gallup poll taken in 1961, when the prospects for the organization seemed bright, 83 percent of those interviewed said it was very important for the United States to work toward making the United Nations a success. A year later, in the aftermath of the *troika* demand, the events in Congo and Goa, and Dag Hammarskjöld's death, precisely the same percentage placed a comparable importance on seeing that the United Nations not fail. As an investment, it is likely that Americans will not consider $1.06 per-capita costs for United States participation in the United Nations out of line with its $300 per-capita outlay for military expenditures.

At the same time, we should expect more criticism in detail and warnings of the limits of American willingness to bear disproportionate burdens. There may well be increasing calls for some kind of weighted voting arrangements. There may well be a real reluctance to underwrite another operation such as that in the Congo, although the pressures to do so will probably be irresistible. The danger is that we ourselves will have made it more difficult to do the job we will surely insist on at a new time of crisis. This we must guard against now.

This second great experiment in international political cooperation hangs in the balance. It is by no means proved that man is ready for such a modest step out of the political jungle. As Herbert Nicholas has written, "The United Nations perfectly embodies in institutional form the tragic paradox of our age; it has become indispensable before it has become effective." Perhaps it is even too much to expect in the present stage of history that the organization will be able to maintain a "king's peace," applying order to chaos on the "king's highways" where its functional writ can run.

The long-run answer is uncertain; but it will depend in no small measure on the steadfastness and vigor with which the United States presses ahead toward moderate solutions, toward improved methods of cooperation, and toward workable compromises which will ensure the future vitality of the United Nations. A United States which is itself strong, which works simultaneously toward unity in the Atlantic basin, which sustains a continuous dialogue with its adversaries on honorable terms while time does its work—this kind of leader nation goes a long way toward supplying a long-term answer to questions about the future of the United Nations.

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PETER PAUL STENDER

The Paradox of Soviet Power

TRADITIONALLY the foreign policy of states has been studied in terms of their military strength considered in conjunction with their known or supposed political interests, aims, and ambitions. The England of Wellington, the France of Napoleon, or the Russia of Alexander I, no matter how diverse as societies, were in international affairs all viewed as entities of comparable nature and comportment, or in the language of the day, as "powers." And the same was still essentially true in the Europe of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. The Russian Revolution of 1917, however, made a major breach in this classical system: for the first time a state existed whose international role was defined not just by its position as a power but also by its nature as an economy and a society. After World War II, as a result of communism's dramatic expansion over a third of the globe as well as of the awakening of the underdeveloped regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the change in viewpoint which began in 1917 was brought to its culmination. Foreign policy is now almost universally regarded as a function not just of the traditional factors, but also of the internal social condition of nations, of their degree of stability or instability, of the dynamism or stagnation of their economies, and of the impact of their domestic problems on their international posture and behavior. The United States of President Kennedy and the Soviet Union of Chairman Khrushchev or, on another level, the India of Nehru and the China of Mao, are not just "powers" engaged in political rivalry but "economic and social systems" engaged in historical and sociological competition. A nation's "rate of economic growth" is now as important an element in its international success as the equipment in its arsenals.

This fact is proclaimed even on the pages of the least sophisti-

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cated of tabloids and illustrated with elaborate graphs and statistics comparing the relative position of states. What is more important, governments today conduct their policies with as much attention to "economic development" as to military might. In Britain, the "pay pause" has brought home even to the simplest worker the dire consequences in the contemporary world of a slipping "rate of national growth." Europe's most traditional-minded statesman, General de Gaulle, who once dismissed the merchants of his realm with the phrase *"l'intendance suit,"* now in his periodic addresses to the nation cites with pride France's impressive rate of growth and seeks the way to grandeur in the Common Market no less than in the *force de frappe*. The Americans, long committed to a classical view of power politics under John Foster Dulles, in the epoch of the New Frontier, of Messrs. Rostow, Galbraith, and Heller, have become almost as growth-conscious in their view of the world as are the functionaries of Gosplan. In this craze for "growthsmanship," as in so much else, the impact on the world of the Soviet challenge has been in truth immense. Nor is it easy to deny that the future of the planet—barring a final nuclear cataclysm—will in large part be decided by economic competition between the two rival social systems. Nonetheless, since the West is a somewhat frightened follower rather than a bold leader in this new analysis of international relations, there is a danger that the fresh insight will be applied uncritically and sweepingly to every problem that presents itself. In particular, with respect to the Soviet Union itself, the current view that economic dynamism is the key to all other forms of power may well be leading us to overestimate the extent of Russia's strength in international affairs.

What is the current Western picture of the Soviet position in the world? First of all, it is evident to everyone that as a "power" in the traditional sense the Soviet state is an entity of the very first magnitude. Ever since Russia astonished the world in 1949 by producing an atomic bomb far ahead of all predicted dates, she has not ceased to impress her rivals by increasingly more spectacular "firsts"—sputniks, luniks, and manned space-flights. If not actually the greatest military power of the missile age, she is at least so close a second that the difference has no practical significance. Nor have her international ambitions and the growth of her political influence in the world failed to keep pace with her burgeoning military might, as the immunity of her ally Castro on the very doorstep of the

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United States so eloquently illustrates. That the West should be filled with awe in the face of these facts is only natural, for they are indeed awesome. What is somewhat more remarkable, however, is the high estimate that in recent years the West has come to hold of the Soviet Union as a society.

Briefly, the current majority opinion about the nature of Soviet society is that, despite vast differences from the West in political and economic organization—summed up in the "totalitarian" state and a nationalized economy—in one vital respect contemporary Russia has come to resemble her rivals: she has become a "mature" industrial society, a "developed," or "modern," nation. Perhaps the first adumbration of this view was given in 1941 in James Burnham's *The Managerial Revolution,*[1] which expounded the theory that in a modern industrial society what counts is not so much political institutions (democracy vs. totalitarianism) or the legal forms of property (capitalism vs. socialism) as technological competence; and in characteristic ways both the Soviet Union and the United States were seen as evolving towards a type of technocracy. While Stalin still inhabited the Kremlin, however, this thesis appeared too simple to account for the more bizarre features of the Soviet way of doing things, and it remained for the milder rule of his successors to produce a fundamentally new impression. After 1953, the abolition of mass terror on the one hand and the spectacular technological advances of the Soviet Union on the other at last created conditions in which the "totalitarian model" as the universal clue to the understanding of Russia progressively gave way to the concepts of "development" and "modernization." In recent years this point of view has been expressed in numerous learned works. Within the specialized area of Russian studies it was the outstanding theme of a recent symposium grouping a majority of America's leaders in the field, a volume entitled *The Transformation of Russian Society,*[2] and it has received its most balanced and original elaboration in Adam Ulam's *The Unfinished Revolution.*[3] Most influentially of all, perhaps, it has been set forth in Walt W. Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth.*[4] It is from the pages of such works, of course, that the concepts of "development" and "modernization" have passed into the thinking of newspaper commentators and government officials.

Taking the matter approximately at the level of the *New York Times* Sunday supplement and somewhat below that of Mr. Rostow's *Stages of Economic Growth,* the new point of view can be para-

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phrased roughly as follows. The history of the modern world is essentially the history of the gradual passage of mankind from a "traditional," agrarian order to a "modern," industrial society, in which the whole of the population is caught up in a single network of production based on an advanced level of mechanization. In its "developed" or "mature" form such a society constantly generates its own dynamism of further modernization, founded on an ever-increasing capacity for "mass consumption." Historically speaking, this process began in England in the late eighteenth century, spread to Western continental Europe and the United States in the early nineteenth century, and reached Russia only on the threshold of the twentieth. Finally, in the years following World War I, but especially after World War II, this process began to revolutionize the life of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Although ultimately the consequences of "modernization" are everywhere the same, a late start due to prolonged "backwardness" or "underdevelopment" can make for very important differences in the way in which "maturity" is achieved. Generally speaking, outside the cradle of the new society—England, Northwestern continental Europe, the United States—backwardness has entailed a brutally accelerated pace of development under exceptionally onerous conditions of "enforced savings," a more or less wrenching social upheaval, and almost inevitably harsh action by the centralized state power in order to impose the ways of the modern world on uprooted and recalcitrant peasants who ill understand what is expected of them.

Russia, of course, in this view is the classic example of a society that has approached the task of modernization with a huge handicap of backwardness. Nonetheless, the present consensus of opinion is that the Soviet Union has at last made it over the hump, that she is now essentially a "modern" society, if not yet the most fully developed example of the species. In Mr. Rostow's terms, she has reached the stage of "maturity" though not of "mass consumption." That she has not actually caught up to the older industrial societies is not taken too seriously by most commentators, since Russia's rate of economic growth—something over seven percent annually for the past decade—is the most impressive of any industrial nation's and far ahead of the United States' mere 2.7 and sagging Britain's less than two. Although Russia may not close the gap between herself and the most advanced countries in the foreseeable future, she will certainly constantly narrow it at a very rapid rate. A similar impression of Soviet dynamism is created by more detailed comparisons: Ameri-

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ca's steel mills function at half their capacity at a time when Russia's steel production grows to be more than half that of the United States—that is, in practical terms, there are periods when the two societies produce the same quantity of steel. Soviet economic statistics, long treated as either a joke or a riddle, are now studied with care and concern. When the goals of the current Seven Year Plan were announced in 1959, it was with a notable lack of self-confidence that such newspapers as the *New York Times* concluded that the Soviet Union could not, in fact, make good its boast to overtake the American economy in total production by around 1970. Yet, no matter what opinion one holds as to the size of the gap between Russia and the West or the rate at which it is closing, almost everyone is agreed that the qualitative difference is no longer that between backwardness and development but merely between disparate—and not greatly disparate, at that—levels of maturity. It has everywhere become a cliché that one of the more meaningful ways of dividing the world is not between East and West, but between North and South, a division in which the northern zone from California to the Altai represents that part of the planet which has made the leap from traditional society into self-sustaining industrial growth, and the southern tier of nations, from Peru to China, represents a morass of underdevelopment where men are still struggling to attain the first stages of modernization and where their efforts are constantly negated by the pressure of a population explosion that proceeds more rapidly than does the creation of new resources. It is this position in the dynamic forefront of the advanced nations that is the foundation of the Soviet Union's international power, as much as are her sputniks, rockets, and warheads.

Now there is certainly much truth to the view that the process of modernization in its varying modes constitutes the lowest common denominator to which most, if not all, of the significant social phenomena of the past two centuries can ultimately be reduced. Nevertheless, this model, like all comprehensive generalizations, is oversimplified; it advances a monocausality which, although crudely valid, tends to obscure irregularities in a society's evolution that at times are as significant in their practical effect as is the prime cause itself. The great vice of the model of modernization is to view economic development as all-determining in the life of nations and to take too little account of the total social context in which economic growth occurs. And being too exclusively economic and insufficiently sociological in emphasis, the model gives us an exaggerated measure

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of the Soviet Union's degree of "maturity" and "modernity," and by the same token inflates our estimate of her international strength. This objection does not mean simply that there are certain sectors of weakness in the Soviet economy. Everyone knows that while Soviet industrial production soars, Soviet agriculture stagnates; and since the twenty-five to thirty percent price-rises for meat, milk, and butter were announced in the spring of 1962 it has become customary to speak of a crisis in this domain. Rather it means that as a society viewed in its totality Soviet Russia is far more "backward" than her spectacular rate of industrial expansion would indicate. In a country with the social and historical heritage of Russia a growth-rate of seven percent means far less than does a rate of four plus in the social context of France or three minus in the United States.

Unfortunately this is much less easy to prove than is the case for Russia's modernity. The latter can be argued on the basis of the imposing statistics already mentioned, whereas the fact of her essential backwardness, beyond the documentable aspects of the agricultural crisis, must largely be inferred from impressions gathered through the Soviet press or from travel in the country itself. Inadequate as these impressions are, they are too glaringly at odds with the statistics to be ruled peremptorily out of court. However imperfectly, they can still tell us something about the humble society—in reality so little known in the West, despite some fifteen bumper years of "Sovietology"—behind the glittering seven percent.

Mr. Chairman Khrushchev is himself a powerful witness for an unflattering view of the Soviet Union's development. In the West he usually passes for a supremely self-confident man, proud of his country's present achievements and unshakably convinced that in peaceful economic competition with capitalism Russia will soon "bury" the West. It was widely reported that President Kennedy, after meeting with the Soviet premier in Vienna in June, 1961, was profoundly disconcerted by his interlocutor's cocksure and inflexible attitude. In reality, however, Mr. Khrushchev, if his declarations are read carefully enough, is haunted by self-doubt. For instance, on numerous occasions, in order to indicate that the Soviet Union cannot be intimidated in international affairs, he has declared that his country is not Laos, or Cambodia, or Lebanon, or Cuba, but a "great power," a "mighty state," who can defend her interests and make her wishes respected. Since this fact is quite obvious it seems a little odd that he should insist on it with such vehemence or that he

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should make his comparisons so far-fetched—unless he feels in his heart that Russia's strength is not in fact so great as her military means would suggest. More revealing still, another of his favorite themes is to warn other powers not to make the mistake of confusing the present-day Soviet Union with the backward Russia of old, or as he shouted rather hysterically in his final speech of the "electoral campaign" of 1962: "This is no longer *lapatnaia Rossiia* [Russia in peasant birch-bark shoes], we are now a mighty, modern state," the country of "Gagarin and Titov." There followed an enumeration of the puissant weapons at this mighty state's disposal, including some fabulous rocket that need not knock in the "front door" of America's defenses but could climb around through the "back window." Again, the gentleman doth protest too much; if the birch-bark shoes [*lapti*] have indeed disappeared, why should he be so sensitive to the suspicion—a suspicion which almost no one is voicing these days—that they still protrude from Gagarin's spacesuit? The answer can only be that Mr. Khrushchev, as a man well-traveled at home and abroad, is quite painfully aware of the persisting drag of the peasants' *lapti* on the stride of the mighty Soviet state.

That hard truth is vividly apparent first of all in the fact that roughly fifty percent of the Soviet population are in the most literal sense still peasants, an exceptionally high figure for a truly "developed" society and one not approached in any major country of Europe, not even in Italy, the most rural Western nation. Moreover, the agricultural labor force of no other advanced country is so notoriously inefficient as that of Russia, for this fifty percent of the population barely supplies the nation with first necessities and at times and in certain regions even fails to do this. For months on end such areas as the Urals, Siberia, or the Volga are almost totally lacking in meat products and green vegetables, since these are naturally poor regions and the distribution of goods, both manufactured and agricultural, is archaically local in the Soviet Union. In the south, which is naturally richer, and in certain great cities such as Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev, which are always more or less adequately supplied through governmental exertions no matter how bad things are in the countryside, the situation is better; yet even here the price-rises of the spring of 1962 have come near to banishing meat from the diet of the lower income groups, or probably over half the population. With respect to green vegetables, throughout the long winter months these simply do not exist, even in such privileged

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centers as Moscow; during most of the summer the main staples are cucumbers, radishes, and onion stalks. Except for the brief height of the growing season in late summer, fresh tomatoes cost five dollars a pound. That even this unvaried fare is hard to come by outside the great cities is shown by the fact that tens of thousands of people from the smaller cities around Moscow travel by train each day to the capital in order to buy foodstuffs and carry them back home for resale—often in the province where they were originally grown. The absurdity of such a situation, of course, hardly escapes the average Soviet citizen, who, when he does not react with real bitterness, asks each traveler returned from "the periphery" (as everything outside Moscow is called) in a tone of mixed alarm and helplessness: how bad is the situation in the provinces? how long are the queues? is there any meat in the stores? The difficulty of getting enough to eat not only gnaws at the stomach; it gnaws at the national self-esteem as well. One need not be long in the Soviet Union to hear someone ask in despair: "Why is it that Russia, with fifty percent of the population on the land, can hardly feed herself, whereas the United States, where only some ten percent of the population works in agriculture, is burdened with a food surplus?" In truth, for a "socialist" country, or simply for a "modern" one, there is something both dangerous and humiliating in such a circumstance.

As for conditions in the countryside, it is harder to judge, since foreigners are almost never permitted to go there. Nonetheless, one has only to take the train between any two Soviet cities or to travel by bus over such approved tourist routes as Moscow-Iasnaia Poliana or Leningrad-Novgorod to see endless villages of two-room unpainted log huts, listing heavily to one side, scattered in disorder along an unpaved street. Except for an occasional cluster of barns with some badly cared-for machinery parked in the yard the modern kolkhoz is almost nowhere in evidence in this sea of villages that have hardly changed in their external appearance since the emancipation of the peasants a century ago. Then, on occasion, the bus breaks down and one is afforded a more revealing glimpse. Along the Volga or even in the central provinces around Moscow one can encounter six- or eight-year-old children who, when offered a lump of sugar, will attempt to write with it on a board fence because they have mistaken it for a piece of chalk. Or in the marketplace of a small town near Moscow it is possible to witness a scene that, in Europe, this writer has seen only in the poorer parts of Spain and southern Italy: two adolescent boys, the one blind and playing an

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accordion, the other maimed and singing in acompaniment, both standing before a battered cap set out for the charity of passers-by. (The pair was roughly hustled from the scene as soon as it was learned that foreigners were unaccountably in the neighborhood.) Sometimes it is possible to talk briefly with the inhabitants of such a locality and to learn how incredibly recently such rudiments of modern civilization as electricity and the cinema have begun to penetrate the everyday life of the villages—a fact which Khrushchev confirmed in a speech at Kremenchuk in July, 1962, criticizing the electrification policies of his predecessor. More interesting still, one can hear that under Stalin the peasants knew dire poverty and often real hunger and that it is only since Khrushchev started to pay the kolkhozes something approximating the cost of the foodstuffs demanded from them by the state that the rural standard of living has begun to approach even the penury of the cities.

To be sure, there are numerous machines in the Russian countryside; indeed, many agricultural experts who have had a glimpse of the Russian village would agree that on certain collective farms there are more machines per acre than in most of the Western United States or Canada. Yet this fact must be set against the revelations of the Soviet press, which in the summer of 1962, for instance, reported that one half the harvesters of Kazakhstan were out of commission; or against stories told by Soviet city-dwellers of peasants abandoning virtually new tractors for want of a spare part. Before sputnik such stories were retailed too frequently in the West, and in a tone of great condescension; now perhaps they are not told often enough, for by and large they are true.

Still, to give a precise assessment of the impact of such facts on Russian life is impossible; one can only fall back on impressions. However, the comparison between the Soviet village and, for example, the opulent, one-family, mechanized farms of Normandy or Flanders—not to mention those of Iowa, so familiar to Mr. Khrushchev—which produce meat, milk, and butter in unheard of abundance, is indeed suggestive. In the light of this contrast, that half of the Soviet society which is still peasant reminds one rather of Andalusia or Sicily, or perhaps even Asia, than of a veritably developed nation. It may only be a surface impression, but the sad, listless, and archaic Russian village often seems to reflect conditions more usually associated with the southern hemisphere, where the cultivation of new agricultural resources is failing to keep up with the needs of a growing population. At all events, it is certain that

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the state of the Russian village absolutely precludes the passage of Soviet society as a whole to the stage of "mass consumption" in any foreseeable future.

The tales that Soviet city-dwellers can tell corroborate first-hand impressions of the exceptional primitiveness of peasant Russia. In Leningrad it is possible to learn that not very long ago new arrivals fom the nearby countryside would frequently assert, in a spirit of almost medieval localism, "We are not Russians, but men of Pskov." On all sides one hears the remark that, for men of the city, the peasant is an enigma, that he is a foreigner in his habits and reactions; moreover, it is said, so great is the gulf which separates him from the rest of the population that, in instinctive distrust, he hides his true feelings from all who are not his kind. These comments on the psychological abyss between the Westernized elite and the "people" were a staple of pre-revolutionary literature.

Indeed, it is this persisting extrusion of "traditional" Russian society into the current Soviet reality that is one of the most striking features of the present scene when observed at close hand. Not only is the Soviet peasantry significantly larger than that of any other industrial power; not only is it much less productive. There is a qualitative difference as well between it and other rural populations. The Russian peasant is more of a "peasant" than his counterparts in the West; he is rougher, simpler, and less adaptable in his mores and mentality. The word "muzhik" always connoted something more rustic than "peasant," and it still carries an apt sociological nuance.

Russia continues, in other words, to feel the effects of the tremendous burden of backwardness with which she embarked on the process of modernization and of the late date of her start. As one Soviet citizen put the matter, commenting with a certain asperity on the failure of the Soviet government in 1961 to mark in any way the hundredth anniversary of the abolition of serfdom: "Ninety percent of the population was freed from slavery only a century ago and already the government is shouting about the building of communism." If "communism" is taken to be no more than a utopian way of signifying a "mature" industrial society based on "mass consumption," the remark is extremely pertinent: not even with all the forcing in the world does a society as "dark" as old Russia become a thoroughly modern nation in one hundred years, much less in the forty-five the Soviet regime has been in power. Under such conditions, backwardness is only partly eliminated in the habits and men-

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tality of a large segment of the population; what remains is no more than held at bay, and often re-emerges to cripple the state's efforts to foster a more modern way of life.

This contamination of the new Russia by the old is a phenomenon familiar to every traveler with any experience of the capital (not to mention the provincial centers, where conditions are significantly worse), for it would be a grave mistake to consider that the influence of traditional Russia stops where the city pavement begins. This is worth making a point of, since it is not apparent at a casual glance. Moscow presents the face of a boom-town, with endless acres of new construction rising on every side and truly "Western" quantities of automobiles, and especially trucks, roaring down every thoroughfare; and the same is true, to a lesser degree, of rebuilt Kiev and Minsk or of the newer sections of Leningrad and Odessa. Yet very soon, behind the façade of modern bustle and timid elegance in dress and style of life that in recent years have begun to touch the larger cities and so often impress the casual tourist, one begins to perceive a profound, an all-pervasive inefficiency and disorder.

Little things begin to strike the eye—such as the fact that, except when it is actually raining, the windshield-wipers of automobiles are removed to prevent their being stolen; spare parts are virtually impossible to come by. More significantly, one is constantly and oppressively aware that there are far too many people for existing standard services and facilities—buses, restaurants, cinemas, and especially stores. As a result, fulfilling even the simplest wants of everyday life usually requires waiting in line—a half-hour for entrance to a self-service restaurant, an hour to buy a few fresh apples or a decent piece of cloth, and possibly four or more hours to purchase an interurban train or bus ticket. In spite of the boom appearance of Soviet cities, in reality no one has much of anything and everyone has had to queue up a long time for what he does have.

With respect to housing, the situation is similarly strained. Despite vast tracts of apartments going up everywhere, construction seems barely to keep pace with need, for rapid deterioration of buildings tends to negate every significant advance on the notorious housing problem. According to Soviet press reports, the equivalent of three million new dwellings has been destroyed in the past year because of appalling maintenance by both tenants and custodians.

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This sad result is no doubt also due to faults of initial construction, which, as every visitor soon notes, is wretched: around certain new apartment buildings in Moscow, for instance, there are metal nets at first floor level, designed to catch falling pieces of masonry. There is no sadder sight in any modern city than a brave new Soviet housing development a few years after completion—dilapidated and crumbling, its three- or four-room flats often subdivided into "communal apartments," one room to a family, as in the old tenements the new dwellings were originally built to replace. In every aspect the Soviet city gives the impression of radical underequipment and overburdening of all vital facilities. Indeed, so great is this problem that the government has prohibited immigration into such privileged centers as Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev, and forbidden police registration of new residents. The population, in turn, tries even more frenetically to thwart this law by devices of considerable cunning.

In the light of such conditions it would not be an exaggeration to claim that, while rural Russia is as yet incapable of transformation, urban Russia is scarcely able to handle the transformations set in motion in its midst. Even granting the state's tremendous exertions toward development and the numerous very real accomplishments, the Soviet city, that frail bulwark of the nation's "modernity," may well be keeping abreast of the growing needs of the population only slightly better than the village. The ostensible progress of Russia seems in many respects to be no more than a labor of Sisyphus.

The drabness and difficulty of life in Soviet cities is usually explained as the result of the government's policy of sacrificing the production of consumer goods in order to devote all resources to the rapid expansion of heavy industry. But this narrowly economic formulation has the disadvantage not only of ignoring the social dimensions of such a regime but even of distorting the economic ones. For the scarcity of consumer goods in the Soviet Union means much more than privation for the population; it means also a radical form of underdevelopment installed in the heart of the most modern segment of society. One of the most striking characteristics of Soviet cities is the dearth of those services belonging to the tertiary sector of the economy which are so omnipresent in every Western city—restaurants, bars, cafés, banks, real estate agencies, insurance offices, automobile display-rooms, gasoline stations, beauty parlors, travel agencies, hotels, and especially shops and stores. This fragmentariness of the infrastructure of "superfluities" beneath the Soviet heavy

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industry economy in effect means a limitation on the breadth of experience, the talents, the adaptability, the alertness, and the self-esteem of the population, and hence ultimately a handicap for the development of the economy. An urban center in the Soviet Union is hardly a full-blown city in the Western sense; rather it is a rudimentary assemblage of dormitories connected by a transportation system to a series of factories and administrative bureaus and provided with only the necessary minimum of services to keep the population alive. Such an agglomeration, no matter what rate of growth it sustains, can hardly be considered "modern" or "mature" in the same sense in which these terms are applicable to Western Europe or North America.

These impressions of the underdeveloped character of Soviet cities are reinforced by acquaintance with the inhabitants, for on every side one confronts the mores and psychology of the old village. This is not surprising, since the vast majority of present-day Soviet city-dwellers, or some thirty million people in all, moved, or were forced, from the villages as recently as the 1930's. Given the short space of time since this uprooting and given also the rudimentary character of the Soviet urban milieu, we may well wonder if this mass of peasants has not transformed the cities almost more than the cities have transformed them. Russians of real urban sophistication frequently refer to Moscow as a village and complain of the boorishness, the ignorance, the *"nekulturnost"* (roughly, lack of familiarity with the elements of modern civilization) of the majority of its inhabitants. Old Leningraders, whose city was so cruelly purged in the 1930's, even more cruelly decimated during the siege of 1941-44, and then purged again after the war, to the point where it is now peopled very largely by newcomers, at times will say that the former capital has the look of a city taken over by foreigners. And, in truth, the rough faces and shabby crowds on the streets ill conform with the elegance and amenity of the setting, the most truly urban in Russia and one of the most magnificent in Europe. Surely a good part of the inefficiency and disorder that characterize Soviet cities is due not just to the government's failure to invest in consumer industries, but also to the rustic ineptitude of much of the urban population.

This ineptitude affects more than the mere comfort of the average citizen. It intrudes as well into the sacred temples of heavy industry for which all else exists, slowing down their operations, corrupting the quality of their products, wasting their raw materials, and

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impeding their modernization. Likewise, it incapacitates the enormous state bureaucratic apparatus designed to hold the rickety structure of Soviet society together and make it run. This inefficiency is furthermore a fertile seed-bed of peculation and petty thievery of all sorts, which makes inevitable the multiplication of bureaucratic agencies created to check the inefficiency and corruption of the original apparatus, until the new institutions are in their turn infected by the old vices.

No matter what the growth statistics say, Soviet society taken as a whole is still struggling with a quantitative and qualitative problem of backwardness, both human and material, which it will take decades to overcome. It is not a "mature" industrial society approximately on the same historical level with the flourishing Common Market of Western Europe, or still less with the United States, for all the latter's "stocks on the rocks" and five million unemployed. Rather it is something *sui generis*, intermediate between these fully modern societies and the radical underdevelopment of the southern hemisphere. It is a hybrid, a demi-modernity, which always has been both unique and ambiguous in its pattern of development.

How do the mixed results of Russian "modernization" affect the Soviet Union's posture as an international force? Essentially, they mean that Russia is today what she has been throughout her modern history: the paradox of a great power founded on a weak society. The military and international strength of the United States and of the nations of Western Europe is a "natural" outgrowth of the many-sided development of the material resources and human talents in these societies. The Soviet Union's strength as a power, on the other hand, has been extorted from an immature society by the "artificial" action of the state, because otherwise Russia could not hope to compete with its advanced neighbors. Superficially, the end result of the two processes may be the same: the creation of a military force of the first magnitude. Yet power produced in the way Soviet power has been produced is forever weakened by its social underpinnings, which inhibit the uses that can be made of it. It cannot be wielded with anything like its full potential sweep, except in brutal ways, because of the feebleness of the society on which it is based.

Practically speaking, this means that Soviet foreign policy is marked by an essential conservatism, indeed defensiveness. Since this statement may seem too inconsistent with Russia's revolutionary pretensions and the aggressive aims attributed to her by her rivals,

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a word of clarification is in order. Most of communism's spectacular advances since World War II have been made very cheaply for the Soviet Union and with little direct effort on her part. On the whole, these advances have been due to the collapse of unstable, "immature" societies, as notably in China, Vietnam, and Cuba, or to the mistakes of the West in handling such crises. The Soviet Union's most ostensibly aggressive action, the Korean War, was probably due to a miscalculation on Stalin's part after he had observed the mildness of the American reaction to the loss of continental China the year before. Even in Eastern Europe—except perhaps for Poland and East Germany, where Russia's most vital defense interests were at stake—she proceeded to bind the satellites to her slowly and only after it became apparent that the United States would counter with nothing more than rhetoric. Otherwise the Soviet Union has reserved her resources for the shielding of her own frontiers, whether by maintaining classical armies or by the development of a nuclear deterrent and the missiles necessary to deliver it. In the domain of economic aid, so essential to foreign policy in the grand manner in the mid-twentieth century, despite her much trumpeted help to such countries as India, Egypt, or Cuba, the only venture in which Russia has engaged that is really worthy of a great power has been her investment in China since 1949. At no time, however, has the Soviet Union even remotely envisaged a policy of massive intervention all around the globe of the sort the United States has practiced for over fifteen years in her lavish spread of military and economic aid, bases, advisers and technicians east and west, from the countries of the Marshall Plan and NATO to South Vietnam, Formosa, Japan, and Korea. Russia's restraint, of course, is exercised not because she is unambitious, but simply because she is poor.

The essential conservatism of Soviet foreign policy, however, is most revealingly demonstrated by the course that Khrushchev seems to have followed since the first Summit meeting at Geneva in 1955. He has been consistent in the pursuit of two objectives. First, to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with the United States, albeit on very stiff terms, in order to limit nuclear weapons and thereby hopefully guarantee Russia's security. Second, to wring from the West some sort of consecration of the present division of Germany, and if possible to obtain the neutralization of the Federal Republic, so as to prevent the emergence of a united Europe, which, given the Germans' economic strength, would inevitably fall under their hegemony.

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To the Russians, such a Europe would be intolerable, since it would represent, alongside the United States, a second immense and alien concentration of developed economic power, and hence eventually of nuclear strength. That this new power would be dominated by the efficient and revanchist Germans would only make it the more menacing to the Russians, who are animated by a panic fear of Germanic superiority born of the last war, a fear which not even their ultimate victory effaced. In their eyes, the creation of a German-led Europe on their frontiers would definitively tip the balance of power against them and constitute an insuperable threat to their security. Their aim, therefore, is to arrive at an agreement with the United States while there is still time to neutralize the growing strength of Western Europe.

It is in the hope of successfully carrying out this policy that Khrushchev has seriously jeopardized his alliance with China. It is in the same hope that he swallowed the humiliation of Eisenhower's tergiversations after Camp David and the worse insult of the U-2 incident. It is for the same reason, finally, that for all his bluster he has meekly allowed the Berlin crisis to drag on for almost four years without daring to push it to a culmination. Seen from an Eastern vantage point, Khrushchev has been almost "soft" on capitalism, as the Chinese maintain. No doubt it is partly because of the frustrations created by this situation that he feels impelled on occasion to shout at the West, in effect: "Why don't you take us more seriously? Don't you know that we are a great power?"

Clearly, such an attitude is not that of a serenely great power. Rather it is the defensive reaction of a tough, well-armed, but slow-moving society, seeking above all to secure an established position and to safeguard itself against the dynamic forces of the outside world. Because of its own internal underdevelopment, the Soviet Union must forego serious pursuit of the golden revolutionary possibilities that exist in still more underdeveloped countries. Despite American panic about the omnipresent "hand of Moscow," Russia has in fact done remarkably little to exploit the situation in such crisis-ridden areas as the Congo, South Vietnam and Laos, Iraq, Algeria, and much of Latin America, even with the assistance of a strong Castroist movement. Instead, the Soviet Union is obliged to design its foreign policies primarily to meet problems posed for it by the more advanced West and to concentrate its formidable military might on the construction of the miserable Berlin "Wall."

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HERBERT FEIS

The United States and China

TRADITIONALLY, the United States and China have lived and behaved as friends. The American people thought of themselves as the kindly guardians of the Chinese people. They took it for granted that the sentiment was mutual, and that Chinese trust and liking were steadfast and assured. But that whole mirrored image of relationship has passed away. Communist-controlled China seethes with anger and hatred toward us. We dislike its ways and acts, and we fear its temper and intentions. We are determined that it must be restrained until and unless its conduct and attitude improve.

I understand that my assignments in this symposium are threefold: first, to try to identify those lost or forgone chances in the past to keep China out of the Communist grasp and avert trouble in Sino-American relations; second, to reflect upon the causes of that trouble; and third, to muster my thoughts about the policies which the American Government should now pursue.

Then, first, how might possibly the present situation have been averted? How might a tolerable and less worrisome one have been shaped? In seeking the answer, I take into account the nature and capacities of both the Nationalist Government of China and its Communist challengers as they were during the three critical years —1944-1947—in which the control and condition of China were determined.

The first mistake that opened the way to the ultimate outcome was Chiang Kai-shek's. He made a fateful—both for himself and for us—decision in the autumn of 1944. Americans were trying to train the Chinese army, and expending young lives and needed planes in flights across the Himalayas from India into China. But the struggle

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against the Japanese invaders in China and Burma was still going badly. American military and diplomatic observers in China attributed this to the misdirection of the war effort by Chiang Kai-shek and to the corrupt incompetence of his military commanders. They inferred that the Generalissimo calculated that since the American military forces in due course would rid China of the Japanese anyway, he need not risk the loss of his armies and use up the small arsenal of weapons on which he relied to overcome his Chinese Communist opponents. The observant American officials were also perturbed because he seemed to worry so little about the miseries and injustices borne by the millions of poor Chinese, and to do little to ease them. They were suffering not only from the unavoidable blight of war but also from the impositions of war lords, landlords, usurers, and military commanders.

Impatient with slack effort, and eager to press on with the war, President Roosevelt urged Chiang Kai-shek to put General Joseph H. Stilwell (the American military representative in China) in effective command of all the Chinese armed forces, subject only to his own personal direction. The Generalissimo detested and mistrusted this irate and impolitic soldier; he knew that Stilwell was contemptuously critical of himself (his most polite epithet for the Generalissimo was "The Peanut"), and inclined to admire the fighting spirit of the Chinese Communists. So he stubbornly refused to accede to Roosevelt's peremptory request to grant Stilwell the right to appoint and dismiss senior Chinese military commanders, or to direct the strategy and use of the Chinese armies.

Had he done what Roosevelt asked, the Generalissimo would have had to brave the wrath of some of his most powerful political supporters and run the risk that displeased or displaced military commanders would lead revolts or join rivals in the provinces. Moreover, though Stilwell was willing to promise not to give American arms to Communist troops, he had indicated his wish to transfer the divisions that were blocking the Communist areas to other fronts. The Generalissimo was too cautious to take such risks to his personal position and the prospects of his regime; and he did not have the energetic positiveness to master them. However, had he accepted Roosevelt's proposals in principle, he might have won his contest against the Communists. For, by coercing or inducing (choose the word) Chiang Kai-shek to yield such primary authority to an American military commander, the American Government would have made itself responsible not only for achieving victory against the

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Japanese in China but for assuring Chiang Kai-shek's continued political preeminence. The Generalissimo would have become the ward of the United States. The American Government would have been under an obligation to provide the military, diplomatic, and economic support to sustain him and enable him to extend his authority over all China and Manchuria as soon as the Japanese were expelled.

Despite Chiang Kai-shek's refusal to accept foreign command of his armies, the American Government continued to provide them with as large a quantity of weapons and supplies as could be flown over the Hump or transported over the reopened Burma Road, and also to train a few divisions thus equipped. These did move forward against the battered Japanese forces in China in the Spring of 1945, impelled and prodded by their American instructors.

The historian may wonder whether if, during these months while the war against Germany was being fought to its end, the joint Chinese-American military plans and effort had been more extensive, the pending task of occupying those sections of China held by the Japanese, and even Manchuria, might not have been mastered by the Nationalist Government. In the light of what has since become known of the plight of the Germans and Japanese, the United States and its allies might have safely kept back some of the ground, air, and naval forces they deployed in and behind the Western fronts in Europe, and reserved fewer men and less combat equipment for the prospective invasion of Japan. The forces and weapons thus released could have been used in cooperation with Chinese armies to gain a sea entry into China, and to compel the Japanese to retreat sooner, farther, and faster toward North China. If this had been done before the summer of 1945 and continued during that summer, and had the expanded American combat ground and air forces, ships, and planes been inside China and Chinese ports when the Pacific war ended, Chiang Kai-shek, despite the persisting faults of his regime, might have managed to establish firm administrative control over all China—except perhaps the areas of Communist concentrations. The Communists then might, if only as a temporary expedient, have accepted his terms for an accord.

This might still have been managed perhaps as late as August-September, 1945, when the Japanese armies in China were stacking their arms. But the senior American army authorities, particularly Generals MacArthur and Marshall, overestimated the size of the

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forces of occupation that would be needed in Japan to assure compliance with the terms of surrender. Further, the veterans in the ranks, their families and employers, and their representatives in Congress demanded that the men in uniform be brought back home and discharged at once. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the assent of the President, decided that the nature, size, and timing of our contribution to the take-over in China must wait upon what they thought more urgent priorities. Thus, while during the late summer of 1945 we sent in essential supplies, and provided transport for Chiang Kai-shek's officials and troops, and expanded our military training activities, and scheduled ships to carry his armies into North Chinese and Manchurian ports later in the year, we declined to send either combat or large service forces into China; and we postponed the stationing of divisions of American marines in North Chinese ports and coastal provinces until October; and we directed the American Commanding General to see to it that none of the American forces in China should take sides in, or become involved in, China's "fratricidal" war. All this was more help than Chiang Kai-shek merited or needed if he had made good and full use of his own resources. The American authorities thought so at the time. But it turned out to be too little and too late.

In fairness to the American military authorities, it should be recalled that they had expected the war against Japan to go on longer than it did. They had reckoned that there would be ample time to arrange for whatever aid Chiang Kai-shek might need to take over the area of China from which the Japanese were expelled. Some senior American naval and air commanders had been fairly sure that it would not be necessary to invade Japan; and Secretary of War Stimson and the group who knew most about the progress in making the atomic bomb were hopeful that the new weapon would end the struggle abruptly. But those few American officials who had final say judged that it would be imprudent to relax military preparations because of these forecasts. Nor were alternative ones approved in advance, for use if the forecasts proved correct. Thus, until after the test of the atomic bomb in New Mexico on July 16th, the previously formulated military plans for the distribution of allied forces in the Far East were not revised. American arrangements to aid the Chinese Nationalist Government to extend its authority had to be hurriedly determined.

In the following year, that is, from September 1945 to the late summer of 1946, the ultimate outcome of the struggle for control of

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China was decided, in my judgment. At a critical juncture during this period Chiang Kai-shek made an irremediable error in the direction of his military effort. He refused to heed the advice of General Wedemeyer, the Commanding General of the United States Forces in China, repeated by General Marshall when he went out to China in December 1945. Each, after appraising the military, social and political situation within China, urged the Generalissimo to concentrate his efforts for the time being upon gaining effective control of the interior areas south of the Yellow River and the large cities along the coast, and defer the campaigns to take over the most northern Chinese provinces and Manchuria. For they did not believe that the Nationalist armies could do more until they were better trained, clothed, and equipped; and they doubted whether the Kuomintang regime had enough trained and honest administrative officials to deal with the distress and disorder in both the cities and countryside of central and coastal China. But Chiang Kai-shek was hell-bent upon moving in all haste against the Communists in the north and into Manchuria; so much so that he had to be dissuaded not to send divisions into these very cold regions in winter-time until they could be supplied with warm clothing and stout shoes.

This overreaching strategy failed. Thus in the summer of 1946 the Nationalist armies had to retreat. For his failure, the Generalissimo reproached the Americans, since they had not fully kept what he deemed were Roosevelt's promises. And he tended to attribute his defeats to Russian bad faith. For the commanders of the Soviet Armies in Manchuria delayed the coming of Chinese Nationalist troops into Manchuria by refusing to allow them to enter through Manchurian seaports. In contrast, they secretly assisted the Chinese Communist forces to take over towns and regions as the Soviet troops departed. This enabled the Communists to secure greater stocks of weapons and ammunition abandoned by the Japanese.

The consequences of Chiang Kai-shek's weakening strategy were the more serious because the civilian administrations which he set up in those cities and sections of China occupied by his troops were inefficient and corrupt, and the conditions of life remained miserable and insecure. The system of conscription for the army continued to be crude and cruel. Many of the postwar appointments to office, both military and civilian, were influenced more by personal loyalty, favored cliques, and family connections than by merit. No effective steps were taken to enable the men and women who kept themselves alive by working on the land to acquire ownership of it, nor

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to relieve them of the need to hand over so much of their produce above subsistence needs to the owners or usurers or tax collectors. Although all Chinese able to work should have been set to work repairing war damage and neglect in the cities, towns, and industries, many millions were left idle. The rationing of rice and other foodstuffs was everywhere irregular, and in some places corrupt. Students and professors were still kept under official constraints. The Kuomintang regime was unable or indisposed to engage in unsparing revolutionary reforms of Chinese economic institutions, activities, and social principles. Consequently, able young Chinese men who could have led in the invigoration of China traveled over to the Communist side, and millions of poor Chinese in uniform, in the fields and factories, and on junks, became predisposed to accept the Communist presence.

During this critical period (September 1945 to mid-1946) the American authorities in Washington and China became baffled and discouraged. First Hurley, then Marshall, strove tenaciously to prevail upon the Kuomintang regime and the Communists to join in a reorganized government under a new constitution. After this effort broke down, the American Government ceased to be initiatory. While continuing to provide some aid, support, and advice to Chiang Kai-shek, the American Government otherwise allowed the internal struggle to take its course.

Either one of two more vigorous policies might have been tried. We might have given Chiang Kai-shek an ultimatum; we might have insisted that he heed American military advice, use his resources within such sections of China as he could master and govern, and reform his civil government and administration—or forfeit American support at once. Or we might have backed him up with an American military expedition almost as large, well-equipped, and supplied as the one deployed against Japan.

But it is unlikely that the American people or Congress would have supported the Executive in either of these drastic courses. Would they have allowed President Truman and his military and diplomatic advisers to turn a blank face to Chiang Kai-shek if that recalcitrant had ignored our ultimatum? Or if he had responded, would they have authorized the President to engage several hundreds of thousands of American soldiers and scores of American planes and ships in the long-drawn-out civil war in China? Probably not. Neither during this period nor during the three subsequent years between Marshall's departure from China and Chiang Kai-

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shek's flight in 1949 was either of these two alternative or complementary courses of action seriously considered. Only after the unprovoked Communist assault against South Korea did the American people become sufficiently aroused to risk their lives and fortunes in protracted and distant wars on the Asian mainland.

These extended comments on the possible other ways in which the situation in China might have been better managed bear upon certain well-worn controversies. Allegations that the Truman administration "lost" China are twisted and unjust. Such mistakes in judgment and deficiencies in decision as the American Government made were only accessory to, not the main determining cause of Chiang Kai-shek's defeat and the Communist triumph. Critics may, however, turn the issue about, and ask whether the American Government could not have "saved" China if it had been clearer-headed and bolder. I presume they mean: have kept all or most of China out of Communist grasp. To that query, so phrased, I find it harder to extract an answer from unacted history. My guess is, that, no matter what we had done, the best that might have been achieved would have been an unstable compromise—more probably a geographic division of China than the emergence of some kind of coalition or constitutional arrangement.

One other pertinent element of American policy ought to be brought into the scope of these appraisals of the past. The Communist conquest of mainland China has had a disproportionate effect on the military and political situation in the Pacific because Japan was so reduced in territory and power. It was compelled not only to get out of Manchuria and Korea but also to give up all its island possessions, including Taiwan, south and north of its four main islands. These penalties of defeat, first announced at the end of the Cairo Conference in December 1943, enlarged the Chinese Communist opportunity and menace.

Perhaps also, the division and control of Korea between Russian and American occupation forces, and the war which followed five years later, might have been averted, if the Allies, including Russia and China, had worked out thoroughly before the liberation of Korea an operative plan for a joint four-power trusteeship for, say, ten years, and imposed it on Korea despite the outcries for immediate independence. Yet this may be an unreal conjecture; even if such a joint trusteeship had been inaugurated, it would have been broken by Korean resistance and Russian and Chinese pressure.

Such a retrospective and conjectural appraisal of the past can

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make us more aware that there are choices in history and that the quality of leadership is important. In my mind, it tends toward some clear, though disputable, impressions. One is that it is very difficult for us in the West effectively to influence the course, political and social, of the peoples of Asia. Another is that, if and as we decide that it is essential for us to do so, we ought to realize that the call upon our personal lives and economic fortunes may be great and prolonged.

With these few precepts I leap from the past to the present. The outspoken enmity of the Chinese Communist leaders is rooted in their fervent creed, which compels them to detest the image of the capitalist West. It was nurtured by the prolonged American resistance during the period in which they were striving for supremacy. It is now sustained by the usefulness of its fused hate-fear appeal in keeping the Chinese masses aroused and subservient. It is the more intense, since absolute power has turned Mao Tse-tung into a person of furious temper.

Although the Communists had also resisted the Japanese, the Americans had helped only the Kuomintang forces during the war. Despite their resentment over this American course, the Communist leaders had not spurned, indeed they had responded to, the initial American efforts to end the civil war and unify China under one government or one constitution (1944-1946). Whether this was a pretense or not remains conjectural. Probably it was tactical; probably they thought that the United States would support the Kuomintang so strongly that they, the Communists, might be worsted and scattered; perhaps they reckoned that as a participant in coalition or representative government they could in time win the allegiance of the Chinese people and get control of the government.

But the sustained American support of Chiang Kai-shek during his subsequent attempt to compel the Communists to accept his terms no doubt seemed to the Communist leaders proof of their belief that the capitalist United States must by the logic of its nature and history, always seek to defeat their cause.

The victory over Chiang Kai-shek in 1949 did not assuage Communist resentment. To the contrary, their exaltation at becoming the rulers of all of China was expressed in enlivened invective against all who had opposed them. This has been customary in Chinese history: one spits on those who have been worsted. But it is likely that the sponsors of the sustained campaign of hatred of the West also

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had a calculated purpose. It enabled the ruling Communist group to present themselves to the hundreds of millions of Chinese who were being brought under Communist discipline, as humane idealists engaged in an inescapable struggle against oppressive imperialists. To Mao Tse-tung and his associates, anger against the United States was not only obsessive but the most effective way to get obedience from the multitude of city workers and peasants and to sustain the idealistic fury of intellectuals and students. Thus, as these revolutionary leaders strained to make over China, they came to rely more and more on the hormones of hatred. The refusal of the American government to recognize their triumph, its protection of Chiang Kai-shek, its willful indulgence of the hope that the Generalissimo might be able to launch a rebellion by landing on the mainland, the loud damnations of American political partisans—all these seemed to them to justify and validate their aggressive hostility.

These attitudes and emotions were compounded and sharpened during the war in Korea which began in 1950. What was to have been a quick surprise conquest of a neighboring country was frustrated by the United States, carrying the United Nations along with its resolution. Western troops thrust forward to the Soviet and Chinese frontiers. Threatened defeat led to a call on the Chinese armies to enter the war, and to an intensified recourse to hatred in order to animate them. Success in holding the line against the superior arms and airplanes of the West brought assurance which verged upon dismissive contempt.

The American measures to debar the Chinese Communists from Taiwan and deprive them of the ultimate satisfaction of destroying the remnants of the Chiang Kai-shek government augmented the other causes of resentment. The American initiatives to restore the defensive capabilities of Japan, to re-introduce that country as a potential element of strength in the prospective control of the Pacific, were deemed to be primarily directed against Communist China.

Such, in summary, can be construed as the interpretations of the experience of these years, in the beam of the Communist mind. Yet, taking all these imputed elements into full account, I am puzzled by the fixed and sustained intensity of the antagonism. It has been insensible to the passage of time and indifferent to our professions of willingness to abstain from offensive acts in return for a corresponding pledge. One reason is that the memories of the Communist leaders are still aflame. Few personal struggles and

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enmities have gone so close to the bone and heart-beat of two men as this between Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek. And few have gone on as long—over thirty years. During that period each has time and again sent armies against the other and laid plots and tried deception. Each can call the long roll of friends and associates whom the other has maltreated or killed.

The Americans, who tried so sedulously from 1944 to 1946 to persuade the two groups to desist in their attacks on each other, and instead argue out their differences within the rules of some kind of coalition or constitutional government, concluded that the ingrown hatreds and mistrusts were greater obstacles than differences in interests or social outlook, or even craving for power. They may have been mistaken, but I am not sure that they were, at this time. For the Nationalist government then seemed still strong enough to keep the upper hand, and the Soviet Union's support of the Chinese Communists being still uncertain, they were proceeding cautiously.

As already remarked, the Chinese Communist view of society predisposes Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues to believe that the United States will never cease to try to destroy Communism in China, and this discredits the possibility of living in peaceful "coexistence" with us. In their eyes, our determined protection of Chiang Kai-shek confirms that opinion. They even construe American resistance to the Communist conquest of South Korea and South Vietnam in the same way. For in their book, Communist use of force to subdue other peoples is only the necessary and justified prelude to "liberation" of their victims. In that cause they expend the lives of their soldiers without regret, and lack pity for those who resist, and disregard the liberties of those who come under their rule.

This corrosive compound of memory, mistrust, and doctrine is kept astir by deformed reports about life in this country. Perhaps many of the Chinese Communist leaders really believe the vicious and distorted portrayals of American ways, morals and conditions which they diffuse among their people. The ability of Chinese Communist troops to fight to a standstill the better equipped American forces in Korea quite possibly seems to them to confirm an impression that Communist stamina, morale, and courage are superior to that of the Americans. But some of them must know better, and still, with iron purpose, disseminate their falsehoods. For the reports of American oppression of the masses, starvation, unemployment,

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life in the slums, may reconcile the Chinese millions to the restraints, the unremitting labor and individual misery, under Communist rule. They animate the faith of younger and idealistic spirits that their lives are being well-spent within the fellowship of the Communist cause. They buoy up tired or worried bodies and spirits by the implicit assurance that a society as decadent and riven as ours is described as being must soon disintegrate, leaving Communism dominant and free to devote all its energies to peaceful progress.

Contrariwise, they are probably fearful of the spread of the opinion among the people that peaceful coexistence is possible; for that might cause the more inquisitive and bolder among them to question what they are being told about us, wonder if it is necessary to submit to extreme Communist impositions, and incline them to be less submissive and hard-working.

Impassioned, worried, they find it easier, or believe it safer, to continue to break down our resistance, first by bringing the smaller countries of South Asia (including South Vietnam) within the Communist circle, and presently by confronting us with the possibility of atomic war for control of Taiwan. Once we have nuclear weapons and a means of delivering them, it can be imagined they say one to another, we will no longer need to put up with American opposition; we will be able to venture upon those extensions of Communist realm from which American power has thus far held us back. It may be surmised that in their more excited moods they envisage the time when they can threaten: "Give us all Asia now, and much else later, or fight with thermonuclear weapons. We dare to issue this challenge, because just as our greater numbers enabled us to endure a far greater loss of life in Korea than the Americans, so they will enable China to survive even thermonuclear war, after other nations are dead."

To his convinced Communist followers in China, Mao Tse-tung is not only the great teacher, organizer, and achiever. He is also the traditional heroic Chinese knight, engaged in battle against the dragon—the United States; he is the armed apostle of good against evil, champion of the oppressed. Such imagery nourishes the cult of personal adoration which Mao Tse-tung has come to crave and encourage. The ascending pitch of Chinese Communist invective against the United States has been in consonance with the changing trend of Mao Tse-tung's temper and nature. He has become enwrapped in self-admiration. After long tenure as the supreme leader,

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the oracle, and the absolute ruler of Communist China, he has come to require submission to himself and popular worship of his image. He resents contradiction, and is tough, unsparing, and rough with any who differ from him.

These are the remembrances, feelings, judgments, doctrines, and dominating personality with which the American Government must reckon in all situations within the field of contact with Communist China. Can they be mollified? Or held in check until Communism in China becomes less compulsive and combative, or founders?

At this point in my exposition, I happened to remark to an eminent scientist living under the same roof, "I am writing an article about the situation that has developed between the United States and China, and I feel depressed over the prospect and puzzled as to how it may be changed for the better." Glancing up, he volunteered: "By cultivating the friendship of the Chinese Communists, and the way to begin is by recognizing the Chinese Communist government. It is as simple as that!" All I could find to say at the moment without distracting him from his work or disturbing his assurance was: "I wish I could be sure of that."

How bothersome human nature is—true! How tragic and futile are these quarrels and wars between national states—true! The "two cultures." Thus, as I recalled my scientist friend's assured comment, a passage I read not long afterward in Robert Gilpin's book, *American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy,* seemed apt.

> The scientist tends to believe that he, in contrast to the statesman, has learned to rid himself of those intellectual impediments which prevent the former from reaching out for "bold and imaginative" solutions to political problems such as those posed by the development of atomic energy.
>
> Scientists, in fact, have become the third group since the breakdown of the unifying forces of medieval Christianity which has sought to bring order to international relations by some non-political means. In the seventeenth century, the lawyers such as Grotius, Suarez and Pufendorf believed international law could regulate the conflicts among nations. In the nineteenth century it was believed that the commercial spirit which could not coexist with war was coming to control the affairs of every nation. Today, depending upon the scientist's specific political view, there is a strong tendency among scientists to believe that the methods, the professional community, and the technical products of science have provided mankind with the means by which to achieve eternal peace.
>
> In the eyes of the student of politics these political attitudes of the scientist possess an ambivalent quality. On the one hand, the scientist

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contributes to political life, in addition to his intelligence and skills, an optimism and conviction that man's most difficult political problems can be solved. . . .

Yet these qualities of concern, persistence, and commitment which characterize the scientist as a political animal have their negative aspects as well . . . the scientist in politics often develops a self-reinforcing system of thought which rules out the elementary canons of evidence that he would normally apply in his own field of study. For the scientist the failure to achieve a political goal tends to represent a temporary defeat in his battle against unreason rather than to stimulate a rethinking of his fundamental political position.

Can my scientific friend be correct? Might not a demonstration of good-will by the United States, as, for example, an offer to feed the hungry Chinese people, and an acceptance of Communist China as a member of the United Nations, break the chain of antagonism? What consequences could be hoped for, what could be expected?

The most commonly heard reasons for the policy which may be called "unreserved initiative for recognition," are impressive. Thus the two connected suppositions on which it rests ought to be explicity stated and examined.

One is that the hostility and aggression of the Chinese Communist government is due primarily to our past and present treatment of it—most particularly now by our continued protection of Chiang Kai-shek, our refusal to enable it to secure Communist China's place in the United Nations, and our armed intervention to prevent social revolution in the other poor and nearby countries of Asia. They derive from the judgment, in short, that the United States is more or less responsible for the present impasse. They tend to forget that it was the unprovoked Communist attack on South Korea which impelled the United States to assume protection of the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Formosa; and that it was the Chinese Communist war against the United Nations (mainly American) forces in Korea that caused the American Government to conclude that it would be wholly inconsistent to accord it entry into the United Nations. The historical experience does not support the view that the current Chinese Communist attitude is due primarily to mistreatment by others or is sufficiently explained by past grievances.

Such an interpretation does not give due weight to the obsessional dictates of the Communist creed, and to the personal passions and traits of Mao Tse-tung and his intimates. It ignores the signs that there is, at this stage of Chinese Communism anyhow, a compulsive drive toward expansion and challenge. While Soviet Com-

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munism has become self-restraining, Chinese Communism has not. Behind the throne (or should I say, the placards) there is a dragon.

The second supposition is that, in this situation as in most others, the best, perhaps the only, way to win friendship and trust is to show friendship and trust. Perhaps so. But I think it more likely that the Chinese Communist rulers at present really do not care a whit for the friendship, esteem or trust of the Western capitalist democracies, though they may purposely pretend to do so now and then. They would probably construe recognition and admission into the United Nations, not as a gesture of friendly acceptance, but as an act of contrition, a diplomatic expedient, and a tribute to the strength of Communist influence. Nor would they be wholly wrong in these inferences.

These are not conclusive arguments against official recognition of the Chinese Communist government as the Government of China and, as such, its admission into the United Nations. They are predictions that these measures in themselves would not bring subsidence of Chinese Communist hostility to the West. Nor would they, in and of themselves, cause Mao's regime to desist from its evidenced aims. These aims may be moderated or deferred because of domestic difficulties, especially lack of food and distress in the cities. Or possibly also if the Soviet and American governments reached accords on limitation of arms and on the political situation in Europe.

Those who judge my caveats excessive can perhaps explain why the recognition accorded Communist China by Great Britain has not caused it to be more outgoing in dealing with that country (I do not think that the fact the Chinese Communists have not tried to take Hong Kong by force is due to the fact that it has been recognized by the British government). And perhaps they have an explanation, consonant with their conceptions, of the reproving dissent of Mao Tse-tung from Khrushchev's affirmation that the Western democracies and Communism could coexist in peace. Does this not mean that they place other aims above equality and friendship in peace?

But, as is maintained by some eminent observers, even though such analyses and forecasts as mine may be justified, would we still not be well-advised to take the risks that would follow upon recognition and admission into the United Nations? Would it not be sensible anyhow to find out in this way whether Chinese Communism can be soothed by acceptance, recognition and equality among the great nations? How else, they persist, can the question be put to the test

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of reality, not of inference that may be wrong? And, they add, has not our present policy of denial proven to be a failure?

Perhaps the event would show their bold will to believe sound. But before acting on it the American government ought to face and safeguard the United States and its political associates against the possible consequences of admitting Communist China into the United Nations and recognizing it as the government of mainland China. Even if the Chinese Communist government accepts membership without insisting that the rival Nationalist government on Taiwan be expelled at once, it would surely exert itself to end this dual representation by any and all means. It would denounce the continuation of American support for the Taiwan government as aggressive; denounce in the United Nations our presence in Thailand and South Vietnam as oppressive and unwanted.

The Chinese Communists would also assail American restrictions on trade with Communist China even in strategic materials and weapons, as contrary to the principles of the United Nations and unjust, and regard our refusal to extend credit as punitive. And almost surely it would demand a substantial share of whatever funds and resources the United Nations can control.

One other possible consequence ought also to be borne in mind. If the Communist government is given China's place in the United Nations and recognized by the American government, how may it affect the situation and reaction in Japan? It would almost certainly improve the prospects for those who wish to dissassociate Japan from the United States and enter into close relations with Communist China.

Assuming, however, that some of these presumed consequences could be warded off, and that it is best to subordinate the others to the governing wish for peace, would Communist China's presence in the United Nations improve the prospect of lessening the quarrels that beset the world? The hopeful do so predict; but this opinion is an expression of faith rather than an inference from past experience. More probably the Chinese Communist government, like the various other Communist governments who are in the United Nations, would use the entries opened and occasions afforded by membership to make trouble for the capitalist West rather than ease tension, and would still believe that the route to peace is by Communist conquest, not by tolerant compromise, not by the rule of live-and-let-live.

Along with these pros and cons—which have been features of

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the problem of decision ever since 1949-1950—account should be taken of two more recently emergent circumstances. One is the severe set-back suffered by Communist China in its economic achievements and plans. I accept the judgment of more closely informed students that there is little or no prospect that these difficulties, if prolonged, will lead to the overthrow of the Chinese Communist regime. But may they not cause it, as it revises domestic policies, to be more inclined to seek a live-and-let-live accord with the West? Would not a continuation of aloofness be more effective than a reassuring display of desire for their company or fear of their opposition?

The other recently evidenced element is the coldness, verging on opposition and rivalry, between Communist China and the Soviet Union. If at this time the American government should reverse its previous position, and indicate its willingness to recognize Communist China, what effect would this have on Sino-Soviet relations? Would or would not the Soviet government construe it as an effort to widen the differences between them by improving the political place and stature of Communist China? Would not China use it to extract advantages or more assistance from the Soviet Union?

There is one other reason for advocating a change in the American course, one that has more weight, perhaps, than any of those which I have mentioned—all of which are necessarily predictive and as hard to appraise as are the arguments in favor of recognition. It is prudential. Is it not probable that after Chiang Kai-shek dies, or is forced by age to retire, the Nationalist regime on Taiwan will crumble, and that control of the island will pass to Communist China? And does it not also seem probable that, even if we maintain our active opposition, a majority of the members of the Assembly will vote to make room for the Communist Chinese government, and even accede to a demand that the rival Chinese government be expelled? Should either or both of these events transpire, would they not be humiliating defeats for the United States and another omen that the cause of Communism is the stronger, and will prevail? Therefore, such forward reasoning concludes, would it not be wiser to yield before we must, and while, by doing so, we may be rewarded by the better response and behavior of the Chinese Communists?

I confess that I am not clear why this predictive counsel does not convince me. Perhaps only because of an irrepressible hurt pride and indignation at the abuse which the Chinese Communist govern-

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ment has spewed over our country and its institutions and ideals. Perhaps because a belief that these two foreseen events will not happen if we are determined that they shall not happen. Perhaps because of the notion that if they should occur, it would make little ultimate difference to the future of American-Chinese relationship, whether they happened with American assent or against its will.

Thus I come to the end of my reflections, with only a sparse collection of conclusions, none novel or buoyant. The American government and people should be honest and fearless in their efforts to convince the Chinese Communist rulers that if they will desist from aggression, the United States will not connive at or support any attack upon Communist China. Our government should insist that Chiang Kai-shek continue to shelve vain attempts to invade the mainland, and cease to make statements of his intention to do so. When and as the Chinese government promises not to resort to force against Taiwan, and not to station its own military forces on Quemoy and Matsu, it should insist with determination that Chiang Kai-shek relinquish these two islands.

But we should maintain our refusal of recognition and our resistance to the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, until and unless we are reasonably assured that the regime will not use force against Taiwan, strive and conspire to bring about a Communist revolution in Japan, and cease to challenge the conception of peaceful coexistence. If the Chinese Communist government would give reliable indications that it will so curb its actions and amend its attitudes, then the American government should venture to recognize it and enter into a truce of toleration with it. We could do so with the greater inner strength and health and promise of our freer society under law than their driven and writhing one.

Whether or not we recognize Communist China, we are in for an unpleasant time. We must maintain a military force so formidable that our diplomacy need not yield to fear or threats. Yet we must be sure that our diplomacy does not reject any fair chance to settle our quarrels with Communist China or the Soviet Union on terms that provide both ourselves and them freedom from fear, because our military superiority makes it seem less essential to do so.

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JOHN N. PLANK

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Problems and Prospects

"LET THE WORD go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans."

This was rhetoric, to be sure, appropriate to an exalted occasion; but the jaded and the cynical err seriously in dismissing it as being rhetoric only. On assuming the Presidency, John F. Kennedy brought to that office more than youth. Supremely self-confident in his possession of vigor, courage, intelligence, and imagination, he brought also a determination to do great things, to be a conscious shaper of the history of his times.

Latin America, an area of the world that has stood in a special relationship to the United States and that has presented both challenge and opportunity, was much in the President's thought. Elsewhere in his Inaugural Address he made a preliminary announcement of the Alliance for Progress: "To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge—to convert our good words into good deeds—in a new alliance for progress—to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty."

This declaration initiated a major shift in United States hemispheric policy, a shift as radical as any in our history. For the Alliance for Progress, whose structure and purposes are set down in the Charter of Punta del Este, is conceived as a program of controlled revolution: it is to be a continental effort directed toward the deliberate, thorough, and rapid transformation of nineteen Latin American societies. Through adherence to the Charter, the United States is committed to playing the leading role in that continental effort.

Proper parallels with this audacious undertaking are not to be

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found in earlier United States experience. Some have called it a Latin American Marshall Plan, but the characterization is inexact and misleading. The Marshall Plan was designed for the rehabilitation of war-shattered economies, not for the reconstitution of whole societies. The Marshall Plan could count for its success upon the participation of populations rich in the technical, administrative, and political skills of the twentieth century, skills in which Latin America's populations are deplorably deficient. The Marshall Plan was carried out among states that were used to dealing with one another, in peace and in war, as members of a select company of dominant powers, not among states of which one had maintained a position of altogether unchallengeable advantage through more than a century of use and abuse.

Still less is the Alliance for Progress to be regarded as a mere expansion of Point Four, a stepped-up program of financial aid and technical assistance. Increased aid and assistance are forthcoming under the Alliance, but these are thought of only as tools in a vast program of induced and channeled change in the political, social, and cultural spheres, as well as the economic. A program as bold as this one has not been seriously considered before by official Washington.

The Alliance for Progress, therefore, is quite unlike the Good Neighbor Policy of Roosevelt and the Good Partner Policy of Eisenhower, whether one looks to the extent of United States involvement or to the nature of purposes and goals. The Good Neighbor and Good Partner Policies reflected partial and—on the part of the Eisenhower administration at least—reluctant accommodations with emerging hemispheric forces and trends whose existence and strength it was inexpedient longer to ignore or adamantly to oppose. The Alliance for Progress, on the other hand, reflects a confident intention on the part of the Kennedy administration to seize the initiative in hemispheric developments, to be ahead of rather than behind events, and thus in a position to forestall or control them rather than adjust painfully to them.

Of course one can exaggerate the extent of disjunction between the Eisenhower and the Kennedy administrations in the matter of hemispheric policy. As early as 1953 Dr. Milton Eisenhower had recommended to his brother the President that substantial changes be adopted in our approach to Latin America; and both the establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank and the signing of the Act of Bogotá occurred before Mr. Eisenhower left office.

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But the difference in tone, in spirit, in attitude, between the two administrations is striking.*

On 13 March 1961, President Kennedy set out in some detail what he conceived the Alliance for Progress to be:

> Our unfulfilled task is to demonstrate to the entire world that man's unsatisfied aspiration for economic progress and social justice can best be achieved by free men working within a framework of democratic institutions.
>
> Therefore I have called on all the people of the hemisphere to join in a New Alliance for Progress—*Alianza para Progreso*—a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health and schools—*techo, trabajo y tierra, salud y escuela.*

After listing ten specific proposals for action, the President spoke again of goals and conditions:

> With steps such as these we propose to complete the revolution of the Americas—to build a hemisphere where all men can hope for the same high standard of living—and all can live out their lives in dignity and freedom.
>
> To achieve this goal political freedom must accompany material progress. . . .
>
> This political freedom must be accompanied by social change. For unless necessary social reforms, including land and tax reforms, are freely made—unless we broaden the opportunity of all our people—unless the great mass of Americans share in increasing prosperity—then our alliance, our revolution, and our dream will have failed.
>
> But we call for social change by free men. . . .

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* The Charter of the Inter-American Development Bank was approved in August, 1959. Latin Americans had been requesting the establishment of such an institution since 1889. The Act of Bogotá, an indirect result of Vice President Nixon's South American trip of 1958 and a direct outcome of Brazil's President Kubitschek's "Operation Pan America," was signed in September, 1960. The Charter of Punta del Este is heavily derivative from the Act of Bogotá.

President Eisenhower, by the record, was less than enthusiastic about these new departures in hemispheric arrangements. On 8 March 1960, he told newsmen, "When internal social reform is required, it is *purely* an internal matter." (Italics mine.) United States Department of State, *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1960.* Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 469. And on 11 July 1960, the then President told another group: "The only real investment that is going to flow into countries that will be useful to them in the long term is private investment. It is many times the amount that can be put in from the public coffers. And normally the public loans are made so as to encourage and make better opportunities for the private investments that follow." United States Department of State *Bulletin*, 1 August 1960, p. 168.

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> Let us once again transform the American continents into a vast crucible of revolutionary ideas and efforts—a tribute to the power of the creative energies of free men—an example to all the world that liberty and progress walk hand in hand. Let us once again awaken our American Revolution until it guides the struggles of people everywhere—not with an imperialism of force or fear—but the rule of courage and freedom and hope for the future of man.[1]

This pronouncement, while tailored to fit the crisis and the need of mid-twentieth-century Latin America as the President conceived them, was in the high Wilsonian tradition. Here was expressed the thought that the Western Hemisphere not only should be, but could be, radically transformed through the rational and orderly efforts of men of good will working harmoniously together for a commonly perceived set of ends.

Criticism may be directed at the President's statement, as indeed at the whole Alliance program, on the grounds that the goals set are unrealistically high, and that the very notion of a democratically ordered revolution involves a contradiction in terms. But those who would dismiss the Alliance as being poorly conceived and overly ambitious ought soberly to ponder two questions: (1) Does the situation in Latin America today allow of any program less audacious in conception, less ambitious in purposes and goals, than the Alliance? (2) Does the Alliance even begin to approach in audacity, not to say arrogance, the philosophy and program of our antagonists in the Cold War?

Moreover, it is not very meaningful to regard the Alliance in terms of its prospects for unconditional success or total failure. What is important about the Alliance is its positive thrust, its frank recognition that rapid amelioration of the conditions under which most Latin Americans live is imperative, and its assembling of instruments to facilitate such amelioration. The Alliance is designed also to serve, of course, as a countertotalitarian, counter-Communist device. Its premise is that the potential victims of Communism are also potential supporters of the cause of freedom, but that they can be brought unequivocally to opt for freedom only if persuaded that the freedom they are offered is real and not spurious.

President Kennedy has put the last point in this way:

> We must not forget that our Alliance for Progress is more than a doctrine of development, a blueprint for economic advance. Rather it is an expression of the noblest goals of our civilization. It says that want and despair need not be the lot of man. It says that no society is free until all

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its people have an equal opportunity to share the fruits of their own land and their own labor. And it says that material progress is meaningless without individual freedom and political liberty. It is a doctrine of the freedom of man in the most spacious sense of that freedom.[2]

In Washington it was decided to "mark," not to "celebrate," 17 August 1962, the first anniversary of the signing of the Charter of Punta del Este. Teodoro Moscoso, chief United States administrator of the program, told his staff: "There will be time enough to celebrate when we have achieved a working alliance and an extensive progress. As yet I am not satisfied that we have either."[3]

While the comment reflected disappointment, its primary purpose was exhortative. For Mr. Moscoso, although chosen for his post because of his outstanding success as master administrator of Puerto Rico's "Operation Bootstrap"—a program remotely analogous to the Alliance—has never believed that the task to which he and his staff had set themselves was an easy one that could be accomplished quickly.

Washington's role in the Alliance is an extraordinarily difficult one. From a purely technical standpoint, the job of mounting and coordinating comprehensive development assistance programs is immense. Formidable enough when such programs are arranged on a bilateral basis between the United States and individual recipient countries, its difficulties are compounded when, as under the Alliance dispensation, programming, financing, control, and review are matters involving the participation of other international agencies.[4] Infinitely more serious than such technical problems, however, is the absence of a true inter-American community, one whose members share common traditions, common values, and common aspirations; a community, above all, whose members trust and respect one another. This community does not exist.

We do ourselves no service by pretending that the case is otherwise. We take shadow for substance if we point to our elaborate inter-American machinery and our libraries of inter-American accords, agreements, resolutions, pacts, and treaties. The economic links between the United States and the countries of Latin America, while numerous and important, are not for the most part of a kind to bolster community. Movement of persons is extensive and is increasing; but it has not given rise to community. The reasons for the absence of community are many, but one of them overshadows all others, both in absolute importance and in its relevance to the prospects for the Alliance for Progress. It is simply that the United

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States is big, rich, strong, and successful, while the states of Latin America are small, poor, weak, and unsuccessful.

Out of this contrast have emerged patterns of behavior and attitudes that affect all aspects of inter-American relations. The United States government in its dealings with Latin American states acts from a position of superiority; the governments of Latin America, in their dealings with Washington, act from positions of inferiority. Individual citizens of the United States, whether government officials, businessmen, or casual tourists, almost automatically assume in their contacts with Latin Americans an attitude of complacent superiority; citizens of Latin America, in their dealings with North Americans, are almost obliged to adopt a defensive attitude, although it may manifest itself in markedly different ways: effusive cordiality, sullen withdrawal, or hostile confrontation. It is the exceptional Latin American who can maintain his equanimity before the irritating, if largely unconscious, condescension of North Americans.*

It is in this charged psychological atmosphere that United States spokesmen for the Alliance are now attempting to spur the Latin Americans to reform, preaching, cajoling, threatening. However necessary the reforms may be—and there is in the region a general recognition of the need for basic changes—much friction and resentment is engendered in Latin America by the United States presuming to tell the Latin Americans what to do and how to do it. After all, it is very late in the day, and had the United States paid adequate attention to Latin America's requirements in the early postwar years, particularly during the decade of the 'fifties, this crash program of the Alliance might not have been necessary. If the Latin Americans with whom the administration deals do not always say this, it is because they are gentlemen and also because they desperately need the assistance the Alliance offers.

The situation is not greatly helped by statements like that of President Kennedy to a gathering of Latin American diplomats on 13 March 1962: "For too long my country, the wealthiest nation on a poor continent, failed to carry out its full responsibilities to its

* A Latin American economist of international reputation, now engaged in carrying out a project of monumental scope, confided recently that during his career he had encountered only two or three North Americans who did not adopt a condescending attitude toward him. We may hope that he was exaggerating. It may be, too, that he is hypersensitive, an understandable characteristic.

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sister republics. We have now accepted that responsibility. In the same way those who possess wealth and power in poor nations must accept their own responsibilities. They must lead the fight for those basic reforms which alone can preserve the fabric of their own societies. Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable." [5]

President Kennedy's sense of urgency is appropriate, and his thought is sound. To the North American ear, the statement is entirely fitting. We should not be surprised, however, if to the ears of many Latin Americans it rings rather differently.

Another respect in which the absence of inter-American community manifests itself, one which must have important effects upon the future of the Alliance, is the different content and value assigned to "democracy" in the two parts of the hemisphere. References to our "common" revolutionary heritage and our "common" republican institutions sadly miss the mark. The same labels have been used, to be sure, and similar formal institutions have been set up; but the phenomena to which the labels have been affixed, and the use that has been made of the formal institutions have been quite dissimilar in the United States and in Latin America. What is really important for us to note here is that comparatively few in Latin America have had any experience of "constitutional democracy" even remotely like that practiced by us, and that comparatively few prize the democracy they know highly enough to struggle for it. The concern of Washington, therefore, that the Alliance program be implemented "democratically" is not a concern shared by most in Latin America.

Recent events in Peru are most instructive. It will be recalled that last July a military *junta* declared void the announced results of a national election, imprisoned the constitutional president of the republic, dissolved the Peruvian legislature, and assumed plenary powers. The United States promptly suspended diplomatic relations and stopped the flow of Alliance for Progress funds to Peru. Obviously taken aback by the sharp United States response, the leader of the *junta* insisted that he and his colleagues, much more effectively than a democratically elected Peruvian government, could see to the implementation of the kind of reforms envisaged by the Charter of Punta del Este.

In this instance, the sincerity and honesty of the members of the *junta* need not at all be called into question; and, in the short term at least—for power still tends to corrupt—the contention of the *junta* leader had some validity. There is no doubt that a military govern-

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ment, unaccountable to a legislature or public opinion, can move much more rapidly and perhaps even more efficiently toward the realization of the mechanical goals of the Alliance than could a chief executive scrupulous in his observance of constitutional procedures.

The Peruvian *junta* seemed genuinely bewildered by Washington's reaction to the *coup*. At the same time, the passive acquiescence in the take-over of the great majority of Peruvians perhaps provides some indication of the positive value they were prepared to place upon the democracy they had known.

Washington, for its part, is altogether right in insisting that the reforms be enacted and implemented by means of democratic procedures. The United States must be concerned to see the establishment of viably democratic societies throughout the hemisphere, if we are sincere in our belief that democracy is worth struggling for; and the United States also must be concerned to demonstrate the superiority of the Western way over the Communist way precisely through the employment of democratic means to the attainment of the Alliance goals.

It is possible, however, that Washington may be expecting too much of the democratic process in Latin America, even in those countries in which it is functioning. We should keep in mind that the purpose of the Alliance is to raise living standards in the region to an extent that will permit the great masses to participate effectively and meaningfully in the life of the nation. This is to be done through land and tax reforms, through mass literacy campaigns, through vocational training, through housing programs, through rapid industrialization. The unsettling effects of moves like these upon established social patterns, patterns that may have the sanction of centuries of use, are bound to be severe. As we urge the Latin Americans to ever greater efforts to complete their peaceful revolution, we will also do well to pause occasionally and to reflect that we in this country, with our great wealth, our vast middle class, our strong democratic institutions, have still not succeeded in assimilating our American Negro to full citizenship—and we have had more than a century to do that job.

A third major manifestation of the absence of inter-American community is evident in the differing interpretations, North and South, of the nature and threat of Fidel Castro's Cuba. As seen from the United States, Communism in Cuba marks the introduction of an alien ideology and system into the western hemisphere that en-

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dangers the bases of inter-American security and that is incompatible with the principles of the inter-American system. It must, therefore, be combated and ultimately eliminated.

As seen from, let us say, Uruguay, the situation is by no means so simple. Above all, Cuba is Latin American, and however little Uruguayans may know about Cuba, they feel that it is linked to Uruguay and the other Latin American states by ties of language, culture, religion, and general *Weltanschauung* in a way that the United States can never be linked to them. Second, while it is to be regretted that Fidel Castro's revolution miscarried and that Cuba is now under Communist control, that is essentially Cuba's affair and her misfortune. Such a thing certainly would never be permitted to happen in Uruguay. In any event, it does not make much sense to go to great lengths, even to the extent of breaching the doctrine of nonintervention, to rid Cuba of Communist domination, if the result of the effort is simply to be a reassertion of United States hegemony over the island.

Fidel Castro's personal star is now very clearly in the descendent around the hemisphere: hopes he may still entertain of leading a Latin American revolution, of transforming the Andes into the Sierra Madre of America, are becoming altogether unrealistic. This is so not only because of growing continental awareness of conditions inside contemporary Cuba; it is so also because leaders and would-be leaders of left-wing extremist movements are not eager to share their laurels in the hoped-for hour of triumph. Fidel Castro, however, continues to broadcast his poisonous harangues throughout the hemisphere; and from his island are despatched quantities of arms and propaganda, to be distributed by his agents and sympathizers.

Fidel Castro's Cuba affects the prospects for the Alliance in ways both positive and negative. Positively, it spurs Washington and some Latin American regimes to move ahead with needed reforms as rapidly as possible in order to prevent repetitions of the Cuba experience. Negatively, the *castrista* Communists are doing all they can to arouse the groups among which they work (students, peasants, laborers, white-collared people) to make exaggerated demands that simply cannot be met. Their objective, clearly, is to excite unrest. Moreover, in addition to acts of overt sedition and violence, the *castrista* Communists are engaged in a constant campaign to discredit the United States, the Alliance for Progress, and the regimes that are committed to work toward the fulfillment of its goals.

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It must not be forgotten that Fidel Castro came down from the Sierra Maestra in January, 1959, and immediately set about implementing a program of drastic reforms which bore labels very similar to those carried by aspects of the Alliance for Progress: land and tax reform, urban renewal, agricultural diversification, elimination of illiteracy. The differences between Castro's program and our own, which go ultimately to the fundamental question of man's freedom, are all too often lost on the Latin American peasant, the frenetic and intellectually undisciplined Latin American student, the harried white-collared worker, the man in the mill or mine.

Moreover, because at an inter-American meeting in May, 1959, Fidel Castro had suggested that the United States launch a ten-year, thirty-billion-dollar development fund for Latin America (a suggestion which, at the time, was dismissed without consideration), the subsequent Alliance for Progress proposal, involving the only somewhat smaller sum of twenty billion dollars, was promptly, and maliciously, branded the "Castro Plan."

It is in all ways unfortunate that the strongly positive and humanitarian thrust of the Alliance for Progress goes unrecognized by great numbers of Latin Americans, it being overshadowed by the powerfully negative anti-Cuban thrust of Washington policy. The course of greatest wisdom, it would seem, is to fight *castrismo* Communism in the hemisphere as energetically and efficiently as possible, but to do so with an absolute minimum of noise.

The picture of the Alliance given here is a patchy and incomplete one. Two matters that much deserve extended discussion are the projected role for the private sector (of two billion dollars a year that are to be funneled into Latin America during the coming years, three hundred million are anticipated from private investors) and the possible effects upon the Alliance of events and trends, political and economic, in the United States, Europe, and other parts of the world. It is evident, for example, that if Latin America's export markets shrink or if world commodity prices collapse, prospects for success of the Alliance are correspondingly dimmed.

Nor have we explored, even superficially, the vast differences that separate the nineteen participating states one from another: differences in respect of size, natural resources, ethnic composition, the extent of economic development, the degree of political stability, and the position vis-à-vis the United States and the wider world.

We have largely ignored the multiplicity of groups in the socie-

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ties of Latin America, societies that are much less homogeneous than our own in whatever concerns living standards, values, and aspirations. The Alliance is a program designed to run for ten years; at the end of that term it is a certainty that in many countries of the region the groups that now dominate their societies and with which our administration deals will have surrendered to other groups. Should we be making greater efforts now to identify and to associate ourselves with the emerging groups? If so, how are we to do it without at the same time alienating the present holders of power? Questions of this kind merit consideration.

Finally, very little has been said here about the immense resistances that dominant interests in Latin America's societies—supported at crucial points by some United States interests—are exerting against attempts to change radically Latin American economic, social, and political patterns. These resistances can be expected to increase as the full implications of the Alliance program come to reveal themselves. Difficult as may be the initial stages of the Alliance, therefore, later stages almost certainly will be still more difficult: accelerated forces of change, not always easily compatible with Alliance procedures and goals, will come up more and more strongly against forces directed toward preserving the status quo.

The omissions we have noted, however, are not owing to oversight, but rather to a concern to emphasize, even at their cost, the extremely precarious bases of cooperation between the United States and Latin America upon which the success of the Alliance is predicated. The effects of the absence of a spirit of mutual trust and respect between the two parts of the hemisphere are grave and may prove to be disastrous. On the one hand, the administration in Washington believes that it knows what is necessary to bring the countries of Latin America effectively and democratically forward; and feeling a justified sense of urgency, it is prepared to aid substantially in the process of their development. The administration must also be aware, however, that because of long decades of relative neglect of Latin America, because of Washington's pursuit of goals in Latin America that are both narrow and short-sighted, it has earned small claim, in the eyes of many Latin Americans, to its self-arrogated role of leader of Latin America's contemporary revolution.

The societies of Latin America, on the other hand, are painfully aware that historically they have been patients and not actors on the world scene; and they are struggling now to assert themselves as self-conscious national entities. Thus, while they recognize the need

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for far-reaching changes in their societies, and the need for massive outside assistance in achieving those changes, they are very reluctant to take direction or even guidance from the United States; for in their view this represents a perpetuation of a master-vassal or teacher-student relationship they fervently wish to supersede.

It is disagreeable to end on a such a pessimistic note, particularly when one is persuaded, as I am, that the Alliance for Progress is superb in conception and vital in our struggle with totalitarianism. Nevertheless, honesty, candor, and an unblinking acceptance of unpleasant facts have their claims too; and we should be aware at other than a superficial level of the obstacles and perils that confront the Alliance program. What is required, if the Alliance is to succeed, is a profound change in attitudes, a profound shifting of wills, in both the United States and Latin America. These are matters not to be accomplished through legislation or pronouncement. They are matters to be accomplished only through a searching re-examination of attitudes and values by everyone in the Americas North and South who is in any way concerned with the Alliance and its prospects. A sense of common purpose, of reciprocal trust and respect, must be infused into the enterprise, or it cannot succeed.

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1. United States Department of State *Bulletin*, 3 April 1961, pp. 471-474.
2. *Ibid.*, 2 April 1962, p. 540.
3. As quoted in *Time*, 10 August 1962, p. 22.
4. Such international agencies are principally, in the case of the Alliance, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. See *Alianza para el Progreso: Documentos Oficiales Emanados de la Reunión Extraordinaria del Consejo Interamericano Economico y Social al Nivel Ministerial*. Washington, Unión Panamericana, 1961.
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RICHARD E. CAVES

The Liberal Revolt against Liberal Trade Policy

AMERICA'S TRADE-AGREEMENTS program was born in the depths of the depressed 1930's. It sprang primarily from the internationalism and political liberalism of such men as Cordell Hull, joined with an economic opportunism which could count the expansion of exports as one more experiment at restoring the health of the economy. The program was promoted on terms designed to be acceptable to an electorate which historically believed in substantial tariff protection. It borrowed the protectionist phrases and sought to turn them to its own uses. This pattern—liberalism speaking the vocabulary of protection—has persisted through nearly three decades of recurring disputes over the renewal of the President's authority to enter into tariff-cutting agreements. No one can understand the heat that these periodic renewals have generated without recognizing the significance of America's historic tradition of protection and the internationalist and isolationist sentiments which the program arouses. No other minor tax draws such attention.

Economists by and large have favored the trade agreements program. They have voiced minor reservations and annoyances with its limitation. Some have charged that the "safeguards" progressively granted to American industry against displacement by increased imports have crippled its effectiveness; but the merits of continuing the program, given the constraints of the American political scene have seldom been questioned.

In recent years, however, a revolt has occurred among economists. Charges have been made that the program in its present form is worthless or even harmful. The striking thing about these charges is that they have come not from scholars believing in protection for its own sake but rather from economists accepting without question the superiority of free trade for countries such as the

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United States. Such a case is William P. Travis' article in the Summer 1962 issue of this journal. Professor Travis feels that the trade-agreements program has brought no broad change in the degree of effective protection given to American industry by our tariff structure, that no competitive imports at all would be better than the present trade pattern distorted by tariffs, but that complete free trade would be better still. These conclusions, he holds, flow directly from the theory of international trade.

Does trade theory indeed tell us that, although free trade is best, the only means the United States has found to move toward it have been worthless? Let us review some of the chief conclusions to be drawn from the modern theory of trade and re-examine the chances of the trade-agreements program and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 for leading to a better organization of our international commercial policy.

Trade Theory and United States World Commerce

Economic theory provides an essential basis for economic policy. At its best, it can predict the consequences of actual and alternative economic policies and thus present the public with a clear-cut ground for choice. These theoretical predictions, however, are no better than the ingredients that go into them. The underlying assumptions about the structure of the economy and the way it reacts must either be known to be correct or must have a consistent record of giving correct answers. The deductions based on these assumptions must follow the rules of logic. No essential assumptions or relations may be omitted, although theories by their nature are abstractions from nonessentials. Professor Travis has performed a service in presenting the implications of modern trade theory for economic policy, but his account is unfortunately not a complete one. The America seen in his theoretical model, like the America in the plays of Bertolt Brecht, resembles an image in a carnival mirror, offering breathtaking insights but also glaring distortions.

Consider some of the factors omitted from Professor Travis' analysis. The industries of his model are all perfectly competitive, containing many firms, all producing with identical costs. There are no positions of monopoly that might be undermined by competition from imports. There are no inefficient domestic firms that might be whipped into shape by rivalry from abroad. There are no slothful firms needing an added competitive spur to innovate. Professor

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Travis' model omits what economists call product differentiation. This term recognizes the fact that consumers may take differing views of the similar products of two firms and make some purchases from each of them, no matter which offers the lower price. With product differentiation present, cost levels alone do not predict which industry will survive and develop in different countries. Consumers may show a willingness to pay more for the distinctive product of one country's firms, although they may suffer a comparative disadvantage in costs per physical unit of output. Product differentiation is pervasive in the world's consumer-goods industries. It may separate the American and British auto markets much more strongly than it affects the competition between Ford and General Motors. Even producer-goods industries show some differentiation between countries in the sense that local producers have the advantage of a closer knowledge of their customers' specifications and preferences, and lower costs of providing maintenance and related ancillary services.

Had his argument not omitted these factors, Professor Travis might have reached very different conclusions about some effects of changing United States tariff rates. He could not say that the gains from tariff reduction must involve the elimination of many industries. Changes in the portion of the domestic market held by home producers, yes, but not necessarily the widespread elimination of industries lacking a comparative advantage, except where cost-cutting and product strategies fail. Also, he could hardly reach his conclusion that, with universal free trade, "probably more than half" of American manufacturing would be eliminated by competition from lower-cost foreign producers. Again, the prediction is correct concerning the direction of change. America should indeed import more manufactures requiring simple skills and small amounts of capital to produce, and pay for them with manufactures and materials requiring skilled labor, capital, and certain material resources. But the weighted average rate of duty on American dutiable imports (admittedly a defective measure) has fallen by three-fourths over the past three decades. Hardly any major category of goods has escaped some significant reduction. Yet the portion of our manufactures imported has hardly reached 3 percent. Professor Travis feels that with the elimination of the remaining United States duties this percentage would rise explosively to something like 50 percent. The lessons of history, inconclusive as they are, and many elements of trade theory combine to suggest that this would not occur.

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Research in recent years has indeed confirmed the fundamental hypothesis of the modern theory of international trade: that a nation's pattern of trade in goods and services is determined by its relative endowment of various factors of production. A mature nation may sell to the rest of the world products requiring relatively large amounts of capital and skilled labor, and buy goods requiring relatively large quantities of natural resources that have been partially exhausted at home. A heavily populated, less developed country may pay with products demanding much unskilled labor for imports requiring for their production large quantities of capital and farm land. These patterns assist economists in explaining a nation's pattern of exports and imports and in predicting how it may develop over time. They also contain implications for economic policy which deserve to be more widely known. As Professor Travis points out, this so-called "theory of factor proportions" does indeed predict that, under certain circumstances, the removal of protective tariffs will reduce absolutely the total incomes of some factors of production.* This possibility was seldom realized by advocates of free trade until recent years. The language of factor proportions, however, has its semantic complications. As long as one can speak of but two factors of production, such as capital and labor, the predictions of the theory can be read with ease. If a region's comparative advantage rests upon relatively abundant supplies of capital, then the elimination of general protective tariffs will in certain cases reduce the real income of labor.

Yet what if we must recognize a distinction between skilled and unskilled labor? What if land is also an important factor of production, and the land which produces avocados is not identical with the land which produces crude petroleum? The theory of factor proportions does not fail us in this case. However, simple theoretical predictions become more difficult to make, and research into the actual conditions of trade grows fraught with difficulties. Professor Travis declares that the percentage gain in national income through shifting to free trade will be less than the percentage change (gain or loss) in the incomes of some factors of production. Again, a valid theoretical statement, when its assumptions are kept in tow, but one which yields few usable conclusions in fact. Any over-all loss in the income of unskilled labor might well be invisible among a welter of

* This prediction is hedged with some complex technical conditions, the most important being that domestic industries *not* be eliminated by competition from imports.

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effects on particular groups and skills within this sector. The very fact that foreign trade constitutes so small a portion of United States economic activity assures that any effects of policy changes on the distribution of income will be swept away by the general ebb and flow of economic change. We may be sure that a prediction is valid and yet be unable to locate the resulting changes.

In conclusion, Professor Travis' application of trade theory yields many worthwhile conclusions, but he stopped too soon. The predictions of an incomplete theory are not necessarily better than predictions made from no theory at all. Simple predictions should have some betting odds attached, or should not be shorn of their qualifications. Reliable predictions about the direction of changes should not be interspersed with wild guesses about their magnitude. Judgments should not be made on the basis of gains or losses in "pure" economic efficiency or gains from trade without attention to other sources of gains and losses as well.* Probably the changes in national income that countries can experience through changes in commercial policy are relatively small. Travis mentions some studies that reach this conclusion; many others likewise suggest that gains in the sense Travis describes are relatively minor. Indeed, the gains from most sorts of policy changes that seek to raise the efficiency with which scarce resources are allocated generally appear small in relation to those that may come from increasing a nation's supply of factors of production or from securing greater success at keeping labor fully employed. On the other hand, there is little evidence to suggest that measures to improve efficiency are not worth the effort, especially when other types of associated gains and the available methods for preventing unfair incidental harm to certain groups are taken into account.

Trade Policy in Practice

Against this background, an appraisal of the past experience of the United States trade-agreements program and of its prospects under current legislation becomes possible. Tariffs have indeed come down, the over-all reduction mentioned above being due in about

* Professor Tibor Scitovsky predicted in his *Economic Theory and Western European Integration* (Stanford, 1958) that the greatest gains to come from the European common market would be those related to the breaking down of monopoly positions and the stimulation of greater efficiency within European business firms. The facts seem to bear out this prediction to a striking degree.

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equal parts to reductions in rates of duty and to the increased general price level reducing the impact of rates fixed in terms of dollars and cents. So-called safeguards to American industry have been built into the legislation, but, as any protectionist will proclaim, they have not crippled further tariff reductions. The Tariff Commission has not been particularly generous in granting relief under the escape clause, and several Presidents have been even less generous. The peril-point provision, which seeks to forestall the reduction of effectively protective tariffs, has proved a restraint at times. However, recent tariff reductions below peril-point levels have not brought an unusual outcry. The slowing down in the rate of tariff reductions in recent years has been due not so much to protectionist features in our own legislation as to our inability to get substantial tariff concessions from foreign countries.

Indeed, the operation of the trade-agreements program is shot through with perversities that match the strange mercantilist language of its proponents. We insist that we will reduce our own tariffs (and raise our real income) only if other countries do likewise. At the bargaining table we measure the concessions we get and give in a perverse way, so that the larger the concession gained, the smaller the probable increase in economic efficiency. We speak as if our benefits from trade lie in the disposal of our goods through export, rather than in the gaining of goods produced elsewhere through import.

Nonetheless, this bargaining process has strong virtues. The free-trade argument suggests that in general the welfare of the world would benefit from the reduction of *all* tariffs. The trade-agreements program not only lowers United States duties but also induces other countries to lower theirs as well. In addition, the simultaneous lowering of tariffs by multiple countries tends to minimize the disturbances to the balance of payments from this source. Out of the confusion of the tariff bargaining process, reasonable and desirable results can emerge, even though the rhetorical noises along the way may grate on our sensitive ears.

The tariff bargaining process, however, has not only presented an uncouth appearance; it has also achieved some tariff reductions which may not on balance have been desirable. Professor Travis rightly declares that lowering a tariff on one kind of goods, leaving all others unchanged, may actually reduce a nation's gain from trade; there is no presumption that this will happen, but the possibility exists. The trend in tariff negotiations over the past decade

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has definitely been toward reductions on narrow classes and away from the broader liberalizations of the 1930's and the late 1940's, thus increasing the chances of an undesired result. Indeed, this fact appears to have played a major role in shaping the determination of the Kennedy administration to seek something new in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. This bill and the statements of those promoting it do not break with the traditions of the trade-agreements program. There are many people who would oppose unilateral tariff cuts by the United States but who would support mutual agreements reached with other countries. This fact of political life surely conditioned the administration's decision not to abandon the bargaining approach, even though Washington planners certainly recognized the weaknesses of its economic logic. The conventional bargaining authority *can* be used across the board to lower duties on a wide range of products. The proposal for trade-adjustment assistance no doubt seeks to pave the way for the use of this authority to secure broader reductions. The bargain reached at Geneva early this year portended a move back toward the less selective reductions of earlier years.

The special authority proposed in the 1962 bill for dealing with the European Economic Community thrusts in the same direction. This is an across-the-board authority, which, if used, would eliminate duties on a wide range of manufactured goods, probably conveying significant gains in the erosion of monopoly positions, both here and in the community, and the creation of pressures counter to the inflationary interaction in wages and prices. It is true, however, that the "dominant supplier" concept in the bill is designed to pick commodities on which the elimination of duties would confer the smallest gains from trade in the conventional sense. It is unfortunate that the political oracles could not see any chance for the passage of a bill involving any bolder approach than this. Yet the chances are slim that a bid to roll back those United States tariffs precluding the greatest gains from trade might have survived Congressional scrutiny. As a pure speculation, future years and favorable trends might make possible periodic renewals of this special authority, with the cut-off percentage of the dominant-supplier rule (now 80 per cent) progressively reduced. The bill thus might serve as a faltering first step in the direction in which Professor Travis believes we should go.

In the meantime, vital problems and needs do face a danger of being overlooked. By postponing bold action to raise the skills of

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our labor force and the proportion of our low-skilled manufactures imported from abroad, we not only deny gains to our own nation but also forgo a powerful stimulus to economic development in foreign lands. Yet the difficulties are very great, and our steps of necessity must be slow. There is a grain of truth in the protectionists' fear of low-wage imports—not because foreign countries can produce *everything* more cheaply because of their low wages, but rather because the extremely elastic labor supplies of developing countries sometimes permit them to move rapidly into the production of certain simple manufactures and to sweep a large share of the world market. This process produces large gains in their own national incomes and, once readjustments have been made, the income of the world at large. However, the attendant readjustments will be large and painful within the older private-enterprise economies. United States policy currently supports international agreements, based on the model of last year's textile agreement, as a means of giving the developing countries an orderly access to world markets. A free-trader may have legitimate doubts about such agreements: does orderly access differ from orderly restriction? Perhaps national policy can reach a coordinated approach to policies on trade and foreign aid, one which will promote the desirable results of a free-trade world along with tariff reductions for the United States that will have minimal chances of undesirable side effects. Until that time comes, perhaps the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 affords us the best practicable means of maintaining the momentum of our program for liberalizing trade and bringing closer the goal of the most ardent free-traders.

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